在数据驱动的经济环境中,明智监管潜力无限。所以接下来,我们有必要继续探究其潜在的执法挑战。首先,反垄断执法机构也许意识不到阻碍竞争机制发挥作用的种种威胁。即便执法者可以正视问题,但是他们仍缺乏有效的对策。其次,在面对人类对计算机行为所负责任的法律与伦理难题时,上述议题已经超越了反垄断工作的范畴。最后,就算执法机构有办法应对,它们又该在何时出手干预?
这些问题看似无解。第3章中曾出现过一段讨论,传统的反垄断监管是否适用于由算法经济拉动的新兴市场环境。面对这个问题,一代代的反垄断学者与执法者都曾试图给出解答。但正如我们所见,现如今的反垄断执法工具尚不具备控诉与纠正前述三大反竞争场景的能力。市场环境风云变幻——自由市场的竞争机制正在让位于新形式下的竞争。
事实上,多年前的司法体系与反垄断执法机构更善于发现市场漏洞,并设计出了直接有效的方式来化解问题。倘若如今我们丧失了这种能力,就连英国上议院也担忧这将形成“一种观念——大型互联网平台的权势凌驾于法律之上”。 1 如果英国上议院都就此发声,那么世上就再也没有哪家反垄断机构有理由为自己的迟钝而依旧心安理得了。
竞争执法的核心挑战
蒙住了双眼的反垄断执法机构
本书开篇已经提到,数字化经济正在蒸蒸日上。但表象的市场竞争并不等同于能够带来社会福利优化的实质性竞争。我们的担忧既不在于技术进步,也无关收获巨大成功的互联网电商。让我们看穿新兴市场表象,直抵它的内核——市场的准入门槛或被拉低,但企业的扩张行为却由超级平台操控;消费者的选择万千,但鲜见商家的正面交锋;具有破坏力的创新威胁不时涌现,但却不免在大企业的怀柔政策与排他性条款的两面夹击中阵亡。市场充分竞争的外衣掩盖了新经济时代下的财富转移与企业的反竞争行径,消费者也在不知不觉中被其操纵。
对反垄断执法机构而言,面对企业的“逐底竞争”(Race to The Bottom)倾向,它们要制止这种恶劣行为,维护消费者的权益。虽然科技进步提升了价格透明度,但定价算法却可以借此东风促成默许共谋——通过对竞争对手的价格调整迅速做出回应,定价算法可以打击竞争对手降价促销的动机。倘若算法与数据的结合令企业拥有了“上帝视角”,执法者也有必要创新思路,拓展追踪默许共谋的疆域。
虽然科技进步能够帮助卖家推出定制化产品(对于消费者来说,这算是件好事),但与此同时,定价算法还能辅助卖家更好地进行客户分组、展开行为歧视——当然,是以牺牲消费者的利益为代价。如今,一些执法者将价格歧视行为视作一种提升市场效率的手段。此外,另有一些执法者则嘲笑起了过去30年的经济思想进步。他们仍然相信市场参与者的理性人假说,并选择性地忽视了薄弱意志与认知偏见在经济活动中的作用。所以,他们对行为歧视的陌生程度就好像他们也不会使用Snapchat(一款“阅后即焚”照片分享应用程序,这款App很受美国青年人的欢迎),这种看法也直接影响了反垄断与反不正当竞争的政策导向。
超级平台也许会在争取软件开发人员时发生竞争。在见识了App商城井喷式的免费应用增长后,执法者可能会得出结论:消费者正在从中获益(管他什么个人隐私保护)。他们既无从知晓,也不愿去探究免费背后的成本——互联网“友敌”联合围剿、攫取用户的行为数据、打造用户数据库,并通过行为定向广告向我们发起精准营销。
事实上,这些反竞争后果往往不易被人察觉。作家迈克尔·刘易斯在《高频交易员》一书中讲述的故事就真实发生在股票交易所中。 2 当传统的投资者(养老基金、私人投资者诸如此类)还在根据他们所见的市场价格做出投资决策时,呈现在计算机屏幕前的股价却早已不是当前时点的股票真实价格。在现实中,各大交易所已被老练的高频交易员操纵,他们并非单枪匹马,而是与诸多大型金融机构展开了积极合作。在这个过程中,高频交易公司之间展开了激烈的军备竞赛,他们关心的问题是,如何在最短的距离里铺设通信电缆,从而在以早于竞争对手几毫秒的时间优势下下达交易指令。打起了时间差的高频交易者在股票市场中玩起了快进快出,如此一来,他们就能每天获得1,600万美元的惊人回报。
这里可能适合插播阿尔伯特·爱因斯坦(Albert Einstein)的那句格言,“真实是一种幻觉,尽管是一种挥之不去的幻觉。”算法经济中的科技进步将创建多个版本的商品与服务市场,区分标准则在于消费者的偏好与经济基础。慢车道与快车道上的企业正在竞赛,而同处在快车道上的企业也互不示弱。这究竟是市场竞争还是反竞争行为,的确是个问题。
正视问题却束手无策
好在,反垄断执法机构已对反竞争场景中的部分问题给出了明确论断。虽然想将竞争法应用于全部的共谋、行为歧视和竞合场景,但现实操作却存在诸多阻碍。在面对三类反竞争场景时,执法者虽有此意愿与决心,但是他们手中的工具也不是万能灵药。
在面对共谋场景时,执法机构往往严阵以待。针对存在垄断协议的信使场景与中心辐射式场景,欧盟有《欧洲联盟运作条约》(Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,TFEU)第101条款、美国有《谢尔曼法》第1条款为其法律支撑。更进一步,如果执法者掌握了企业存在反竞争意图的确凿证据,那么预测型代理人场景中的商家也难逃法律制裁。然而,除非另立一条法令(好比《联邦贸易委员会法》第5条条款,内容要求“在缺乏共谋协议证据的情况下,将直接损害消费者利益的‘不正当行为’视作非法”),否则执法机构的现有工具尚不足以对那些不占有市场支配地位、自行使用定价算法的企业构成威慑。对于部分司法管辖区的执法机构而言,它们在电子眼场景下的默许共谋前仍会束手无策,因为对方既不存在反竞争协议也无反竞争意图的确凿证据。 3
至于行为歧视场景,竞争执法中也不乏挑战。首先,执法机构需要充分理解新型市场动态的特性,从而客观认识近乎完美行为歧视的大势所趋。其次,执法机构衡量社会福利的标尺需要聚焦于消费者与卖家之间的财富转移,并且着重分析消费者剩余减少的问题。再次,非排他性的企业行为歧视对现有执法工具免疫。仅有一种情况例外,即企业通过这个途径获取了市场垄断地位。但按理说,企业开展行为歧视的能力已经彰显了它的市场力量。对于企业向消费者强加的垄断价格,欧洲的反垄断机构执法者拥有更强的执法抓手。 4 最后,基于友敌场景的特殊情况,执法者需要对消费者蒙受的损害做出额外考量。首要的关注点在于应用程序开发者在超级平台生态系统内的共谋,执法者应如何用反垄断的语言定义这种行为?事实上,在企业攫取用户数据的具体情形中,消费者权益保护法与数据保护法往往能比反垄断法与反不正当竞争法更好地保障用户权益。此外,我们还不能忘了超级平台滥用市场支配地位的种种行径。当超级平台采用不公正的手段将用户引向自己的产品与服务并对其他产品与服务商的市场拓展造成抑制时,反垄断执法机构有必要出手干预。美利坚合众国诉微软案 5 与欧盟近年来对谷歌发起的诉讼都事关于此。
武器在手却处处掣肘
即便反垄断执法机构选择挥起手中大棒,但在新型市场动态面前,它们还是面临诸多现实难题。
举例来讲,在数据驱动的市场环境中指认市场支配力量就不是一件容易的事。互联网企业能够不顾用户感受也不屑竞争对手的反击而兀自行事吗?目前,实证研究中尚未发现这样的情形。判断企业是否拥有市场支配地位的首要步骤是划定市场范畴并且理解市场动态。如同竞合场景中呈现的那样,数据驱动下的市场环境十分复杂。反垄断执法机构需要对种种市场条件(企业之间的相互依存、议价能力的悬殊、网络效应的强大、外部选择的有限性、高昂的用户转换成本等诸如此类)进行充分考证后,再对企业是否占据市场支配地位做出定夺。
虽然企业的市场支配地位已经得到政府承认,但垄断并不等同于违法(除非是某些通过并购行为实现的市场垄断)。总之,一旦企业通过合法途径获取了市场垄断资格,执法机构有必要对其滥用市场支配地位的可能行为进行密切关注,并在必要的时候采取行政干预。 6
另一项具有挑战性的工作是提出可信的反事实假设。在传统的共谋场景中,紧随卡特尔成员峰会之后的价格抬升可以让执法者抓住前者苟合的蛛丝马迹。但在新形式下的默许共谋中,价格会随着市场透明度与企业相互依存度的加强而逐渐上涨。在这个过程中,没有一场决定性的会议可供执法者拿出铁证。不仅如此,在评估商家的行为歧视时,执法者同样难以提供令人信服的反事实假设,以此来论证已经发生的反竞争行为的错误。在差别化、动态定价的商业社会,具有可比性的市场公允价格何在?在市场动态与科技进步还没有迎来下一场革命性的变革之前,执法者很难找到一个恰当的时机与公允的标尺出手干预。毕竟,今天的价格递增也许会成为明日广泛接纳的市场标准。
还有,由人与机器的关系萌生的法律与观念难题——人类对于机器的控制(或者放松控制)以及人类需要对算法活动承担的责任。 7 如果算法之间存在共谋或者价格歧视,那么人类是否应当承担相应的法律责任?多位计算机专家曾指出,“算法虽然没有是非观,但并不能就此忽视它对社会造成的影响”。 8 又或者,某位法官也曾给出过恰当的评述,“自动化作业是通过人类的设计来实现的”。 9 市场中注定会存在企业追求利润最大化、保障消费者权益以及买卖中的道德规范之间的冲突。然而,当前的竞争法也许既无法有效化解这种冲突,也无法激励人类对于具备自学习能力算法的行为承担责任。
时机与分寸
围绕着干预的时机、本质与范围,市场参与者与执法者也时有争论。在市场中仍活跃着诸多竞争特性时,行政干预似乎是在捣乱。那么,市场动态何时才需要外力的及时矫正?
在高新技术领域,企业市场支配地位的持续性长短令人捉摸不透,由此执法者也难以确定采取行动的适当时机。被动等待企业进入或扩张?何时得以断定企业已拥有稳固的市场力量?执法者又该采取什么监管措施?这些问题都有待慎重回答。经验表明,平衡反竞争行为危害与科技进步带来的社会福利改善之间的关系实非易事。更重要的是,一些市场效率的改进只能通过超级平台来实现。
在缺少有效解决方案的情况下,司法工作者与行政执法者往往不会主动对反竞争行为做出干预或以反垄断的名义对商业企业提起诉讼。美国最高法院曾表态,“任何法院都不应被强加责任来解决它无法解释或者难以实施充分且合理监督的问题。当强制性的介入要求法院承担日常性的监管工作时,这类问题则不属于反垄断法规制的范畴”。 10
不同的监管思路会引导执法者采取不同强度的行政干预。虽然都有一定的经济学理论支撑,但各国施行的竞争法条在社会变迁、政党轮替、市场环境变化中也演化出了自己的特色与倾向。 11 执法者对市场自矫正机制的看法不尽相同,他们在干预与放手之间的利弊权衡也有自己的一套思路。
即便是在同一个司法管辖区内,政府官员、市场监管者与法院也可能对行政干预的手段、执法依据、行动时间表与策略各有一套方案。
回想2009年,奥巴马政府废止了前任政府发布的关于弱化《谢尔曼法》第2条款的报告,正式宣布要向垄断势力宣战。 12 事实上,布什政府的这份报告早已被看作是对国内垄断势力的俯首帖耳,由此还遭到了多位美国联邦贸易委员会委员的反对。 13 作为奥巴马任内的司法部反垄断局局长克里斯汀·瓦尼(Christine A. Varney)表示,“撤销这份报告的举动相当于对外宣告,反垄断局会在垄断企业开展限制竞争行为或损害消费者权益时采取更为强势的监管”。 14 尽管她的言辞犀利,但自1999年以来,美国司法部只对一起垄断企业涉嫌从事反竞争单边行为的事件发起过公共执行,而这起诉讼的被告是位于得克萨斯州北部城市威奇托福尔斯的一家私立医院。 15 不论是美国联邦贸易委员会还是司法部都不曾对多起互联网行业并购案提出过质疑 16 或是对任何一家超级平台的反竞争行为提起过指控,包括苹果。 17
所以,留给我们的政策空间还有多少?行政干预的反对者称反托拉斯法并不适用于今天的数据驱动市场,而现有的执法工具也无法为执法机构的出手干预提供依据。然而,当我们反思这些执法思路时,我们不该用现有执法工具的多寡与效力来定义伤害与市场失灵。相反,一旦发生这些问题,执法者应积极调用并创造出相应的对策来化解问题。虽然有句话讲的是“此前的判例不鼓励行政干预”,但这类言论并未充分挖掘执法工具箱的潜力并客观认识竞争与市场环境的动态变化。行政干预不应被一刀切地视为与新型市场动态无关。但在肯定了行政干预有效性的同时,我们也要承认它的局限性。虽然它被证明能够矫正一些市场失灵现象,但它却不是一切问题的万灵药。有一点要铭记在心,行政干预只是我们的选择之一。
从做中学
传统的竞争法可以应对市场中出现的部分反竞争现象。在2016年的一场演讲中,欧盟竞争专员玛格丽特·维斯塔格谈到了大数据技术与竞争执法干预的问题:
针对大数据在经济活动中的应用,我们不需要搞出一整套全新的市场竞争规则……但是,我们有必要对大数据市场给予额外的关注,并在必要的时候采取行政干预。有形的手无法靠自己的力量化解所有问题。但是它们可以为市场开放度与数字化市场有序运作贡献自己的力量,从而确保消费者可以在恰当的价格水平上体验到创新的产品与服务。同时,对于数字化世界中的创业者而言,无论生意规模大小,他们都有可能获得成功。 18
对此,我们表示认同。竞争法不应被淘汰,世上许多司法管辖区正从广泛的市场与行业调查制度中获益。灵活的执法工具可以让执法机构更为顺畅地开展调查,同时收集到充分的市场信息以更好地理解市场动态。但与传统的反垄断调查不同,如今的调查重点不在于一家或几家公司是否违反了法律,而在于市场的运作本身是否存在市场失灵的现象。
从实证研究来看,这类工具的确可以帮助执法机构更好地理解数据驱动市场环境下的市场动态。在一些司法管辖区,比如英国,有关市场与行业调查的法律条文为市场失灵问题提供了广泛的市场行为与结构上的解决方案。所以说,即使我们还没有找出化解市场失灵与反竞争行为的终极方法,但执法机构的行动仍能够减弱前述三大反竞争场景的潜在风险。 19 此外,监督性调查工作还可以令执法机构获取充分的市场信息,进而为新型执法工具的酝酿提供宝贵的思路框架。
构筑健康的虚拟竞争框架
竞争是一种规范。我们视作竞争机制的东西既是法律约束与经济激励的体现,又是非正式的社会与道德教化的产物。正式的规范(如法律法规)与非正式的惯例(如行为守则 20 )塑造了市场参与者的动机与市场格局。经济学家道格拉斯·诺斯(Douglass North)指出,“政府在经济活动中不是一个公正的第三方”。 21 比如,如果政府针对市场垄断行为采取无为而治,又假设很多市场都易于陷入市场垄断状态,那么市场参与者将求仁得仁。相比在面对市场动态时被动采取事后干预(等待垄断厂家的崛起,再对它们施加行政调控或者指控),政府更倾向于采取事前预防性干预举措(如勒紧并购法或者通过降低行业准入标准鼓励市场竞争)。
为了虚拟竞争的蓬勃发展,我们应当把焦点放在如何培育起鼓励市场竞争的先决条件,同时兼顾起消费者权益保护与隐私保护。这类做法的潜力巨大。通过改变正式和非正式的市场规范,政府会对竞争市场的固有特性产生影响,进而促使企业在追逐自己的经营动机时也顾及消费者的权益。换句话说,小心翼翼地播下“改变”的种子要比费心费力、不加分辨地清除杂草更可取。
针对三大反竞争场景,我们提出了几种超越竞争法的应对工具。当然,这个清单并不是排他性的。毫无疑问,研究者与执法者还会提出更多有创造性的方案。下面的工具只是广阔探索空间中的小尝试。
从设计入手保护隐私与消费者赋权
为了给行为歧视和竞合场景中的反竞争行为设置障碍,设置用户隐私保护措施是一项必要条件。一个颇有前景的立法方案是向用户赋予更大的个人信息数据控制权限,从而免于线上与线下的数据追踪。
在设备上显示隐私权限列表并征求用户许可的方式已经被证明是一条蹩脚的途径。 22 很多时候,作为用户,我们习惯性地在还没有阅读各项条款的情况下就点击同意。一项研究表明,0.2%的受访者表示自己会阅读电子设备上显示的用户隐私条款,但是这种阅读过程不过是形式大于内容。 23 鉴于我们如此热衷于点击“同意”和“接受”,问题的解决方案不在于在用户隐私条款中增添更多我们看都不会看的信息(和法律术语)。因为超载的信息可能会产生反作用力——进一步削弱用户阅读这些公告的兴趣。其实,即便披露的内容得到了简化,用户也缺乏重新谈判的空间。对于那种一次性显示的隐私权限列表,用户只能选择同意,否则就不能使用这款App。对此,监管者与商家应充分考虑到用户与商家之间的议价空间不对等问题与由此产生的用户参与感降低的可能。 24
所以,留给我们的还有什么选择?首先,企业应就数据获取与应用向用户做出充分说明与解释,例如,(1)使用弹出窗口告知用户数据获取与追踪的事实;(2)清楚地告知用户,商家针对某一产品和服务所标识的价格是个性化定价,而非市场统一价格;(3)充分披露“最优价格”字眼的定义,以免用户忽略了其他外部选择;(4)解释“不可用/无可用选项”——如在预订酒店时,如果遇到这种情况,商家应向用户做出说明,所谓的“无空房”是仅针对该网站的可预订客房数量而言,还是指酒店客房的实际预订情况。
其次,我们应当要求电子设备上的默认隐私设置选项符合人们通常的隐私偏好。在美国,我们可以将《儿童网络隐私保护法》的内容推而广之,应用到每一个网民身上。 25 在法律的约束框架下,隐私保护将成为应用程序与网站的默认设置。对于商家的数据追踪行为,我们可以选择主动放行,而不是手工操作禁止。为了征求我们的同意,企业需要获得由用户手写的同意书。回顾欧盟诉微软这起反垄断诉讼,其最后的结果是微软未在欧洲市场销售的Windows7系统中捆绑IE浏览器 26 。效仿此举,用户在买回智能手机和计算机之后,将会被要求设置一个总括性的隐私选项。除了基础性功能(如使用Cookies记录登录密码以及购物车商品)以外,用户可以拒绝其他一切个人信息获取与追踪的请求。由此,企业无法再将我们的“同意”视作是对它所开展的全部数据收集、追踪、处理与交易的批准。即使用户授权同意企业可以使用我们的数据,在“数据最小化”原则的指引下,企业也无权收集超出产品运作所必需的数据以外的其他个人信息。同时,用户还可以随时查看企业收集的有关他本人的数据并且有权删除这些信息。
在欧洲,执法者已经实践了这些设想。一般意义上的隐私权,尤其是用户个人隐私,被视为公民的基本权利。这其中,发挥重要作用的是欧盟《一般数据保护法案》(General Data Protection Regulation)。这一法案商讨并修订了4年,最终于2016年经欧洲议会投票通过,它以欧盟法规的形式确定了对个人数据的保护原则和监管方式。 27 隐私保护监督者将被赋予更大权力,包括开具金额更高的行政罚款。 28 按照该法案的规定,企业“不能在未经用户本人许可的情况下,泄露它们收集到的信息。至于消费者,他们需要对企业使用用户数据的行为给予明示许可”。 29 借此,消费者被赋予了更大的个人信息管理权。 30
随着用户对个人信息数据拥有了更大的掌控力,我们可以选择第三方代理代表我们进行谈判。从事机器学习研究工作的华盛顿大学教授佩德罗·多明戈斯(Pedro Domingos)提出了一个设想,由一个数字化的第二自我代替我们与企图获取我们的个人信息数据的商家展开交涉。 31
想来,这种事前预防性的隐私保护政策可以培育起相关创新服务,同时限制卖家开展行为歧视的能力与动机。 32
迎接抱有不同动机的市场新人
政府可以通过吸引更多参与者进入某个行当,从而扰乱市场中现有的默许共谋与行为歧视。一个有效的方法是为编写反制措施的算法开发商发放补贴,从而重塑市场竞争机制。另一条路径则是鼓励消费者共有合作社(Consumer-owned Cooperatives)的组建,将合作社取得的超额收益以消费者折扣的方式进行再分配,进而促使市场价格回归完全竞争价格。社会采购网站CrowdZap就在取得规模效应后有效降低了消费者的采购成本。 33 同样,Living Social、Wowcher、高朋等网站也以团购的方式赢得了众多消费者的青睐, 34 它们在汇聚到一定数量的消费者订单后,向这些消费者提供额外折扣。 35
与之相似的一种手段是扶植卖家中的“价格叛徒”。这类异见者往往会率先采取降价措施(或是抵制竞争对手的抬价企图),又或者率先扩大产能。为了能够迅速实现扩张,异见者在编写定价算法时,往往会将市场份额扩大的目标置于利润最大化目标之上。如果消费者都涌向了降价的商家,其他竞争者也有可能纷纷效仿。一旦价格背叛的行动取得成功,卖家之间将全面开战。
但不得不承认,“价格叛徒”的出现也可能会制造麻烦,而它所能发挥的作用也很有限。在薄弱的公司治理框架下,消费者共有合作社的利润可能会因内部薪资、福利分配、生产扩张等因素而被削弱。尽管这类企业克服了种种准入障碍最终得以创建,但现有的市场玩家也可能采取反击措施,打击前者的市场份额扩张企图。在多业务经营、市场广阔的行业里,计算机可以学会跨市场的价格反击(比如在“价格叛徒”的大本营发起一轮打折销售),而一旦异见者的定价算法做出了回应,由此造成的亏损可不是一个新入行的商家可以承受的。
通过这种方式,现有市场玩家沉重打击了“价格叛徒”的降价动机,进而促进了企业之间的协作行动。借由技术进步,企业可以复制优步的“上帝视角”,清楚地掌握客户的地理位置信息以及他们的日常活动。利用实时地理位置数据,企业将知晓它们的忠实客户是否走进了竞争对手的店铺或者光顾了后者的网站。利用“上帝视角”,企业之间可以避免全面开战。取而代之的是,它们可以集中锁定“价格叛徒”手中的客户,将其排挤出市场。
降低价格透明度
人们习惯于把透明的价格视作市场竞争机制发挥作用的表现。如果能够设计出这样一种机制,让企业使用不透明的交流方式与客户交流,从而拉低市场价格,那么精心设计的秘密投标与促销可以动摇默许共谋成员之间的互信。
降低价格透明度的其中一个方法是向客户提供不收集用户数据的专属会员折扣卡(以避免前述的行为歧视场景),经销商也可以展开逆向拍卖(有别于传统的正向拍卖,即一位卖方、多位买方的形式。逆向拍卖指的是一种存在一位买方和许多潜在卖方的拍卖形式,潜在卖方持续喊出更低价格,直到不再有卖方喊出更低价为止),并以低于市场价格的水平出售商品,这类价格策略常见于汽车销售、法律服务等行业。 36 与之相似,一些网站在销售家用电器等商品时也允许买家向多个卖家私下询价。
除了上述方法以外,政府还试图降低商家调整价格的频率。这种做法已在奥地利和澳大利亚联邦西澳大利亚州的能源业有所实践,当地政府要求企业不能在同一天内为了打击竞争对手的价格调整而相应调价。这类要求意在降低企业调价的次数,打开共谋价格的口子,鼓励共谋成员成为价格背叛者。面对竞争对手的率先降价,虽然定价算法监测到了对方的价格调整,但是受制于法规的约束,企业也无法立即调整自己的产品价格。在这种情况下,身为共谋价格背叛者的企业将因为低价策略而吸引到更多客户,从而赚取额外回报。
当然,这种方法也有自己的弊端:竞争对手很快就会向政府抱怨,表示这一举措是在阻止自己开展降价促销。对此,比较好的解决方案是,政府允许即时的价格下调,同时为价格上浮设置一个时滞。但是聪明的定价算法同样可以在这个价格体系中展开博弈。举例来看,占有市场支配地位的卖家可以在价格背叛者降价后紧随其后进行调价以惩戒后者。由于价格背叛者在这个时候无法立刻涨价,所以为了网罗现有客户,它只能继续跟进降价。考虑到这种可能,价格背叛者手中的定价算法会在首次降价时计算出其他竞争对手采取报复式降价的可能以及它将为此消耗的成本(或说损失)和潜在的收益(如果竞争对手立即给予反击,那么它的盈利空间将非常有限)。由此说来,政府的延迟性调价要求不仅没有帮到价格背叛者与消费者,反倒成为共谋者握在手中的惩戒利器。顾忌到可能的同业报复,价格背叛者的降价动机也大为减弱,从而在无意中助长了默许共谋。
针对算法的稽核
在此,让我们探究一下对企业定价算法采取“事前预防性监督”的可能。通过提高市场透明度,这种机制将在识别到行业范围内的信号传递与价格固化时自动发起“公共对策”。算法模型的对外披露将有望改善产品与服务质量的下滑或企业对搜索结果的操纵。但为了保护互联网企业的知识产权,企业将在严格的保密工作安排下向特定的执法机构进行信息披露。
无可否认,对算法展开稽核工作的想法还面临不少现实阻碍。首先,算法在设计的过程中不太可能被赋予明确的“共谋”指令。它的任务是监测市场价格波动,并在追求利润最大化的目标指引下回应市场变化。所以说,在模拟场景中复盘算法的运算机制无法揭示它们的真实作用,这也无法将执法者引向有实操意义的行政干预。
其次,尽管人们可以找到算法辅助共谋的证据,但是执法者却难以采取有效的措施纠正这种行为。比如,让计算机忽视市场公开信息的要求就不可行。或者,如果只限制算法对于具有一定商业价值信息的获取呢?这时稽核工作关注的焦点就放在了“廉价磋商”(Cheap Talk)上面,这是指那些促使企业达成有意识的平行行为同时又对消费者没有太大意义的数据。但我们又该如何界定这类信息的范畴呢?大数据技术的其中一个重要意义就在于数据融合。计算机算法会把通过不同数据源获取到的所有信息整合在一起,进行统一处理与分析,最终得出商家想要找寻的结论。 37 除此以外,部分数据还拥有双重价值——它既可以被用来提高市场效率,同时也可能引发外界的反托拉斯担忧。 38 就算消费者有意识地限制了一些信息的外泄,但是经由数据融合,算法也有可能补充这段知识空白。所以说,由政府明确指定哪类信息不可用于定价算法模型的方法并不可取,甚至还会引发潜在的社会福利下降。
最后,稽核工作的效率也让人堪忧。政府的行动总不免滞后于市场环境的变化,反垄断执法机构也难以跟进企业在算法技术上的精进。
虽然这个主张在21世纪的第二个10年里还不具有可行性,但随着技术的进步与执法者效率的改进,稽核工作终将在执法机构的工具箱中找到自己的一席之地。
本章回顾
由新型市场动态带来的监管挑战可以被分成四类。第一类是市场机制运作与竞争法目标的思路问题。第二类是政治意愿问题,毕竟智力与监管俘获的后果不容小觑。第三类是独创性问题。执法工具的缺位象征了一种监管思路上的误判——在大数据时代,政府竟然无法有效利用数据或者分析工具来妥善评估行政干预的后果。对那些现有执法工具无能为力的反竞争行为,执法机构有必要严阵以待,改进监管手段,创新思路。
最后的挑战在于法律不时的错乱。执法者常将自己视作外科医生,在“摘除”反竞争活动的同时保留有利于促进市场竞争的部分。当然,这是一种理想化的描述。执法活动中的不确定性与成本消耗会令执法者在设计新的执法工具时谨小慎微。在设计方案与具体的执法过程中,执法者应清楚地认识到自己无法准确预测未来以及市场环境的动态。但我们仍要强调的是,作为主治“市场机制发展问题”的外科医生,一个直白的拒绝无疑会令饱受病痛困扰的病人再无治愈信心。所以,执法者绝不能对潜在的新型执法手段说“不”。这种说法可能来自一种错误的认识——大数据时代下的反竞争行为不过是新瓶装旧酒。但事实上,数字化市场中存在的诸多市场失灵问题是我们以往不曾遇见的,而这也的确需要新的执法工具的介入。
最后的话
算法、大数据、超级平台的风起云涌似乎预示了市场竞争机制的加速终结,而我们似乎也对这种市场机制的衰退见怪不怪。但正如我们在本书开篇所言,这也并非意味着新型市场动态的前景惨淡。从机器学习与大数据技术中衍生出的创新活动拥有变革性力量——它有效节省了消费者的搜寻成本,降低了市场准入壁垒,开辟了市场扩张与准入之间的崭新通道,并且最终活跃了市场竞争氛围。
诚然,大数据的潜力无限。这些创新技术本身无关善恶,它所能发挥的作用取决于企业如何应用它们、商业动机是否与消费者权益相契合以及经营行动对市场产生的作用。
所以说,这片崭新的竞争风景也不必然风光无限。在复杂的计算机算法、人工智能和大数据技术的辅助下,共谋、行为歧视与竞合场景将改变市场竞争范式并有可能恶化市场竞争环境。这些新型市场动态需要我们看透竞争市场的本质,客观认识它的缺陷,并利用明智监管予以纠正。由此,我们总结了以下几点认识。
从云端跌入尘埃
竞争假象会暴露在我们面前吗?在竞争市场,20世纪著名的经济学大师、奥地利学派的代表人物路德维希·冯·米塞斯(Ludwig Von Mises)指出,消费者,而不是企业,应有至高权力。通过消费习惯,我们影响了企业对于商品生产数量、档次与品类的决策。 1 米塞斯不仅信奉消费者主权(Consumer Sovereignty),他也曾对私人垄断的弊端流露出怀疑态度——毕竟有意志力的理性消费者往往能照顾好自己。然而当我们回归现实后,生活中的市场环境却不得不令我们怀疑自己手中拥有的自主权与控制力还剩几何。
如果我们当真拥有至高权力,就可以利用手中的产品与服务更好地保护自己的个人隐私。这样一来,我们就不需要为一款广告拦截App而等待数年。我们也不必再“掘地三尺”寻找靠谱的网络安全保护插件。如果我们认定行为歧视是不公正的商业行为,企业又怎会对我们进行客户分组,并运用差别化定价策略对我们开展定向营销?除此以外,企业也不会开展默许共谋并向消费者索取高价。
在竞争市场,为了降低生产成本和激发产品升级与创新,企业之间免不了开展合作。 2 但是,正如竞合场景中分析的那样,合作与竞争有时也具有误导性。新型市场动态将市场从原有的“消费者剩余”竞争变成了“生产者剩余”竞争,而后者指的是企业合力围剿消费者剩余,进而彼此就战利品展开争夺的过程。更重要的是,在“生产者剩余”竞争过程中,竞争市场的固有属性也许仍然有所保留,但我们却无法再从中得到好处。
诚然,超级平台投入重金用于研发工作,并不断优化产品与用户的交互界面与服务质量。这些辛勤投入的确在一些情况下提高了社会整体福利。但是不论我们几时想起这几家超级平台,我们都不会将它们视作优秀作品的创作者。脸书不提供吸引用户的原创内容,这些内容来自用户的上传。同样,在推特、领英和谷歌的社交平台上,事实也是如此。我们自己制作YouTube视频或是上传他人的作品。没有哪一家超级平台曾写出过优秀的文学作品,执导过赢得奖项的电影,出演了舞台剧,在音乐剧里亮过嗓子又或是用调查性的新闻报道点燃过公众讨论。是其他个人或是公司提供了这些富有创造性的内容,而超级平台算法的职责是识别它们,并将它们推向大众,吸引大众驻足围观。
有一点尤其值得关注,不少消费者经常在超级平台上呕心沥血,不收取一分钱报酬地为平台提供各种原创内容。于是,我们创建的内容越多越有趣,其他人就越有可能访问超级平台,平台获取的数据就越多,而我们将越有可能成为行为定向广告的靶子。事实上,超级平台诱使我们醉心于自己收获的点赞个数、粉丝数量、发帖浏览量。为了在超级平台的舞台上取得相对优势,我们在暗中展开竞争。
“当然,”可能有人会说,“毕竟我们分文未掏地得到这些服务。”然而,金钱只是衡量产品价值的其中一种表现形式。如果商家不是在用个人数据(与行为定向广告)收费,也许有些人反倒愿意掏出真金白银。就算如此,这也并不等于我们的个人信息与原创内容投入已经得到了公正的补偿。事实上,我们在超级平台上面的辛勤付出与贡献出的个人信息数据总价值早已超过了平台研发与运维费用。一些科技公司早已给用户数据标上了价码。谷歌召开投资者大会时,这个价格是每个人720美元/年。 3 在脸书与其他互联网站看来,“月活跃用户”是一个关键指标,“用户数量对我们而言何其重要,我们所能展示的广告数量、广告主眼中的广告价值、交易支付的规模费用与资本性支出都与之密切相关。用户数量的趋势变化会直接影响我们的收入与财务指标。” 4 相关报告显示,自2010年5月以来,脸书的每位用户平均收入(Average Revenue Per User,ARPU)取得了稳步增长。 5
相对来说,在2014年第一季度里,谷歌的每位用户平均收入远超脸书6倍有余, 6 而两家公司也的确都从各自的广告平台上赚得盆满钵满。 7
在一个以消费者为导向的竞争市场,我们可以要求互联网平台根据个人数据价值与网络活动贡献提供经济补偿。但是,这类要求在互联网世界中却显得如此无力。事实上,当用户在脸书上点赞了某个产品、广告或者公司时,他们便成了这些事物的免费背书人(Endorsor)。在脸书想要继续向他的朋友、家人展开营销时,他的照片可能会出现在产品广告的最下角。 8
脸书清楚地知道,“用户基础和用户参与度对我们的成功至关重要”。 9 如果脸书的用户不再耗费心血为脸书提供丰富有趣的内容又或者离开了这片收割数据的“草场”,紧随其后的就是内容质量与发帖次数的下滑,脸书的利润也将缩水。脸书曾告诉投资者,“鼓励用户贡献内容对我们来说至关重要”。 10 对于用户的内容创造力,脸书向来非常重视。在2015年第三季度里,有市场分析师发现“34%的脸书用户更新了自己的状态,另有37%的用户分享了照片。相比去年同期的50%和59%,这两个指标都出现了较大程度下滑”。 11 因此,脸书一直在试图将我们架上“数据跑步机”,努力生产数据。比如,自2015年5月以来,为了促进用户的在线交流与分享,脸书根据用户的点赞内容和位置信息,在用户新闻流的显要位置安排弹出与之相关的“热点趋势”。 12 一些人认为,脸书巧妙利用了用户害怕错过好友更新或者一些新闻的心理。 13
图1 脸书每位用户平均收入(美元)
数据来源:http://statista/statistics/251328/facebooks-average-revenueper-user-by-region/
由此看来,脸书存在充分的动机引导我们常驻自己的平台,并且在我们心无戒备的情况下驱使我们为其工作——上传内容、评论他人以及点击页面广告。如果另有一家社交平台对用户发布的内容和在其中花费的时间给予补偿,那么难以想见脸书还会和今天一样受人们欢迎。如果我们知道一个免费手电筒App正在利用我们的个人信息数据牟利,那么我们一定会转而使用另外一款同类App。但是即便市场中客观存在个人隐私保护的需求,那个声称拥有强大力量的无形之手与市场机制也没能满足消费者的需求。
正反馈回路——强者愈强的舞台
所以说,消费者不是必然地拥有至高权力。我们在共谋、行为歧视和竞合场景中发现的市场失灵问题已经有所显现并还会持续加重。如果执法者认定这些弊端只是一时的阵痛,那么他们也不会选择出手干预。然而,我们在三大反竞争场景中指证出的市场力量究竟会稍纵即逝还是久经考验屹立不倒?虽然我们希望是前者,但市场特性却将结果指向了后者。好在这种反竞争均衡也并非刀枪不入,这里需要一个市场闯入者迅速挺进市场,重塑市场竞争秩序,改善社会福利。由于三大反竞争场景各有一片广阔天地,所以对于无依无靠的市场闯入者来说,在实现遏制巨头的市场力量滥用与保障消费者隐私安全的双重目标之路上,他们举步维艰。
原因在于,市场透明度的提高斩断了这两个目标的出路。不完全信息与市场价格不透明虽能促成市场操纵——商家或与消费者达成秘密折扣,如在股票交易市场利用弱势有效市场进行套利。然而,当定价权被转移到算法身上时,随着算法运作效率的提升,市场透明度的改善将带来默许共谋的后果——虽然从表面上看,市场竞争者为消费者提供了更多选择空间,但是市场整体价格却有所抬高,个性化选择也在减少。
更何况,大数据为商家搭建起了“上帝视角”,他们不仅能够监视竞争对手的报价,任何处于萌芽期的竞争筹划也逃不出他们的法眼。像是乐购和克罗格(Kroger)这样的商超,它们的超级计算机能够根据流入数据进行顾客消费行为分析。如果一位常客正驱车前往竞争对手的商铺,掌握了这个动向的乐购即刻就能发起阻击。说来也巧,用户可能会突然收到一则乐购折扣码信息。当然,如果竞争对手仍不甘示弱,那么这将是一场竞争激烈的价格战。无疑,竞争双方都不乐于见到这种局面。对于同质化产品来说,最有可能的结果是共谋场景。对于异质化产品而言,后果则倒向了行为歧视。抑或,有些时候企业也会为消费者提供“免费”的商品或服务,反正这也无碍于它们通过行为定向广告来攫取财富。
另一个可能促成长期市场力量的原因是网络效应。 14 计算机或手机操作系统就是网络效应发挥作用的经典案例:当越来越多的用户选择某家操作系统平台时,“软件开发人员同样也被吸引而来,积极为用户提供与该平台兼容的产品,这又反过来强化了平台的普及”。 15 也正是网络效应帮助谷歌与苹果确立了移动操作系统市场中的霸主地位。据《经济学人》报道,“投资者并不是基于Alphabet(谷歌)、脸书和亚马逊的经营风险而对它们给予了高溢价。他们看重的是这几家巨无霸企业的市场占有率是否持久,以及网络效应与数据库规模是否能够最终让它们站上市场之巅,赢得垄断利润”。 16
正反馈回路与数据驱动的网络效应在互联网平台的壮大过程中发挥了重要作用。 17 在竞合场景与行为歧视场景中,数据是新型货币。一家咨询公司曾指出,“大数据技术将成为企业的新型资产……它将发挥强势品牌效应……代表了竞争机制的关键构成”。 18 收集数据的能力令超级平台和卖家的算法能够更好地对消费者进行客户分组与精准营销,并最终会聚更多利益相关者来到这个生态系统,众人的利益交织在一起,一荣俱荣,一损俱损。成功的数据收集与分析有着显著的滚雪球效应,它能让算法的提供者更好地锁定潜在消费者,同时增强自己对于其他用户的吸引力。 19 光明的前景激励企业“收集更多有关消费者习惯的宝贵数据,进而改善自己的服务。这既为了赢得消费者的青睐,也为了能够招揽更多广告主的入驻”。 20 拥有更多用户、更多用户数据、更先进算法的企业可以更好地开展价格歧视或是在竞合场景中拥有更大的权势。于是,它们争先恐后地想要在大数据与算法的军备竞赛中赶超对方。2015年,白宫在一份有关大数据的报告中指出,“即使是微小的进步也能够为企业的盈利能力带来重大影响。对于那些拥有庞大消费者群体的企业来说,尤其如此”。 21 白宫举的例子是主业为在线影片租赁的网飞公司(Netfiix)。2014年的一项研究表明,网飞公司正在使用行为数据开展个性化定价来提高利润。 22
有了数据驱动的网络效应这道屏障,企业可以运用自己的数据优势与业务场景来训练算法模型,直到超越竞争对手。自此,超级平台拥有了早年垄断企业为之艳羡的大数据工具,令它们得以把握先机,早于竞争对手(甚至政府)对市场趋势与潜在商业威胁做出识别与预判。 23
这种优势市场地位令超级平台不仅在与消费者打交道时占得上风,也令它在与中小企业的竞合中占尽了便宜,后者与我们一样缺少资源、数据和算法来有效抑制超级平台市场力量壮大。在面对无人车的威胁时,即便像通用汽车这样的庞然大物也是十足地戒备,担心自己的饭碗被这些科技企业抢走。 24
在大数据军备竞赛中取胜的赢家将收获多重奖赏:首先,他的自学习算法将进一步精进;其次,数据将创造更大价值(既可以为广告主提供广告平台服务,也可以开展行为歧视);再次,网络平台可以利用这笔丰厚的回报进一步扩展自己的势力范畴,汇聚更多用户、广告主和个人信息数据;最后,当网络平台最终进化为超级平台时,他们摇身成为新型市场规则的造物主——作为数据的拥有者,他们在竞争中得以予取予求。
于是,我们步入了这场大数据军备竞赛,逐利的商家没有开展用户隐私保护的动机。 25 数据优势可以令企业获得显著规模效应,从而让竞争的天平向自己倾斜。事实上,互联网巨头不仅限于在数据收集与分析领域精耕细作,它们还忙于基础设施建设与新兴市场拓展。正如互联网批评家叶夫根尼·莫罗佐夫(Evgeny Morozov)所言,“谷歌与苹果已经意识到,如果它们不控制住产生知识的传感器和通道入口,它们就不能从事整理世界知识的业务”。 26
作为谷歌生态系统的叛徒,Disconnect虽然在潜心为用户提供网络安全保护与反数据追踪工具,但它此举无异于逆流而上。没有哪家超级平台会鼓励这种隐私保护技术。事实上,超级平台将这种隐私保护技术视作对自己商业模式的潜在威胁。面对大势,在夹缝中生存的独立应用程序开发者的创新热情不断被浇灭。尤其当超级平台将他们踢出生态系统时,任何痛下决心要与消费者建立联系的“独立战士”都有必要做好打一场硬仗的准备,其间资金弹药的消耗不言而喻。
技术与财富分配不均
人们总是想当然地认为,尽管消费者会在一些市场中蒙受损失,但在新型市场动态下,整体的社会福利仍会得到提升,消费者剩余(与财富)的增长将被用于其他开销或者储蓄。
但是,部分线上市场仍受到竞争机制支配的事实并不能为其他市场的反竞争策略开脱。评估算法经济模式的收益和损失会让我们更清楚地认识到由此而产生的种种问题。总体而言,假设其他条件保持不变,当我们步入虚拟竞争时代,财富分配不均的现象是会加重、缓解还是维持不变?
当前的财富分配不均早已成为世界难题。2016年1月,在达沃斯世界经济论坛召开前夕,国际发展与援助组织乐施会(Oxfam)发布了一份关于全球财富不平等问题的报告。根据这份报告,62位超级富豪拥有的财富与世界一半人口的财富总和相同。 27 正如一位乐施会的执行董事所说:“世界上有一半的人口——相当于35亿人——拥有的财富却不敌在一辆双层巴士上的商业精英的个人财富总和。” 28
造成这种收入与财富分配不公的原因之一是企业的市场力量。 29 让我们见识一下美国的市场竞争环境。2016年,白宫经济顾问委员会发布了一份报告。 30 报告显示,自20世纪70年代以来,美国国内市场的竞争机制正在逐步减弱。首先,在长达几十年的时间里,诸多经济领域都出现了新公司成立数量减少的情况。其次,部分经济领域的行业集中度正在提升。此外,不断增长的行业利润落入了更少企业的口袋。总体来讲,经济顾问委员会的这份报告指出了一个事实:更多行业正被更少公司主导。这几家实力强大的公司正在从工人、零售商和消费者身上榨取更多利润(和财富)。与此同时,新公司进入市场和工人更换雇主的难度也越来越大。解决这些问题的方案是活跃市场竞争氛围和强势的反垄断执法。 31 经济顾问委员会指出,随着更多经济部门引用数字化技术,政府需要考虑数字化趋势对市场竞争的影响,以及是否存在勒紧监管的必要。 32
因此,在评估“数字化的手”是否正在削弱市场力量和改善消费者剩余时,可用的衡量标准是财富分配不公情况的变化。按照上面的逻辑来看,分配不公的现象理应得到缓解。但这也不能完全得到保证。联合国专家小组在2014年的一份报告中指出,随着大数据技术的重要性越发凸显,未来存在这样一种可能,“一个全新的不平等边界将被撕开个口子,将世界分割为掌握数据的一拨人和不掌握数据的另一拨人”。 33 担忧在于,大数据技术的繁荣和信息不对称的加重将令财富分配不公现象更为严重。 34 正如一位作家所言,“有关个人隐私的数据挖掘技术将给市场带来颠覆性影响,它将大量有关用户兴趣、行为和欲望的知识转移到少数人的手中。” 35
我们已经在三大反竞争场景中见识到了企业榨取利润的手段。在共谋场景中,商家通过抬高售价的方式赚取了超额收益。即便是在中间产品销售过程中发生的共谋行为,最终埋单的人仍是终端消费者。
同样,面对财富分配不公时,行为歧视场景也不免沦丧。可能有人会为价格歧视争辩,称这种做法将令穷困的消费者拥有更多机会(如大学助学金和其他奖学金的授予)。但行为歧视的受害者并不一定是那些愿意支付更多钱的富人。反倒是那些生活环境受限的穷人,他们因为没有更多的外部选择,而成为行为歧视的受害者。办公用品公司史泰博的定价策略就是一个例子,它正在向穷人施行定价歧视。《华尔街日报》发现,史泰博的线上网站通常会为那些住在高档社区的消费者报出更低价格。 36 因为对于经济宽裕的人来讲,他们的外部选择更多(他们的房子附近可能就有史泰博竞争对手的商铺,或者也可以驱车到别家采购),史泰博很有必要讨好他们。
转而,在竞合场景中,财富的攫取可以发生在多个层面。第一个层面,超级平台通过收集用户数据(却未支付相应对价)牟取利益。第二个层面,超级平台从用户手中免费得到了吸引流量的原创内容。第三个层面,超级平台可以通过发布行为定向广告与行为歧视的方式赚得超额利润。第四个层面,超级平台可以从其他网站抓取有价值的内容并将其发布到自己的网站上,从中获取回报。 37
于是,当超级平台将业务触角延伸至虚拟助手、物联网、智能感应设备时,它们的数据优势将演化为一种竞争优势和市场力量。随着财富获取能力的增强,资金将集中流向少数几个超级平台。有趣的是,在2016年初,由于谷歌的盈利能力不断增强,市场竟然引发了盘后交易的一时冲高,谷歌也一度超越苹果成为全球市值最高的公司。 38 由此说来,谷歌和苹果这两家移动互联网超级平台牢牢把控住了“全球最有价值公司”的头两把交椅。
隐私与信任
在很多经济学家看来,财富转移就是一个不称其为问题的问题。富豪的遗孀和子孙都可以成为垄断企业的大股东。当垄断利润无法被返还给穷人和中产阶级时,政府将通过税收和补贴计划的方式对财富进行再分配。经济学家着眼于社会净损失(Deadweight Welfare Loss),也就是那些在交易过程中发生的无谓损失。竞争市场往往能够避免这些损失,但卡特尔行业或垄断行业则难以幸免。
有时,执法者不会将隐私安全问题与他们的反垄断担忧等量齐观。在脸书与WhatsApp的并购交易中,欧盟委员会认为,脸书可能会削弱WhatsApp的隐私承诺,并会收集和使用WhatsApp用户数据。在此,欧盟关注的焦点仍在于与此相关的广告业务,而非用户个人权益:
为了验证这起并购交易是否会壮大脸书线上广告市场的支配地位,欧盟委员会已对潜在的数据集中问题展开了全面分析。同时,因为这起交易而产生的用户隐私担忧不应纳入欧盟竞争法规的规制范畴,转而应将《欧盟数据保护指令》视作法律依据。 39
对于一些执法者而言,他们并不将隐私安全问题视作对消费者福利的影响。 40 也有一些人说,“现如今还没有发现谷歌损害消费者福利的事实”。 41 另一些人称,仅仅对这一问题进行相对有限的成本效益分析实则是“看轻了隐私作为公民基本人格权的地位”。 42
然而,这些看法都失之偏颇。免费的应用程序并不意味着消费者必然从中得到好处。App的用户隐私设置可以被视作一种非价格竞争的参数,它是线上产品质量与用户体验的体现。 43
此外,隐私保护有时还会卷入新古典经济学有关社会净损失的担忧。如第1章所述,虚拟经济将强化社会分配效率。但与此同时,它还可能通过降低信任的方式放大社会净损失。信用是市场经济的基石。 44 商业研究表明,社会公平与信任高度相关。从宏观层面来看,贪婪并非市场经济的先决条件, 45 充斥着贪婪的社会不一定会收获繁荣的经济。相反,如果要比较对市场经济做出的贡献,公平准则比贪欲的作用大得多。法学教授林恩·斯托特(Lynn Stout)指出,有关公平的社会准则与亲社会行为在市场经济中既是普遍现象也是必要存在。 46 违背社会公平准则的行为将降低社会互信并有可能激化矛盾挑起报复。 47 当人们纷纷选择依靠牺牲旁人利益来赚取回报时,你又怎能对这个世界怀有信任?在这个贪婪的世界,交易成本是个天文数字。在行为经济学实验中,人们的确表现出了互信。但是,他们的信任与合作也是有条件的,这取决于旁人实际或表达出的合作意愿。 48
为了让线上市场能够充分发挥优势,人们必须对企业与它们的数据使用行为抱有信赖。但随着科技进步与数据规模的增大,我们开始对企业在背地里玩的那套把戏有所警惕。 49 对于企业的大数据技术应用,不信任的情绪在网民之中蔓延。 50 更不消说,人们对于谷歌涉嫌逃避隐私保护指令的诸多责难, 51 以及尼桑聆风汽车车主遭遇数据追踪事件的曝光。 52 英国反垄断执法机构近期发现,大多数消费者不满于企业对于数据收集行为给出的解释。 53 该机构最后得出结论,“消费者对商家的信任感是很脆弱的。不乏因为消费者对某一新科技或者商家的数据使用行为产生了负面看法而对相关企业丧失了信任的情况。我们担心的是,未来数据收集与应用方式的改变(如通过物联网技术进行数据被动捕捉)将成为消费者是否愿意继续提供数据的信任试金石”。 54
一旦各行各业的定价趋近于完美行为歧视,消费者对于服务提供商、网络平台、移动设备、可穿戴设备的不信任感将越发强烈。消费者也许会拒绝使用这些高新科技——如搜索引擎、移动科技、智能电子感应器、智能手表等,从而主动化解个人隐私安全的危机。如果他们对卖家与市场公平准则心存疑问,他们可能会放弃很多他们原本打算进行的消费。因此,随着收集到的个人数据的规模、维度和复杂性的提升,隐私安全问题将可能变得更加紧迫。 55 随着社会不信任感的递增,无谓的社会福利损失也会增加。
财富、权力与政治
除了社会净损失,掌握着数据、算法和整个生态系统的商业巨头还引发了人们对于权力集中问题的担忧。 56 经济集中又将在多大程度上影响政府的执法工作?
经济力量早已有效地转化为政治力量。企业与贸易组织花费了数十亿美元用于向美国政府游说。 57 随着私人经济力量的崛起,政治活动中搅和进来了一股商业力量。 58 裙带资本主义的势力之大令很多人意外。虽然我们能够想见大型金融机构的影响力,但是当金融危机爆发,联邦政府选择拿出纳税人的钱为其进行政府救助时,我们这才真正见识到了这股力量在政治活动中的翻云覆雨。不过想来,他们的确有充分的经济动机去向政府施压。不出意外的是,三分之二的美国人(其中一大部分是共和党支持者)都相信,经济“不公正地偏袒强大的利益集团”。 59
当前,科技巨头对政府的影响力已被媒体广泛曝光。超级平台与其他利益相关方正投入巨资用于引导政治呼声。比方说,就在美国联邦贸易委员会对谷歌展开滥用市场支配地位的调查事实被曝光前一周,谷歌额外聘用了12家游说公司, 60 而当年的游说费用支出也增加了88%,从而使谷歌成为“试图影响联邦政府决策的前十大金主”。 61 在这段时间里,据《华尔街日报》报道,谷歌“与白宫和美国联邦贸易委员会的高级官员举行了一系列会议”。 62 另有报道称,谷歌与奥巴马政府建立了密切关系:“从奥巴马任期伊始到2015年10月,谷歌方面的代表至少每周参加一次白宫会议。在此期间,近250人在奥巴马政府职位与谷歌工作岗位之间完成了工作调动。” 63 我们无从知晓这些会议究竟讨论了哪些议题?会议的内容是否有益于社会福利改进,抑或是为政府决策带来了外部新鲜视角?不论如何,它们反映了一家公司对行政部门最高层的空前接近以及将国家政策与公司利益相结合的有利情况。
考虑到这样的影响,当美国联邦贸易委员会决定结束对谷歌涉嫌垄断的调查,但其在法律问题方面的雇员却给出了不同意见时,这的确让人有点意外。 64 由于《华尔街日报》无意中收到了参与调查的法律专员的工作手稿,这起事件才得以向公众曝光。在工作手稿中,法律专员客观承认了向谷歌提起反垄断诉讼的障碍,并且建议联邦贸易委员会放弃对谷歌所实施的部分反竞争行为进行追究。在这场长达19个月的“马拉松式”调查中,联邦贸易委员会的法律专员发现,“谷歌的行为已经导致并将对消费者和在线搜索和广告市场的创新造成实质性伤害”。 65 因此,不顾诉讼举证与认定的困难重重,法律专员建议对谷歌滥用其垄断权力的行为发起诉讼,因为它的行为的确从多个方面损害了互联网用户与竞争对手的权益。 66
在这份工作文档被公之于众之后,外界的反映非常强烈。特别是在这个档口,欧盟也在对谷歌进行反垄断调查。谷歌的说客给美国联邦贸易委员会发了一封邮件,称该公司“深陷困境” 67 ——它的竞争对手正拿着联邦贸易委员会雇员的工作手稿“制造混乱,扰乱视听,企图颠覆联邦贸易委员会对谷歌的结束调查决定。这番混乱局面在欧洲尤甚”。 68 此外,邮件中还敦促美国联邦贸易委员会在新闻声明中为自己辩护。曝光了这起事件的记者发现,“就在邮件发出后两天,当《华尔街日报》又发表了一篇关于谷歌与华盛顿关系的文章后,联邦贸易委员会发表了一份声明,其中包含了谷歌说客期待的内容”。 69
抛开这个事件,重要的是要理解为什么随着虚拟竞争的加剧,商业巨头和经济舵手会加大对政府的游说。事实上,这其中的赌注高昂,毕竟企业可以从共谋、行为歧视、竞合场景中榨取更多消费者利益。他们与日俱增的经济实力会转化成政治力量,通过影响政府决策来守住自己的市场地位。 70 其实,就连法律也为他们提供了便利:对于有实锤的反垄断行为,如信使场景和中心辐射式场景,反垄断法律规制的硬性标准堵住了企业诡辩(与行政自由裁量权)的可能。但是在其他反竞争场景中,自由裁量权的使用范畴“豁然开朗”。行政机构对违规行为的自行判断空间越大,政策遭到政治说客扭曲的可能性就越高;法律条文的界定越模糊,裁决过程就越容易混入主观判断成分,这也给了说客“钻空子”的机会。
但是,问题的根源却不在于这些政治说客。真正的症结在于集中的经济权力、政治陷阱的薄弱管理 71 、模糊的法律标准(如法院依照判例制度对大多数反托拉斯案件作出的裁决)的交织。 72 对于那些熟识“运作流程”的经济学家、政治说客和反垄断顾问来说,他们对于模糊的法律标准欢迎之至,因为这为他们打开了一个劝说行政机关不要介入反竞争场景的窗口。
认知俘获
与经济力量紧密联系起来的是培育认知俘获与监管俘获的能力。人类学教授戴维·格雷伯(David Graeber)指出,“如果1%的人口控制着全球大部分的可支配财富,我们所谓的‘市场’实际上反映了他们对待事情的看法”。 73 政治游说活动正是塑造政府和公众认知的重要工具,它可以巧妙地影响舆论的导向和社会公众的是非观。 74 相似的办法还有为学术研究工作、智库创建、文章发表提供赞助。 75 此时,企业利用个人与机构的信誉为自己站台,他们传播的观点正是企业所极力倡导的方向。
据报道,自美国联邦贸易委员会开始对谷歌涉嫌反垄断行为介入调查直至2013年尾声,后者向乔治梅森大学法律与经济中心提供了76.2万美元的捐赠。 76 同时,我们还看到:这家研究中心“发表了多篇学术报告力挺谷歌清白,并曾举办相关主题的研讨会,席间的发言人与来宾都是由谷歌方面负责指定的”。 77 据称,在2009年至2015年之间,至少有“由45个研究机构发表的66份学术报告”曾“‘接受了谷歌的委托’‘由谷歌资助’又或是‘收到了谷歌的捐赠’”。 78 在这条路上,谷歌并不孤单。不难想象,为了让有关“虚拟竞争”的讨论向着它们所预想的方向发展,三大反竞争场景的获益者都曾为学术活动、文章创作与智库创建提供过赞助。在面对市场现状时,如社会阶层固化、中小企业的创建数量减少以及扩大的财富分配不公,它们可能会转向新古典经济学理论的市场自矫正机制寻求帮助。我们被灌输的道理是:动态市场的自我监管力量将防止企业遭受重大伤害,并维护消费者福利。
与之相匹配,那些支持政府行政干预的言论则被描摹成对科技进步与创新精神的损害。在1998年针对微软的反垄断“世纪审判”中,微软的首席律师将司法部比作19世纪的卢德主义者,后者蓄意破坏了节省劳力的机器,以阻止科技进步的进程。 79 并称美国司法部对于微软的指控是“对‘创造性商业活动行为应给予鼓励与奖赏’这一社会基本原则的否定”。 80 然而,欧美法院的实践经验已经告诉我们,企业对市场垄断地位的滥用不会对市场创新热情产生激励作用;相反,这种滥用如果不加以约束和规制,还将对科技创新造成更大的危害。可惜,已有不少人将约束滥用市场支配地位的监管手段视同于对创新的打击。
当科技巨头利用多种手段企图影响舆论导向时,我们不禁想到,竞争执法者与监管者能否抵抗这股认知俘获的力量——媒体、游说、政治施压与赞助,糖衣炮弹与真刀真枪双箭齐发。受控生态系统是只存在于互联网世界,还是已经渗入了现实的政治生态——让我们活在了自主与独立的假象之中?
前方的路
我们常被告知,技术革命将如何以提高透明度、改进交流方式、丰富选择与价值的方式来改善社会福利。计算机算法的确在不断改进。算法的广泛使用与人机交互界面技术也在不断成熟。物联网的疆域正在不断拓展,从住家到办公场所、从轿车上的装备到人身上的智能传感器,并最终实现“万物互联”。
这些技术的潜在好处显而易见。从改善我们的身体健康到寻找一个可用车位。我们当然对这些变革性技术的到来欢欣鼓舞,但这些令人欣喜的发展与社会福利不应成为掩盖潜在风险的遮羞布。
我们的目的是在说明,数据驱动的在线市场不一定会激活市场自矫正机制。尽管商家之间中仍存在竞争,但这种压力也未必会改善我们的福利。在新型市场动态下,财富会以更快的速度被转移到少部分人手中。当权力之棒也移交给了他们时,风险也随之加剧。
因此,慎重而妥善的行政干预实在是有其存在的必要。主流竞争法、隐私保护、消费者保护法的法律条文与规章制度在维护社会福利时都将发挥作用。就像我们此前讲过的,虽然有些传统的对策并非尽善尽美,但是与其让病人“病入膏肓”,不如以不完美的方法对其施救。更何况,随着市场动态的演化,新型政策工具也有望陆续出炉——它们的任务包括阻止超级平台的权力滥用和竞合场景的伤害,防止计算机相互勾结,并堵上通往完美行为歧视的道路。反垄断执法机构和我们的民选政府有责任向消费者宣传虚拟竞争的前途与风险,并向大众普及“免费也有可能昂贵”的道理。
重要的是,反垄断执法部门必须投入资源以更好地理解市场动态、参与者动机、数据与算法所发挥的作用以及其对社会福利的影响。除此以外,面对当前法律规制在定价算法时代的有限效用,各机构需要尽快升级执法工具箱以应对崭新挑战。
这项任务从来都不轻松。动态市场特性更是加重了它的难度。不明智的或被误导的行政干预可能会为市场带来不可小觑的成本消耗。但同理,如果我们选择搁置问题,这无疑也会损害市场效率与社会福利。
更令人担忧的还在于认知和监管俘获,这种俘获可能会搅乱人们对于市场动态所应做出的批判性思考。而最终,这种想法还将反映在政府施政上面。所以,摆在我们面前的艰巨任务是唤醒政府去有所作为。当然,面对市场中存在的反竞争场景,一些执法者表现得进取且主动,而其他人则还在沉睡,甚至是“麻木不仁”。
所以说,外部的政治压力是必要的。奥巴马政府麾下的反垄断执法效果充其量来说是利弊交织,往糟了说则是相当无力。尽管美国拥有历史悠久的反托拉斯立法史,但正如一位前政府官员所言,“美国已不再被视作反垄断的知识领导者”。 81
在最后,我们要向那些阅读了本书,并陪伴我们走完“算法经济学”探索之旅的读者致以诚挚的感谢。在当下的世界,很少有人会对反垄断有兴趣,但是冷漠终究是要付出代价的。我们无法确保“数字化的手”总会站在我们这一方。当这些反竞争行为正在我们身边发生时,我们有责任去敦促我们的政府有所行动。
致谢
在撰写这本书的过程中,其中一件乐事是与反垄断领域的专家展开研讨。我们关于本书的许多想法都得益于与众多反垄断执法机构官员、监管者、从业人员以及学者之间的思想交流。此外,与统计学家、数学家、软件工程师和IT专家一道出席的研讨会也进一步拓宽了我们的认知,令我们更深刻地理解了科技进步与市场竞争机制两者之间的关系。在此,我们要向他们致以由衷的感谢,正是他们在百忙之中的耐心聆听、见解分享与批评指正促成了这部作品的诞生。
借此,我们要特别感谢以下诸位的鼎立支持:阿伦·格鲁内斯(Allen Grunes)、弗兰克·怕斯奎尔(Frank Pasquale)、尼古拉斯·佩蒂特(Nicolas Petit)、英玛尔·波斯纳(Ingmar Posner)、托尼·克赞·普莱斯(Tony Curzon Price)、格雷格·泰勒(Greg Taylor)、弗兰克·伍德(Frank Wood)以及其他匿名稿件评审者。
自这个项目开展以来,我们陆续在各大论坛发布了部分关于本书的内容。我们在思维科学研究所(IONS)的演讲以及随后的现场讨论更是加深了我们对虚拟竞争的理解。在本书的最后,我们还要感谢以下学术与(非)政府机构的活动组织者与参会人员:经济合作与发展组织有关“跨平台平等协定”的听证会;英国上议院有关“在线平台和数字单一市场”听证会;加拿大竞争局举办的“关于新型竞争问题的研讨:在不断变化的世界中与时俱进”研讨会;欧洲数据保护监督局与欧洲法学院(Europäische Rechtsakademie)一同举办的会议——“重启竞争:数字化市场中的执法和个人数据”;美国联邦贸易委员会的研讨会“共享经济:摆在网络平台、市场参与者与监管者面临的问题”;以色列巴尔伊兰大学举办的关于“反垄断中的公平”会议;英国国际法与比较法研究所举办的“大数据在竞争和隐私保护法中的应用”活动;瑞典隆德大学举办的“21世纪的挑战与反垄断:对未来的思考”以及芝加哥洛约拉大学和以色列海法大学联合举办的“转型市场中的反垄断议题”等会议。
我们在牛津大学时萌生了撰写本书的念头,彼时恰逢莫里斯到访牛津大学竞争法律与政策研究中心。为此,感谢牛津大学为我们创造了这个机缘。此外,我们还要特别感谢牛津大学彭布罗克学院校长琳恩·布林德利(Lynne Brindley)夫人以及该院的诸位教授与工作人员,你们的亲切与热忱深深地感染了我们。此外,莫里斯还要感谢他所任教的田纳西大学,以及田纳西大学法学院的同事道格·布拉兹(Doug Blaze)、卡罗尔·帕克(Carol Parker)和格雷格·斯坦(Greg Stein)。
在本书出版的过程中,哈佛大学出版社诸位同人可谓尽心尽力:马丁·迪克森(Martin Dickson)为我们提供了专业的图书编辑指导,黛博拉·格雷厄姆-史密斯(Deborah Grahame-Smith)则承担起了本书的编辑排版工作,伊恩·马尔科姆(Ian Malcolm)在出版的整个过程中提供了指导。对于他们的辛勤工作与无私奉献,我们由衷地表示感谢。
最后,我们还要感谢所有家人的支持。
注释
序言
1. 行为定向广告指的是广告主利用技术手段得到用户当前浏览的页面信息主题,并以用户的连续浏览行为做参考,分析用户本人的信息,然后通过后台的内容匹配设定将广告展示在页面上。与传统广告相比,这种定向广告更贴合用户的兴趣,符合精准营销的思想。
2. 引自T·S·艾略特(著),查良铮(译),《J·阿尔弗瑞德·普鲁弗洛克的情歌》(The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock )。
第一部分 场景设定
第1章 市场竞争为我们做出的美好承诺
1. Financial Conduct Authority, Price Comparison Website: Consumer Market Research(June 2014), 7, price-comparison-website-consumerresearch.pdf.
2. 举例来看,根据英国金融管理局的统计,在2013年里,通过比价网站卖出去的保单占到全国保单总销量的三分之一。引自: Financial Conduct Authority, Price Comparison Websites in the General Insurance Sector, Thematic Review 14/11(July 2014), 3, https://fca.org.uk/static/documents/thematic-reviews/trl4-ll.pdf。
3. G. Stigler, “The Economics of Information,” Journal of Political Economy 69, no. 3(1961): 213-225; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Price Transparency, DAFFE/CLP(2001)22(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,2001); R. Nitsche and N. von Hinten-Reed, “Competitive Impacts of Information Exchange,” Charles River Associates(June 2004), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2004_6_reg_4056_86/note_on_information_exchange_en.pdf.
4. G. J. Stigler, “Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated,”Journal of Political Economy 65, no. 1(February 1957): 1—17.
5. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Unilateral Disclosure of Information with Anticompetitive Effects, DAF/COMP(2012)17(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, October 11, 2012), 11; see also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Roundtable on Information Exchanges between Competitors under Competition Law, Note by the Delegation of the United States, DAF/ COMP/WD(2010)117(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,October 11, 2010), 11, http://justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2014/09/17/269282.pdf.
6. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Roundtable on Information Exchanges.
7. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Roundtable on Information Exchanges.
8. 我们之所以在这里加上一句“总的来说”,是因为反垄断当局同样也承认,透明的市场环境在一定情况下会助长商业共谋,详见:European Commission, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004/C 03(February 5, 2004), para. 51。
9. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Roundtable on Information Exchanges.
10. 详见:Consumer Futures, Price Comparison Websites: Consumer Perceptions and Experiences(July 2013), 32(“Factors Considered”),for some empirical research as to which features of PCWs consumers value. http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140522123945/;http://consumerfutures.org .uk/files/2013/07/Price-ComparisonWebsites-Consumer-perceptions-and -experiences.pdf.
11. New York City Labor Market Information Service, Employment in New York City Grocery Stores(New York: New York City Labor Market Information Service, May 2009), http://nyc.gov/html/sbs/wib/downloads/pdf /grocery_stores.pdf(5,111 stores in 2008).
12. Peter A. Diamond, “A Model of Price Adjustment,” Journal of Economic Theory 3, no. 2(June 1971): 156-168; Peter A. Diamond,Search Theory, Working Paper No. 389(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1985); J. Stiglitz, “Imperfect Information in the Product Market,” in Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1,Richard Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds.(Amsterdam: North-Holland,1989), 769—847.
13. Peter A. Diamond, “A Model of Price Adjustment,” Journal of Economic Theory 3, no. 2(June 1971): 156-168; Peter A. Diamond,Search Theory, Working Paper No. 389(Cambridge, MA: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1985); J. Stiglitz, “Imperfect Information in the Product Market,” in Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 1,Richard Schmalensee and R. Willig, eds.(Amsterdam: North-Holland,1989), 769—847.
14. J. Yannis Bakos, “Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Marketplaces,” Management Science 43, no. 12(December 1997); John G. Lynch Jr. and Dan Ariely, “Wine Online: Search Costs Affect Competition on Price, Quality, and Distribution,” Marketing Science 19, no. 1(2000): 83—103.
15. Gerald Haubl and Valerie Trifts, “Consumer Decision Making in Online Shopping Environments: The Effects of Interactive Decision Aids,” Marketing Science 19, no. 1(2000): 4—21.
16. Competition Commission, Extended Warranties on Domestic Electrical Goods: A Report on the Supply of Extended Warranties on Domestic Electrical Goods within the UK, vols. 1-3, Cm 6089(December 2003).
17. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.Horizontal Merger Guidelines(August 19, 2010), section 9, https://ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/attachments/merger-review/10 0 819hmg.pdf.
18. Maurice E. Stucke, “Behavioral Economists at the Gate: Antitrust in the Twenty-First Century,” Loyola University ofChicago Law Journal 38(2007): 513, 563—572.
19. European Commission, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers, para. 68; see also U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc v. Parts Geek, LLC,494 F App’x 743, 745[U.S. Court of Appeals(9th Circuit), 2012] .
20. Airbnb, Inc., The $1,000,000 Host Guarantee, https://airbnb /guarantee.
21. Rob Price, “The Incredibly Simple Way to Find Your ‘Secret’Uber Passenger Rating,” Business Insider UK, February 11, 2015, http://uk.businessinsider /uber-passenger-rating-how-to-customer-starshow-do-i-2015-2.
22. 营销学中转换率的概念是用来衡量网站宣传效果的指标,它的计算公式是:网络转换率=进行了相应动作的访问量/总访问量。
23. 详见:A. Ezrachi, “The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce,” SSRN Working Paper(October 11, 2015), http://ssrn/abstract=2672541.
24. Competition and Markets Authority, State of the Market Assessment(March 27, 2014), 26, 78, 79-80, fig. 38, https://ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2014/03/assessment_document_published_1.pdf.
25. Competition and Markets Authority, State of the Market Assessment(March 27, 2014), 26, 78, 79-80, fig. 38, https://ofgem.gov.uk/sites/default/files/docs/2014/03/assessment_document_published_1.pdf.
26. Bakos, “Reducing Buyer Search Costs.”
27. 该机构已于2014年4月1日终止运营,相关职责转由英国竞争与市场管理局承接。
28. OFT Statement of Objections, Annex 1, para. 1.15, as cited in the Competition Appeal Tribunal judgment in Skyscanner Limited v.Competition and Markets Authority, Case No. 1226/2/12/14, September 26, 2014, [2014] CAT 16, 31—32.
29. Info Entrepreneurs, Stock Control and Inventory, http://infoentrepreneurs.org/en/guides/stock-control-and-inventory/#5.
30. Ismat Sarah Mangla, “3 Tricks to Help You Snag the Best Deals Online,” Time, September 8, 2014, http://time/money/3136612/dynamic-pricing -amazon-best-buy-walmart/.
31. Ariel Ezrachi, “The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce,” European Competition Journal 11, 488(2015).
32. 这段内容引自亚马逊公司提交给欧洲理事会内部市场委员会的一份回函,以回应该委员会针对欧盟数字化市场发展情况的问询。详见:http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-internal-market-subcommittee/online-platforms-andthe-eu-digital-single-market/written/24005.html; House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union ‘Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market’(20 April 2016)10th Report of Session 2015-16,http://publications .parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf。
33. 详见:The effects of insurance aggregators: George Maher, Andy Staudt, and Ryan Warren, “Why Aren’t We Making Money... ,” Willis Towers Watson(February 2011), http://towerswatson/enGB/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2011/02/Why-arent-wemaking-money.
34. Jeffrey R. Brown and Austan Goolsbee, “Does the Internet Make Markets More Competitive? Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry,”Journal of Political Economy 110, no. 3(2002): 2(draft of October 2010), http://faculty .chicagobooth.edu/austan.goolsbee/research/insure.pdf.
35. C. R. Leslie, “Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust,” Texas Law Review 82, no. 3(2004): 628.
36. U.S. Department of Justice, Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For(June 15, 2015), http://www .justice.gov/atr/price-fixing-bid-rigging-andmarket-allocation-schemes.
37. U.S. Department of Justice, Price Fixing, Bid Rigging, and Market Allocation Schemes: What They Are and What to Look For(June 15, 2015), http://www .justice.gov/atr/price-fixing-bid-rigging-andmarket-allocation-schemes.
38. A. Mitra and J. G. Lynch Jr., “Toward a Reconciliation of Market Power and Information Theories of Advertising Effects on Price Elasticity,” Journal of Consumer Research 21(March 1995): 644—659;A. Kaul and D. Wittink, “Empirical Generalisation about the Impact of Advertising on Price Sensitivity and Price,” Marketing Science 14, no. 3(1995): 151—161.
39. P. Nelson, “Advertising as Information,” Journal of Political Economy 78(March/April 1974): 311—329.
第2章 新经济现实:大数据分析的崛起
1. Charles Fishman, The Wal-Mart Effect: How the World’s Most Powerful Company Really Works — and How It’s Transforming the American Economy(New York: Penguin, 2006).
2. Citri-Lite Co. v. Cott Beverages, Inc., No. 1:07-CV-01075 OWW,2011 WL 4751110, 5(E.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2011)aff’d, 546 F. App’x 651(9th Cir. 2013).
3. Steven Barrison, “Study Proves It: Walmart Super-stores Kill Off Local Small Businesses,” Daily News, May 4, 2011.
4. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 695801, 17(S.E.C. No-Action Letter,March 16, 2006)(quoting Anthony Bianco and Wendy Zellner, “Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful?” BusinessWeek, October 6, 2003).
5. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2006 WL 695801, 17(S.E.C. No-Action Letter,March 16, 2006)(quoting Anthony Bianco and Wendy Zellner, “Is Wal-Mart Too Powerful?” BusinessWeek, October 6, 2003).
6. Justin Lahart, “How Wal-Mart’s Store Closings Paint Wider Retail Picture: Shift to Online Sales Shows Difference between Retailing’s Haves and Have-Nots,” Wall Street Journal, January 15,2016.
7. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Form 10-K(2015), 23, https://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104169/000010416915000011/wmtform10kx13115.htm.
8. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Form 10-K(2015), 23, https://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/104169/000010416915000011/wmtform10kx13115.htm.
9. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Annual Report(2014), 7, http://stock.walmart/files/doc_financials/2014/Annual/2014-annual-report.pdf.
10. Kim S. Nash, “Wal-Mart to Pour $2 Billion into E-Commerce over Next Two Years,” Wall Street Journal, October 14, 2015, http://blogs.wsj/cio/2015/10/14/wal-mart-to-pour-2-billion-into-e-commerceover-next-two-years/.
11. James B. Stewart, “Walmart Plays Catch-Up with Amazon,” New York Times, October 23, 2015.
12. James B. Stewart, “Walmart Plays Catch-Up with Amazon,” New York Times, October 23, 2015.
13. Amazon, Inc., Form 10-K, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2015(2016), 17; Amazon, Inc., Form 10-K, For the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2014(2015), 17.
14. 引自亚马逊2015年年报中,公司创始人兼首席执行官杰夫·贝佐斯给股东的信。
15. Amazon 2014 10-K, supra, at 3.
16. Charlie Osborne, “Amazon Sellers Sold Record Number of Products in 2014,” ZDNet(January 5, 2015), http://zdnet/article/amazon-sellers-sold -record-number-of-products-in-2014/#!.
17. United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-3741-cv(2d Cir. 2015), 15.
18. Khadeeja Safdar, “Gap’s Chief Open to Selling on Amazon,”Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2016, at B6.
19. Andrew Couts, “Why Did Amazon Charge $23,698,655.93 for a Textbook?” Digital Trends(April 23, 2011), http://digitaltrends/computing /why-did-amazon-charge-23698655-93-for-a-textbook/.
20. Greg Besinger, “Boomerang Commerce, a Real-Time Pricing Startup, Raises $8.5 Million,” Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2014, http://blogs.wsjdigits/2014/07/16/boomerang-commerce-a-real-timepricing-startup-raises-8-5-million /.
21. CamelCamelCamel, Amazon Price Historyfor Conair CuisinartICE-21 1.5 Quart Frozen Yogurt-Ice Cream Maker(White)(2015), http://camel camelcamel/Cuisinart-ICE-21-Frozen-YogurtIce-Sorbet/product/B003KYSLMW?context=browse.
22. CamelCamelCamel, Amazon Price History for Fossil Women’s ES3733 Stella Crystal-Accented Stainless Steel Watch with Link Bracelet(2015), http://camelcamelcamel/Fossil-ES3733-Crystal-Accented-Stainless-Bracelet/product/B00NVAYBUQ?active=price_amazon&context=top_drops.
23. Jubin Mehta, “Boomerang Commerce, a Dynamic Price Optimization Company Raises $8.5 Million,” Your Story(July 16,2014), http://yourstory /2014/07/boomerang-commerce-raises-8-5million/.
24. Lizzie O’Leary, “Marketplace Weekend for Friday, December 19, 2014,” Marketplace Weekend(December 19, 2014), http://marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-weekend/marketplace-weekendfriday-december-19-2014.
25. Ryan Mac, “Ex-Amazon Manager Gets Funding to Help Retailers Battle His Former Employer,” Forbes, July 16, 2014, http://forbes/sites /ryanmac/2014/07/16/boomerang-amazonbattle/.
26. Besinger, “Boomerang Commerce.”
27. 详见:Salil K. Mehra, “Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms,” Minnesota Law Review 100(March 2015),http://ssrn /abstract=2576341.
28. George Packer, “Cheap Words: Amazon Is Good for Customers.But Is It Good for Books?” The New Yorker, February 17 and 24, 2014,http://www .newyorker/magazine/2014/02/17/cheap-words.
29. Julian D’Onfro, “13 Interesting Startups Founded by Former Amazon Employees,” Business Insider UK, June 20, 2015, http://uk.businessinsider /startups-founded-by-former-amazon-employees2015-6?r=US.
30. Joe Lindsey, “This Software Company Wants to Help Retailers Compete against Amazon,” Entrepreneur, October 29, 2014, http://entrepreneur /article/238454.
31. Amazon.co.uk. Prime Same-DayDelivery(2015), http://amazon.co.uk/b/?ie=UTF8&node=5782509031&tag=googhydr-21&hv adid=66544544104&hvpos=1t1&hvexid=&hvnetw=g&hvrand=12880 355850154458096&hvpone=&hvptwo=&hvqmt=b&hvdev=c&ref=pd_sl_241ngzeoil_b.
32. Amazon.co.uk, Amazon PrimeNow(2015), http://amazon.co.Uk/b/ref =pn_uk_surl_lp?node =6584642031.
33. Neal Ungerleider, “It Has 40 Million Subscribers. Now Amazon Prime Is Eyeing the Competition,” Fast Company(July 9, 2015), http://fastcompany/3048366/it-has-40-million-subscribers-nowamazon-prime-is-eyeing-the-competition.
34. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Exploring the Economics of Personal Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value, OECD Digital Economy Papers, No. 220(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, April 2, 2013), 7, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k486qtxldmq-en.
35. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, DataDriven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being: Interim Synthesis Report(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,October 2014), http://oecd.org/sti/inno/data-driven-innovationinterim-synthesis.pdf; Executive Office of the President, Big Data:Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values(Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, May 2014), 2, https://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf.
36. 详见:Robert McMillan, “IBM Turns Up Heat Under Competition in Artificial Intelligence,” Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2015, http://wsj/articles/ibm-turns-up-heat-under-competition-in-artificialintelligence-1448362800.
37. Jo Best, Jo. “IBM Watson: The Inside Story of How the JeopardyWinning Supercomputer Was Born, and What It Wants to Do Next,”TechRepublic(2013), http://techrepublic/article/ibm-watsonthe-inside-story-of-how-the-jeopardy-winning-supercomputer-was-born-andwhat-it-wants-to-do-next /.
38. Steve Lohr, “IBM’s AI System Watson to Get Second Home,on West Coast,” New York Times, September 24, 2015, http://nytimes/2015/09/25/technology/ibms-ai-system-watson-to-get-newwest-coast-home.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphoneshare&_r=0.
39. Antonio Regalado, “Is Google Cornering the Market on Deep Learning?” MIT Technology Review, January 29, 2014, http://technologyreview /news/524026/is-google-cornering-the-marketon-deep-learning/; Nicola Jones, “Computer Science: The Learning Machines,” Nature, January 8, 2014, http://wwwnature/news/computer-science-the-learning-machines-1 .14481.
40. European Data Protection Supervisor, Towards a New Digital Ethics: Data, Dignity and Technology, Opinion 4/2015(September 11,2015), 9.
41. Robert D. Hof, “Deep Learning,” MIT Technology Review, April 23, 2013, http://technologyreview/featuredstory/513696/deeplearning/; Tereza Pultarova, “Jaguar Land Rover to Lead Driverless Car Research,” E&T(October 9, 2015), http://eandt.theiet.org/news/2015/oct/jaguar-land -rover-driverless-cars.cfm; David Talbot, “CES 2015:Nvidia Demos a Car Computer Trained with ‘Deep Learning,’ ” MIT Technology Review, January 6, 2015), http://technologyreview/news/533936/ces-2015-nvidia-demos-a-car-computer-trained-withdeep-learning/; David Levitin, 2015. “The Sum of Human Knowledge,”Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2015, http://wsj/articles/thesum-of-human-knowledge -1442610803. See also, Lohr, “IBM’s AI System Watson to Get Second Home.”
42. European Data Protection Supervisor, Towards a New Digital Ethics.
43. Suzanne Vranica and Robert McMillan, “IBM Nearing Acquisition of Weather Co.’s Digital and Data Assets,” Wall Street Journal, October 27,2015, http://wsj/articles/ibm-nearing-acquisition-of-weather-co-sdigital-and-data-assets-1445984616.
44. Suzanne Vranica and Robert McMillan, “IBM Nearing Acquisition of Weather Co.’s Digital and Data Assets,” Wall Street Journal, October 27,2015, http://wsj/articles/ibm-nearing-acquisition-of-weather-co-sdigital-and-data-assets-1445984616.
45. IBM, Mobile App from Octo Telematics Uses IBM and the Weather Company Data to Help Drivers Score Savings with Pay-As-YouDrive Insurance(October 26, 2015), http://www-03.ibm/press/us/en/pressrelease /47949.wss.
46. IBM, Mobile App from Octo Telematics Uses IBM and the Weather Company Data to Help Drivers Score Savings with Pay-As-YouDrive Insurance(October 26, 2015), http://www-03.ibm/press/us/en/pressrelease /47949.wss.
47. IBM, Mobile App from Octo Telematics Uses IBM and the Weather Company Data to Help Drivers Score Savings with Pay-As-YouDrive Insurance(October 26, 2015), http://www-03.ibm/press/us/en/pressrelease /47949.wss.
48. Josh Constine, “Facebook launches Messenger platform with chatbots,” April 12, 2016, http://techcrunch/2016/04/12/agentson-messenger/; Ben Popper, “Mark Zuckerberg Thinks AI Will Start Outperforming Humans in the Next Decade,” April 28, 2016, http://theverge/2016/4/28/11526436/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-earningsartificial-intelligence-future.
49. Madhumita Murgia, “Facebook Messenger’s New Bots Are a Powerful Way to Target Adverts,” The Telegraph, April 13, 2016,http://telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/04/12/facebook-messengerlaunches-chat-bot-economy-to -take-on-apps/.
50. Jack Nicas, “Google Touts New AI-Powered Tools,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2016, at B1; Jay Greene and Matthias Verbergt, “Microsoft Cuts Low-End Phones,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2016, at B1.
51. Michael Bowling et al., “Heads-Up Limit Hold’em Poker Is Solved,” Science, January 9, 2015, 145.
52. Tuomas Sandholm, “Solving Imperfect-Information Games,”Science, January 9, 2015, 122.
53. Amazon Machine Learning(last visited May 3, 2016), https://aws.amazon /machine-learning/.
54. Danny Palmer, “Amazon follows Microsoft and Google with AI tools in Amazon Machine Learning Service,” Computing, April 10,2015, http://computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2403533/amazon-followsmicrosoft-and-google-into-offering-customers-ai-tools-with-amazonmachine-learning-service.
55. Ingrid Lunden, “Amazon Launches AWS IoT — A Platform for Building, Managing and Analyzing the Internet Of Things,” Tech Crunch,October 8, 2015, http://techcrunch/2015/10/08/amazon-announcesaws-iot-a-platform-for-building-managing-and-analyzing-the-internet-ofthings/# .gfgxjj:0nTE.
56. Ingrid Lunden, “Amazon Launches AWS IoT — A Platform for Building, Managing and Analyzing the Internet Of Things,” Tech Crunch,October 8, 2015, http://techcrunch/2015/10/08/amazon-announcesaws-iot-a-platform-for-building-managing-and-analyzing-the-internet-ofthings/# .gfgxjj:0nTE.
57. Reuters, “Amazon Launches Platform to Build Apps for IoT,”FirstPost, October 9, 2015, http://firstpost/business/amazonlaunches-platform-to-build-apps-for-iot-2461852.html.
58. Reuters, “Amazon Launches Platform to Build Apps for IoT,”FirstPost, October 9, 2015, http://firstpost/business/amazonlaunches-platform-to-build-apps-for-iot-2461852.html.
59. City of New York. Mayor de Blasio Announces Minerva Tantoco as City’s First Ever Chief Technology Officer(New York: City of New York, September 4, 2014), http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/437-14/mayor-de-blasio-minerva-tantoco-city-s-first-ever-chieftechnology-officer.
60. “Pricing Algorithms: Is the Price You Pay Right?,” Bloomberg(May 12, 2015), http://wwwbloomberg.eom/news/videos/b/02d3f0f0e653-4cal-8bdd-0f95a 5a81212.
61. Executive Office of the President, BigData and Differential Pricing(Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, February 2015), 13, https://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/docs/Big_Data_Report_Nonembargo_v2.pdf.
62. Suzanne Kapner, “Black Friday Shopping — with Thinner Crowds,” Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2015, http://wsj/articles/black-friday-shoppingwith-thinner-crowds-1448639398.
63. Suzanne Kapner, “Black Friday Shopping — with Thinner Crowds,” Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2015, http://wsj/articles/black-friday-shoppingwith-thinner-crowds-1448639398.
64. Suzanne Kapner, “Black Friday Shopping — with Thinner Crowds,” Wall Street Journal, November 28, 2015, http://wsj/articles/black-friday-shoppingwith-thinner-crowds-1448639398.
65. Andrew McAfee and Erik Brynjolfsson, “Big Data: The Management Revolution,” Harvard Business Review, October 2012,https://hbr.org/2012/10/big-data-the-management-revolution/ar/.
66. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology,Report to the President, Big Data and Privacy.
67. McAfee and Brynjolfsson, “Big Data.”
68. Executive Office of the President, Big Data and Differential Pricing, 5.
69. Samuel B. Hwang and Sungho Kim, “Dynamic Pricing Algorithm for E-Commerce,” in Advances in Systems, Computing Sciences and Software Engineering, Proceedings of SCSS05, Tarek Sobh and Khaled Elleithy, eds.(Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 149-155; N. Abe and T.Kamba. “A Web Marketing System with Automatic Pricing,” Computer Networks 33(2000): 775-78; L. M. Minga, Y. Q. Fend, and Y. J. Li,“Dynamic Pricing: E- Commerce—Oriented Price Setting Algorithm,”Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics, Xi’an,China, 2003, vol. 2.
70. Mehra, “Antitrust and the Robo-Seller.”
第3章 点到为止的反垄断监管
1. Alan Greenspan, “The Effects of Mergers(Testimony before the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate),” Federal Reserve Bulletin, 84(June 16, 1998): 643, 646, at 5.
2. A. Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016). For statistics on US enforcement, see Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
3. United States v. Syufy Enterprises, 903 F.2d 659, 662-63(9th Cir.1990).
4. Order of the President of the People’s Republic of China No. 68,Anti-Monopoly Law of the People’s Republic of China, Chapter 1, Article 1,http://www .china.org.cn/china/2011-02/ll/content_21900178.htm.
5. U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Antitrust Division Manual, 4th ed., chap. 5(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,March 2008).
6. Unilateral Conduct Working Group, Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies(Moscow: International Competition Network, May 2007), http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads /library/doc353.pdf.
7. Posner, “The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis.”
8. Justin Fox, The Myth of the Rational Market(New York: Harper Business/ HarperCollins, 2009), 89—107.
9. Case No. T-79/12, Cisco Systems Inc. v. Commission [December 11, 2013] 612 TJ 0079, para. 69.
10. Thomas O. Barnett, “Maximizing Welfare through Technological Innovation,” George Mason Law Review 15(2008): 1191, 1200.
11. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, A Smarter Section 5(Washington DC:U.S. Federal Trade Commission, September 25, 2015), 12, https://ftc.gov/system/files /documents/public_statements/804511/150925smarter section5.pdf.
12. J. Thomas Rosch, I Say Monopoly, You Say Dominance:The Continuing Divide on the Treatment of Dominant Firms, Is It the Economics?(Florence: International Bar Association, Antitrust Section Conference, September 8, 2007), 5, https://ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/i-say-monopoly-you-say-dominancecontinuing-divide-treatment-dominant-firms-it-economics/070908isaymo nopolyiba_0.pdf.
第4章 穿透竞争的表象
1. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think(London:John Murray, 2013), 35.
2. C. M. Bishop, Pattern Recognition and Machine Learning(New York: Springer-Verlag, 2006).
3. “Pricing Algorithms: Is the Price You Pay Right?” Bloomberg(May 12, 2015), http://bloomberg.eom/news/videos/b/02d3f0f0e653-4cal-8bdd -0f95a5a81212.
4. Sarah Griff iths, “Facebook Ads to Become More Intrusive: Site Will Soon Show Promotions for Products You’ve Looked at across the Web,”Daily Mail, June 13, 2014, http://dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article2657043/Facebook-ads-intrusive-Site-soon-promotions-products-youvesearched-web. html.
5. Executive Office of the President, Big Data: Seizing Opportunities,Preserving Values,(May 2014), 5, https://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs /big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf; see also Facebook, Announcing New Product Ads on Facebook(February 17,2015), https://facebook/business/news/product-ads.
6. European Data Protection Supervisor, Towards a New Digital Ethics: Data, Dignity and Technology, Opinion 4/2015(September 11,2015), 6.
7. 举例来看,“一个由数据驱动的性格分析应用网站Crystalknows可以为人们提供打造定制版领英网站个人页面的服务,并且教授用户应该如何与潜在的雇主交谈、发送邮件或者展示自己。说起来可能会令人多少有些不安,这个由数学模型打造的算法竟可以做到精确地向用户传授与用人单位沟通时的措辞、语言风格和腔调,以期能够更好地契合用人单位的喜好”。Elle Hunt, “Crystal Knows Best ... or Too Much? The Disconcerting New Email Advice Service,” The Guardian, May 19, 2015, http://theguardian/media/2015/may/19/crystal-knowsbest-or-too-much-the-disconcerting-new-email-advice-service.
8. Allen Grunes, “Tracking Not Allowed(Unless You’re Google),” Politico(October 1, 2015), http://wwwpolitico/agenda/story/2015/10/tracking -not-allowed - unless-youre -google - 000261.
9. “消费者剩余”是微观经济学中的专有名词,指的是消费者购买一定数量的某种商品愿意支付的最高价格与这些商品的实际市场价格之间的差额。
10. 详见:French Autorite de la concurrence and the German Bundeskartellamt,Competition Law and Data, May 10, 2016, http://bundeskartellamt .de/SharedDocs/Publikation/DE/Berichte/Big%20 Data%20Papier.pdf?_ _blob=publicationFile&v=2; U.K. House of Lords,Select Committee on European Union “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market,” April 20,2016,10th Report of Session 2015-16, http://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf; Keynote Remarks of FTC Commissioner Terrell McSweeny,“Competition Law: Keeping Pace in a Digital Age,” 16th Annual Loyola Antitrust Colloquium, Chicago, IL, April 15, 2016. 正如英国上议院在题为“线上平台与数字化单一市场”的报告中指出的,“大数据技术的飞速发展已为社会福利的下降与不正当竞争行为的新变化埋下了伏笔。不易为人察觉的品质下降、独家获取用户数据库以排挤其他竞争对手、新形式的共谋层出不穷……虽然其中一部分的控诉还只是假设,但却值得引发对现有反垄断政策是否充分有效的关注”(详见报告原文第178段)。
11. 2015年8月10日,原谷歌公司宣布将对企业架构进行调整,成立一家名为Alphabet的控股平台公司,将旗下搜索业务、创新研发、风险投资等部门分离出来各自成立子公司。但在本书中,在谈及Alphabet公司旗下所有业务时,我们仍沿用谷歌这个旧说法。对这家新公司的新动向,详见:Google, “G Is for Google,” Google Official Blog(August 10, 2015), https://googleblog.blogspot.co.uk/2015/08/google-alphabet.html。
第二部分 共谋场景
1. 研究发现,卡特尔组织的存续期呈现出了两极分化的态势:部分卡特尔组织往往无法坚持一年以上,而另外通常能维系4 ~ 6年的合作关系。详见:M. C. Levenstein and V. Y. Suslow, “What Determines Cartel Success?,” Journal of Economic Literature 44(2006): 43, 51-52。这种背地里的勾结(甚至是由十几个合作伙伴一同参与)可以持续数年时间,详见:J. M. Connor, “Cartels and Antitrust Portrayed: Internal Structure — Private International Cartels 1990-2008,” American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 09-06(2009), 4,8, ssrn/abstract=1372849(文中曾提及,卡特尔组织的存续期的中位数与平均数分别是57个月与82个月。相应地,世界级的卡特尔组织通常更加“长寿”)。调查发现,在1983—1994年被成功告倒的国际卡特尔组织的存续期均值接近90个月;1995—1999年,这个指标下降到了80个月以下,而在此后的数年间又再一次上升到了从前的水平。《华尔街日报》(Wall Street Journal )曾撰文称,“如果共谋者将价格抬得过高,那么组织中的背叛者与市场中的新进入者将矫正这种错误”。然而,一位美国司法部的官员则对这种说法做出了驳斥,据他所言——“从实证研究来看,这套逻辑并不成立,很多与我们打过交道的卡特尔组织往往已经成立了十年有余”。详见:W. J. Kolasky(美国司法部助理总检察长), Antitrust Compliance Programs: The Government Perspective, Speech at Corporate Compliance 2002 Conference of the Practising Law Institute(San Francisco:U.S. Department of Justice, July 12, 2002)。
2. Scott D. Hammond(美国司法部副助理总检察长,主管反垄断案件的刑事执法), Recent Developments, Trends, and Milestones in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program(Washington,DC: U.S. Department of Justice, March 26, 2008), http://www .justice.gov/atr/speech /recent- developments- trends -and -milestones -antitrustdivisions- criminal- enforcement。本文认为,对阻止反垄断罪行而言,现有的沉重刑罚是一个次优解。在过去的40年中,美国政府提高了《谢尔曼法》(Sherman Act)的刑事处罚力度——违反该法案的个人最高将被判处10年监禁,同时个人与企业都将受到巨额罚款。
3. 一位美国司法部的官员表示,“操纵价格者往往都是惯犯”。Kolasky, Antitrust Compliance Programs; J. M. Connor and C. G.Helmers, “Statistics on Modern International Cartels 1990-2005,” AAI Working Paper No. 07-01(January 10, 2007) , 23。文中提到,作为研究样本的283个国际卡特尔组织中的170家企业均是操纵价格的惯犯,其中更有11家企业被逮到了不止10次。在司法部将全球四大粮商之一——美国阿彻丹尼尔斯米德兰公司(Archer DanielsMidland Company)—— 的价格操纵案件作为警示教材大为宣传之后,大多数的卡特尔组织并未有所收敛。
4. “核心卡特尔”是一种国际社会公认的危害最大的反竞争行为,它主要包括:操纵定价、划分市场、串通投标、限制产量等市场竞争对手之间达成的反竞争协议。这种行为不仅限制了市场竞争机制的发挥,还将损害消费者利益并阻碍国际贸易的发展。
第5章 信使场景
0. 引言: Bill Baer(美国司法部助理总检察长), Former E-Commerce Executive Charged with Price Fixing in the Antitrust Division’s First Online Marketplace Prosecution(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, April 6, 2005), 15-421, http://justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2015/313011.docx。
1. Scott D. Hammond(美国司法部反垄断司刑事执法部门主任),The Fly on the Wall Has Been Bugged— Catching an International Cartel in the Act(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, May 15, 2001),http://justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/8280.htm(ADM case)。
2. 这五家银行将为此支付合计25亿美元的罚款。不仅如此,由于瑞银集团与巴克莱银行违背了各自在2012年签订的不起诉协议而还需分别额外支付2.03亿美元和6,000万美元的罚款。See ElaiKatz, “U.S. Brings Computerized Price- Fixing Charges,” New York Law Journal 254, no. 120(December 23, 2015).
3. U.S. Department of Justice, Five Major Banks Agree to ParentLevel Guilty Pleas: Citicorp, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Barclays PLC, the Royal Bank of Scotland PLC Agree to Plead Guilty in Connection with the Foreign Exchange Market and Agree to Pay More than $2.5 Billion in Criminal Fines(May 20, 2015), http://justice.gov/opa/pr/fivemajor-banks-agree-parent-level-guilty-pleas.
4. 美国司法部向花旗集团、巴克莱银行、摩根大通、苏格兰皇家银行分别开出了9.25亿美元、6.5亿美元、5.5亿美元以及3.95亿美元的罚单。数据引用来源同上。
5. 美国司法部向花旗集团、巴克莱银行、摩根大通、苏格兰皇家银行分别开出了9.25亿美元、6.5亿美元、5.5亿美元以及3.95亿美元的罚单。
6. Carrefour Marinopoulos原是希腊本土最大的零售连锁企业。1995年,它由希腊Marinopoulos集团与法国家乐福集团各自占有50%股份出资成立。但是在2012年,由于希腊经济危机,家乐福决定撤出合资公司。
7. 维持转移售价(Resale Price Maintenance,RPM)是指产品制造商或批发商因为试图控制自己的商品或服务的最终售价而与零售商达成的一种协议。这种协议不被欧盟反垄断法所接纳,但在美国,虽然RPM已在过去95年的时间里被视为违法协议,但是美国联邦最高法院推翻了自己之前的决定。对于垂直价格限制的反垄断裁定,美国联邦最高法院将依据更为宽松的“合理原则”标准做出裁决。Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 882(2007).
8. Lia Vitzilaiou, “The Hellenic Competition Commission Fines a Retailer for Resale Price Maintenance and Other Infringements within Its Franchise Network(Carrefour Marinopoulos),” e-Competitions(February 2011), http://www .lambadarioslaw.gr/publications/2011/en/article_33885.pdf.
9. Hellenic Competition Commission. Decision Concerning Infringements of Articles 1 of Law 703/77 and Article 101 TFEU by the Retailer Carrefour Marinopoulos S.A. in Connection with the Franchise Network for the Operation of “5 Marinopoulos”Retail Stores(Athens:Hellenic Competition Commission, July 15, 2010), http://epant.gr/img/x2/news/news270_1 _1279200461.pdf.
10. Vitzilaiou, “The Hellenic Competition Commission Fines a Retailer.”
11. Hellenic Competition Commission, Decision Concerning Infringements.
12. United States v. Airline Tariff Publ’g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9,12(D.D.C. 1993).
13. 详见:Case 40/73, Suiker Unie and Others v. Commission, [1975]ECR 1663, para. 26, and Case C-89/85 I, [1993] ECR I-1307, para. 63;commission decision in Case IV/37.614/F3 PO, Interbrew and AlkenMaes, [2003] OJ L200/1, para. 221.
14. 判例制度(Case Law)是英美法系国家的主要法律渊源。它指的是基于典型的案例判决作为判例,为法官审理同类案件提供借鉴和指导。这种判例对以后的法院判决具有法律规范效力,能够作为法院判案的法律依据。
15. Power Conversion, Inc. v. Saft Am., Inc., 672 F. Supp. 224, 227(D. Md. 1987). “不论是抬高还是压低市场价格、共谋协议运作成功抑或失败、价格合理与否,价格操纵行为具有本身违法性。”按照美国反垄断基本准则的《谢尔曼法》的规定,所有以抬高、压低、盯住、抑制价格为目的或者是起到上述效果的行为都被纳入了反垄断监管范畴。详见:Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 222, 224。
16. Maurice Stucke, “Morality and Antitrust,” Columbia Business Law Review(2006): 443.
17. Songfacts, “Milgram’s 37(We Do What We’re Told),” by Peter Gabriel, http://songfacts/detail.php?id=772.
18. S. Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience,” Journal of Abnormal & Social Psychology 67, no. 4(1963): 371.
19. DP DenkProducties, “Milgram Experiment—Jeroen Busscher,” YouTube(June 2012), https://youtube/watch?v=yr5cjyokVUs.
20. S. Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View(New York: Harper & Row, 1974), 30—31.
21. Milgram, “Behavioral Study of Obedience.”
22. F. Gino et al., “See No Evil: When We Overlook Other People’s Unethical Behavior,” HBS Working Paper No 08-045(January 11,2008), 11.
23. M. C. Levenstein and V. Y. Suslow, “Breaking Up Is Hard to Do:Determinants of Cartel Duration,” Ross School of Business Paper No.1150(September 2009), 11, http://ssrn/abstract=1676968; Gino et al., “See No Evil”.
第6章 中心辐射式场景
1. United States v. Newton, 326 F.3d 253, 255(1st Cir. 2003).
2. United States v. Newton, 326 F.3d 253, 255(1st Cir. 2003).
3. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227(1939).
4. United States v. Lapier, No. 13-30279, 2015 WL 4664689, at para. 8(9th Cir. August 7, 2015)(internal quotations omitted).
5. United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-3741-CV, 2015 WL 3953243,para. 28(2d Cir. June 30, 2015).
6. United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 13-3741-CV, 2015 WL 3953243,para. 17; Howard Hess Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 255(3d Cir. 2010); see also Toys “R” Us, Inc. v.FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 932-934(7th Cir. 2000).
7. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208(1939).
8. 对于共谋的辅助者——中心辐射式场景中的“枢纽中心”——的责任认定,打个比方来讲,一家名为AC-Treuhand AG的咨询公司被欧盟指控协助其他企业开展共谋。欧盟之所以认定该公司违反了反不正当竞争法的原因在于,后者曾协助卡特尔组织成员召开商谈会议、收集各方的相关销售数据、充当分歧的调和人,并规劝组织成员做出妥协,促成合作。依据相应的工作量,该咨询公司赚取服务费报酬。然而,面对指控,该公司拒不认罪。他们坚持认为,反垄断法的适用范围不包含自己的这种行为。但是,欧洲法院则支持了欧盟的指控(详见:T-27/10 AC-Treuhand v. Commission, C-194/14 P AC Treuhand v. Commission)。
9. European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Fines Broker ICAP€14.9 Million for Participation in Several Cartels in Yen Interest Rate Derivatives Sector, IP/15/4104(Brussels: European Commission, February 4,2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-4104_en.htm.
10. United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638(S.D.N.Y.2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 290(2d Cir. 2015). 在当时,苹果公司与它的合作者变革了由亚马逊公司确立的图书批发市场的商业模式,从而抬高了电子书的售价。United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 310(2d Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376(2016),2010年2月,本案中被指控的图书出版商将电子图书发售的定价方式由亚马逊定价转为代理商定价,在此后的一年中,他们的新书售价(加权平均价格)上升24.2%,畅销书价格上升40.4%,其余电子书价格增长27.5%,总体的加权平均价格提高23.9%。
11. 在2010年苹果公司首次发布iPad与iBooks Store时,苹果与各大图书出版商就平价条款做出了约定,意在确保自己能从图书出版商手中得到不高于其他买家购买价格的最优价格。在通常情况下,平价条款会与代理分销的模式相结合,供货商与代理人签订相关协定,约定该代理人互联网平台上的产品售价应不高于供货商提供的上限。详见:Okeoghene Odudu, “Indirect Information Exchange:The Constituent Elements of Hub and Spoke Collusion,” European Competition Journal 7, no. 2(2011): 205—242。
12. 事实上,法院曾谴责苹果公司与各家图书出版商签订的协议,称“这些合同虽本身并不具有不合法性,但它们为苹果公司有意识地与出版商结成共谋的事实提供了证据”。详见:Apple, 791 F.3d at316。美国纽约州南区联邦地区法院也曾做出过类似表态,“如果苹果公司认为对于它们做出的不利裁决一定意味着它们与图书出版商之间代理合同、限价政策或是平价条款存在不妥之处,那么也是一个正确的观点。在本案中,原告并未争辩称苹果进入电子图书市场后所采取的这些做法是不合法的,并且法院也没有发现相关的违法证据。问题的症结在于,苹果公司运用这些手段与图书出版商勾结在一起,达成了共谋”。详见:United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp.2d 638, 708(S.D.N.Y. 2013)。
13. Boomerang Commerce, Our Story, http://boomerangcommerce. com / about /.
14. Jason Del Rey, “Amazon Vet Raises $8.5 Million to Help Retailers Think More Like Amazon,” Re/Code(July 16, 2014), http://recode/2014/07/16 /amazon-vet-raises-8-5-million-to-help-retailersthink-more-like-amazon/.
15. Jason Del Rey, “Amazon Vet Raises $8.5 Million to Help Retailers Think More Like Amazon,” Re/Code(July 16, 2014), http://recode/2014/07/16 /amazon-vet-raises-8-5-million-to-help-retailersthink-more-like-amazon/.
16. Boomerang Commerce, What’s Worse than An 800-Pound Gorilla Undercutting Your Prices?, http://boomerangcommerce/resources/whats -worse-than-an-800-pound-gorilla-undercuttingyour-prices/.
17. Rohit Joshi, “How Does Uber’s Dispatch Algorithm Work?”Quora(December 13, 2014), http://quora/How-does-Ubersdispatch -algorithm-work; James Surowiecki, “In Praise of Efficient Price Gouging,” MIT Technology Review, August 19, 2014, http://technologyreview/review/529961/in-praise-of-efficient-pricegouging/; Eric Posner, “Why Uber Will — and Should — Be Regulated,”Slate(January 5, 2015), http://slate/articles/news_and_politics/view_from_chicago/2015/01/uber_surge_pricing_federal_regulation_over_taxis_and_car_ride_services .html.
18. Douglas Macmillan and Telis Demos, “Uber Valued at More than$50 Billion,” Wall Street Journal(London), July 31, 2015, http://wsj /articles/uber-valued-at-more-than-50-billion-1438367457.
19. Mark Harris, “Uber: Why the World’s Biggest Ride- Sharing Company Has No Drivers,” The Guardian, November 16, 2015, http://theguardian/technology/2015/nov/16/uber-worlds-biggest-ride-sharingcompany-no-drivers; Izabella Kaminska, “If and When Uber Drivers Unionise...,” Financial Times, January 12, 2016, http://ftalphaville.ft/2016/01/12/2149878/if-and-when-uber-drivers-unionise/(问题集中于优步合作车主的低工资与有限的职工权益);Tim Bradshawand Leslie Hook, 2015. “Uber Drivers Win Union ‘Breakthrough,’”Financial Times(San Francisco), December 15, 2015, http://www .ft/cms/s/0/37930e72-a2c6-1 1 e5-bc70-7ff6d4fd203a.html#axzz3yTDzV6n7(文中介绍了一项由西雅图城市法院颁布的法令,其中规定优步的合作车主可以成立工会,为自己向优步公司争取更多权益); Leslie Hook, “Setback for Uber on Drivers’ Class Action Case,” Financial Times(San Francisco), December 10, 2015,http://ft/cms/s/0/ddc7b032-9ec9-11e5-b45d-4812f209f861.html#axzz3yTDzV6n7(报道中介绍了一起发生在美国加利福尼亚州的案件,其中提到优步的合作车主应该被认定为该公司的正式员工而非合同工)。
20. Ian Beetlestone, “Why London’s Black Cab Drivers Are Protesting over Uber,” The Guardian, June 11, 2014, http://theguardian /commentisfree/2014/jun/11/why-london-taxi-driversprotesting-uber-tfi(这是一篇由驾驶伦敦标志性黑色出租车的专职司机撰写的文章,文中介绍了优步是如何规避监管框架,成了租车市场的服务商)。
21. Macmillan and Demos, “Uber Valued at More than $50 Billion.”
22. Uber, Always the Ride You Want: The Best Way to Get Wherever You’re Going, https://uber/ride.
23. Sarah Ashley O’Brien, “NYC Uber Drivers Protest Rate Cuts,”CNN Money(February 1, 2016), http://money.cnn/2016/02/01/technology/uber-nyc-protest/index.html?sr=twCNN020116uber-nycprotest0317PMVODtopPhoto &linkId=20849630; Lyft, Nashville Drivers Make Up to $6000/Month Driving Your Car, https://lyft/drivefor-lyft?im=&inc=6000&t=month&kw=Nashville%20Drivers&utm_source=bing&utm_medium=search&utm_campaign=Driver_BNA_v2_Search_Brand_All_Lyft&utm_term=lyft%20com%20driver&adgroup=lyft_driver&device=c&matchtype=b.
24. Uber, “Dynamic Pricing 101 | Uber,” YouTube(December 2014),https://www .youtube/watch?v=76q7PDnxWuE.
25. Annie Lowrey, “Is Uber’s Surge-Pricing an Example of HighTech Gouging?,” New York Times Magazine, January 10, 2014, http://nytimes/2014 /01/12/magazine/is-ubers-surge-pricing-anexample-of-high-tech-gouging .html?_r=0.
26. Jay Hathaway, “Uber Turned on Surge Pricing for People Fleeing Sydney Hostage Scene,” December 15, 2014, http://gawker/uberturned-on -surge-pricing-for-people-fieeing-sydney-1671193132; Brian Ries& Jenni Ryall, “Uber Intros Surge Pricing during Sydney Hostage Siege,Then Backtracks after User Outcry,” December 15, 2014, http://mashable/2014/12/14/ub er-sydney-surge-pricing/#lnLL3Y YzXSqM.
27. Min Kyung Lee, Daniel Kusbit, Evan Metsky, and Laura Dabbish,“Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and Data-Driven Management on Human Workers”(Pittsburgh: Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Heinz College, Carnegie Mellon University, 2015), http://cs.cmu.edu /~mklee/materials/Publication/2015-CHI_algorithmic_management.pdf.
28. 在英国公平交易局起诉零售企业乐购(Tesco)的案例中,对于交易双方通过第三方间接进行信息交换的问题,英国上诉法院认为,这个过程需要经历以下两个环节才能够被认定为中心辐射式共谋:(1)在明知供货商B会为了改变市场环境而将消息透露给其他零售商的前提下,零售商A将自己未来的定价策略告诉了前者;(2)零售商C从供应商B处获悉零售商A的定价策略(同时他也能够理解零售商B这样做的目的)并以此为参照制定自己的定价策略。详见:Case 1188/1/1/11, Tesco v. Office of Fair Trading ,(2012)CAT 31,para. 57, 58。
29. Case C-74/14, Eturas and Others(2016).
30. 欧盟法院的某位法律顾问提出这样一个说法,他认为“在判断第三方交易服务平台是否存在辅助横向共谋的不当行为的问题上,前提是需要确定信息的接收方是否将由第三方交易平台传递出去的信息视为竞争对手向自己发出的信号,或者是直接与竞争对手进行过沟通”。出处同上,详见:AG Opinion, para. 50。
31. Case C-74/14, Eturas and Others, para. 45(本案的卷宗中曾提到,“如果没有确凿的证据可以证明使用该网站的旅行社票务代理人对网站的这则公告知情,那么竞争对手之间在定价上的一致就不能被认定是由网站设定票价折扣率上限造成的……除非还有其他证据可以证明各家旅行社的票务代理存在蓄意共谋的企图,并构成了不正当竞争行为”)。
32. Maurice E. Stucke, “Is Intent Relevant?” Journal of Law,Economics & Policy 8(2012): 801; U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Antitrust Division Manual, 5th ed.(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, March 2014), chap. 3-12(文中指出,“如果有确凿的证据可以证明案件中的当事人对自己的行为可能造成的后果并不知情或者无法做出估量,那么美国司法部将不会对这类案件提起刑事诉讼”)。在分析竞争对手之间的协作时,如果反垄断执法机构对合作协议可能带来的后果无法给出明确答案,那么他们倾向于从寻找犯罪意图的证据出发对竞争对手的这种行为做出分析。详见:Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors(April 2000), p. 12, note 35, https://ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaborationamong-competitors/ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf。同理,欧盟在评估“合作协议是否给市场竞争秩序造成不良影响时”,是基于“一系列的因素”,其中就包括行为主体的意图。详见:Communication from the Commission, Notice Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3)of the Treaty, 2004/C 101/08)(April 27, 2004), para. 22, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:101:0097:01 18:EN:PDF. See also Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines(August 10, 2010), para.2.2.1, https://ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/mergerreview/100819hmg.pdf。
33. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 444-446(1978).本案审理过程中得出的结论是——“如果涉案企业对自己的行为所可能造成的后果明确知情,并且该行为的确造成了限制竞争的后果,那么在反垄断法的约束下,可以对涉案企业提起刑事诉讼”。
34. Case 1188/1/1/11, Tesco v. Office of Fair Trading.
35. 回到优步的例子,有必要对下面两种情况做出甄别:以优步的定价算法作为中心辐射式共谋的枢纽中心,或是优步与出租车同为竞争对手。2015年9月,加拿大某地方法院审理了一起案件,埃德蒙顿市出租车公司指控优步涉嫌串通它的合作车主进行价格操纵。本案中原告强调,由于优步的定价算法承担起了为合作车主设定车费的职责,所以优步自己就是其他出租车司机的竞争对手。详见:See“Uber Accused of Price-Fixing in $150M Lawsuit by Edmonton Taxi Companies,” CBC News(September 14, 2015), http://cbc.ca/news /canada/edmonton/uber-accused-of-price-fixing-in-150m-lawsuitby-edmonton-taxi-companies-1.3228115。
36. Meyer v. Kalanick, Case 1:15-cv-09796-JSR, slip op.(S.D.N.Y.March 31, 2016).
37. Meyer v. Kalanick, Case 1:15-cv-09796-JSR,15。
38. 即决判决(Summary Judgment)又译为简易判决,是英美法系过滤案件的一项重要民事诉讼制度,指的是法院无须经审理程序而进行裁决诉讼请求或系争案件的程序。这种民事诉讼制度意在加快诉讼进程、节省司法资源、提高审判效率。
39. 合理原则(Rule of Reason)是指对市场上的某些限制竞争行为并不必然地视为违法,其违法性需要依据具体情况而定的判断标准。具体而言,对某些限制竞争行为案件,反垄断执法机构或法院应具体地、仔细地考察和研究相关企业的行为目的、方式和后果,以判断该限制竞争行为的合理与否。合理原则是美国联邦最高法院在1911年“标准石油公司案”(Standard Oil Case)中确立的一项原则,并最终发展成为在反垄断法领域内应用最广泛的一项基本原则。至此,限制竞争行为不再被视为当然违法,而是要在具体研究案件各方面情况的基础上,确定该限制竞争行为合理与否,合理限制竞争的,属合法行为;而不合理限制竞争的,属违法行为。
40. Maurice E. Stucke, “Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of Law?” U.C. Davis Law Review 42(2009): 1375; Maurice E. Stucke,“Antitrust Marathon: Antitrust and the Rule of Law,” Loyola Consumer Law Review 22(2009): 15; Peter C. Carstensen, “The Content of the Hollow Core of Antitrust: The Chicago Board of Trade Case and the Meaning of the ‘Rule of Reason’ in Restraint of Trade Analysis,”Research in Law and Economics 15(1992): 1, 4.
41. Adam Candeub, “Behavioral Economics, Internet Search, and Antitrust,” MSU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-03(2014),http://ssrn/abstract =2414179.
42. Judy Wajcman, Pressedfor Time: The Acceleration of Life in Digital Capitalism(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); see also Hartmut Rosa, Social Acceleration — A New Theory of Modernity(New York: Columbia University Press, 2013).
第7章 卓有成效的默许共谋
1. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,509 U.S. 209(1993); R. S. Khemani and D. M. Shapiro, Glossary of Industrial Organisation Economics and Competition Law(Paris:Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 1993),http://oecd.org/dataoecd/8/61 /2376087.pdf.
2. Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright, and Jean Tirole, “The Economics of Tacit Collusion,” Final Report for DG Competition(Toulouse: European Commission, March 2003), 4, http://ec.europa.eu /competition/mergers/studies_reports/the_economics_of_tacit_collusion _en.pdf.
3. 有关默许共谋的经济学原理以及欧盟法院对于默许共谋的处理态度,详见:Nicolas Petit, “The ‘Oligopoly Problem’ in EU Competition Law” in Research Handbook in European Competition Law, Ioannis Liannos and Damien Geradin, eds.(Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013), 259。
4. White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 579(1st Cir. 2011).
5. White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 579(1st Cir. 2011). 21%的价差差距是由运输成本造成的。
6. White v. R.M. Packer Co.
7. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引,但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍:取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来,马撒葡萄园岛委员会(Martha’sVineyard Commission)已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面。
8. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引,但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍:取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来,马撒葡萄园岛委员会(Martha’sVineyard Commission)已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面。“一般来说,汽油并非耐用品,所以消费者会经常购买汽油。同时,他们也不会因为一时的价格涨跌而不去消费。”汽油消费的这种特点在马撒葡萄园岛上格外明显,游客往往都是在夏日匆匆来岛并短暂停留。所以他们中的大多数人更不会太过介意岛上汽油的溢价。
9. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引,但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍:取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来,马撒葡萄园岛委员会(Martha’sVineyard Commission)已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面。
10. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引,但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍:取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来,马撒葡萄园岛委员会(Martha’sVineyard Commission)已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面。
11. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引,但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍:取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来,马撒葡萄园岛委员会(Martha’sVineyard Commission)已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面,579。
12. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引,但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍:取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来,马撒葡萄园岛委员会(Martha’sVineyard Commission)已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面。
13. White v. R.M. Packer Co.。虽然潜在的市场竞争者会被岛上加油站的高利润所吸引,但他们却需要面对一个监管障碍:取得岛上加油站的营业牌照非常困难。自1997年以来,马撒葡萄园岛委员会(Martha’sVineyard Commission)已经拒绝所有开设加油站的申请。这在一定程度上也造成了岛上加油站市场的寡头垄断局面。
14. Bundeskartellamt, Fuel Sector Inquiry Final Report in Accordance with § 32e GWB(Bonn: Bundeskartellamt, May 2011), section 5,http://bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Sector%20 Inquiries/Fuel%20Sector%20Inquiry%20-%20Final%20Report.pdf?blob=publicationFile&v=14.
15. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines(August 10, 2010), para. 7.2,https://ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/attachments/merger-review/10 0 819hmg.pdf.
16. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines(August 10, 2010), para. 7.2,https://ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/attachments/merger-review/10 0 819hmg.pdf.
17. Case T-342/99, Airtours,(2002)ECR 2585,(2002)5 CMLR 317, para. 61.
18. European Commission, Guidelines on the Assessment of Horizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, 2004/C 31/03(February 5,2004), para. 49-50.
19. Ivaldi et al., “The Economics of Tacit Collusion,” 5.
20. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 7.
21. Roland Moore-Colyer, “Predictive Analytics Are the Future of Big Data,” V3(October 9, 2015),http://v3.co.uk/v3-uk/analysis/2429494/predictive-analytics-are-the-future-of-big-data.
22. Roland Moore-Colyer, “Predictive Analytics Are the Future of Big Data,”,citing Larry Augustine, chief executive at Sugar CRM。
23. Samuel B. Hwang and Sungho Kim, “Dynamic Pricing Algorithm for E-Commerce,” in Advances in Systems, Computing Sciences and Software Engineering, Proceedings of SCSS05, Tarek Sobh and Khaled Elleithy, eds.(Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 149-155; N. Abe and T.Kamba, “A Web Marketing System with Automatic Pricing,” Computer Networks 33(2000): 775-788; L. M. Minga, Y. Q. Fend, and Y. J. Li,“Dynamic Pricing: E-Commerce-Oriented Price Setting Algorithm,”International Conference on Machine Learning and Cybernetics 2(2003).
24. 届时,计算机会开展平行协作行动。“经营者对于竞争对手的市场策略所采取的回应都是理性的,而非报复性的反击或者心怀共谋协议的退让。但是计算机算法依旧可以实现抬高市场价格,削弱市场竞争机制的目的。”详见:Federal Trade Commission and U.S.Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 7。
25. Salil K. Mehra, “Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the Time of Algorithms,” Minnesota Law Review 100(March 10,2015), http://ssrn /abstract=2576341, on how pricing algorithms can promote tacit collusion under a Cournot model.
26. Christopher Chabris, “High-Tech Chess Cheaters Charge Ahead,”Wall Street Journal, October 9, 2015, http://wsj/articles/hightech-chess -cheaters-charge-ahead-1444404660.
27. Michael Lewis, Flash Boys: A Wall Street Revolt(New York: W.W. Norton, 2014).
28. 原告可以宣称,被告企业是蓄谋使用同样的定价算法。特别是他们之间达成了某种协议,约定使用同样的辅助工具用于促成默许共谋。详见:Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191(2d Cir. 2001)。这种诉讼策略的好处是易于证明市场参与者的确就使用定价算法达成了共识。但坏处就是,基于“合理原则”向被告发起指控时,调查取证的难度较高,法院有时还可能得出事与愿违的判决结果。
29. 按照一般意义上的理解,竞争法包括反不正当竞争法与反垄断法。
30. Case C-199/92, P Huls AG v. Commission,(1999)ECR I-4287,(1999)5 CMLR 1016; Joined Cases C-89, 104, 114, 116, 117, 125,129/85,Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio and others v. Commission(Wood Pulp II) ,(1993)ECR I-1307,(1993)4 CMLR 407; Cases T-442/08, CISAC v Commission,(2013)5 CMLR 15(General Court). Note that our focus is on nondominant firms.
31. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 7.
32. In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 874(7th Cir.)cert. denied sub nom.; Aircraft Check Servs. Co. v. Verizon Wireless, 136 S. Ct. 524(2015).
33. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199(October 16, 2014), http://sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34 -73369.pdf.
34. 据称,Athena公司的高频交易算法“在6个月的时间里,在每一个交易日收盘前的两秒钟内进行自动化交易。该公司的交易系统投入巨额资金,以庞大的交易规模直接操纵了在纽约纳斯达克市场中上市的数千只股票的收盘价”。详见:U.S. Securities andExchange Commission, SEC Charges New York-Based High Frequency Trading Firm with Fraudulent Trading to Manipulate Closing Prices,October 16, 2014, http://sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370543184457#.VEOZlfidV8E。出处同上。
35. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199(October 16, 2014), http://sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34 -73369.pdf.
36. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199(October 16, 2014), http://sec.gov/litigation/admin/2014/34 -73369.pdf.
37. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Administrative Proceeding File No. 3-16199, para.34.
38. Peter J. Henning, “Why High-Frequency Trading Is so Hard to Regulate,” New York Times, October 20, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes/2014/10/20/why-high-frequency-trading-is-so-hard-to-regulate/.
39. Steve Goldstein, “High-Frequency Trading Firm Fined for Wave of Last- Minute Trades,” Market Watch(October 16, 2014), http://marketwatch/story/high-frequency-trading-firm-fined-for-wave-oflast-minute-trades -2014-10-16.
40. 请留意一点:算法也可能被用来阻碍其他竞争者进入市场、传递复杂的信号以向潜在盟友暗示利润空间、参与限制定价等行为。
41. 从实践中看,默许共谋在市场参与者众多的情况下同样易于确立。详见:R. Selten, “A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition,Where Four Are Few and Six Are Many,” International Journal of Game Theory 2(1973): 141; Steffen Hucka, Hans-Theo Normannb, and Jorg Oechssler, “Two Are Few and Four Are Many: Number Effects in Experimental Oligopolies,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 53, no. 4(2004):435—446。
42. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16(1978); See also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law, 2nd ed.(Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2001), 160. 一般来讲,如果卖方能够掌握更多有关于竞争对手的价格与产出信息,那么市场运行效率也将得到提升。
第8章 人工智能、“上帝视角”与电子眼
1. Johana Bhuiyan and Charlie Warzel, “ ‘God View’: Uber Investigates Its Top New York Executive for Privacy Violations,”BuzzFeed News(November 18, 2014), http://buzzfeed/johanabhuiyan/uber-is-investigating-its-top-new-york-executive-forprivacy#.fcOoXKDMw.
2. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines(August 10, 2010), para. 7.2, https://ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/attachments/merger-review/10 0 819hmg.pdf.
3. Natalie Mortimer, “Amazon Launches Platform to Build IoT Apps for Cars, Lightbulbs and More,” The Drum(October 9, 2015), http://thedrum/news/2015/10/09/amazon-launches-platform-buildiot-apps-cars-lightbulbs-and-more.
4. Natalie Mortimer, “Amazon Launches Platform to Build IoT Apps for Cars, Lightbulbs and More,” The Drum(October 9, 2015), http://thedrum/news/2015/10/09/amazon-launches-platform-buildiot-apps-cars-lightbulbs-and-more.
5. 如果没有这些限制性原则,那么默许共谋将与信使场景中的情景无异。
6. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554(2007).
7. Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life(New York: W.W. Norton, 1991), 108.
8. Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life(New York: W.W. Norton, 1991),111。
9. 战略性行为指的是企业旨在增加利润所采取的因影响市场环境进而影响竞争对手预期,使竞争对手在预期的基础上做出对自己有利的决策行为。主要类型包括非合作型战略性行为与合作型战略性行为。
10. Don Ross, “Game Theory,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Winter 2014 ed.), Edward N. Zalta, ed., http://plato.stanford.edu/archives /win 2014/entries/game-theory/.
11. 如果想对卡特尔组织如何培育成员互信这个课题有更全面深入的理解,详见:Christopher R. Leslie, “Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust,”Texas Law Review 82(2004): 515。
12. 在一项有关卡特尔组织成员个数的实证研究中,研究人员调取了1910—1972年所有被成功起诉的卡特尔组织案例。其中,在以同业协会的方式辅助共谋的例子里,平均有33.6家企业参与其中(中位数则是14家企业)。另外,以价格操纵组织(企业之间未成立同业协会)辅助共谋的例子里,以上两个指标的数据分别为8.3家与6家。详见:Arthur G. Frass and Douglas F. Greer, “Market Structure and Price Collusion: An Empirical Analysis,” Journal of Industrial Economics 26(1977): 21, 25, 36—41。
13. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 7.
14. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow(New York: Farrar,Straus and Giroux, 2011).
15. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 7; Casey C. Sullivan, “As Machines Learn, Will They Learn the Law? Will They Follow It?” FindLaw(September 8, 2015), http://blogs.findlaw/technologist/2015/09/asmachines-learn-will-they-learn-the-law-will-they-follow-it. html.
16. A. Ezrachi, “Sponge,” University of Oxford Centre for Competition Law and Policy Working Paper CCLP(L)42(March 1, 2015), http://ssrn/abstract =2572028.
第三部分 行为歧视
1. Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Jeremy Singer-Vine, and Ashkan Soltani, “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information,”Wall Street Journal, December 24, 2012, http://wsj/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534.
第9章 对价格歧视的简要说明
1. Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis, Mark A. Lemley, Christopher R. Leslie, and Michael A. Carrier, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property Law, 2nd ed.(Frederick, MD: Aspen Publishers, 2010), Appendix F.
2. Deven R. Desai, Ioannis Lianos, and Spencer Weber Waller, eds.,Brands Competition Law and IP(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
3. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Horizontal Merger Guidelines(August 10, 2010), para. 3, https://ftc.gov/sites/ default/files/attachments/merger-review/10 0 819hmg.pdf.
4. Peter Schmidt, “At Elite Colleges—Dim White Kids,” Boston Globe, September 28, 2007, http://boston/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/09/28/at_the_elite_colleges dim_white_kids/?page=full.
5. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 3.
6. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, para. 3.
7. Barry C. Smith, John F. Leimkuhler, and Ross M. Darrow, “Yield Management at American Airlines,” Interfaces 22, no. 1(1992): 8-31;Paul Davies, “Airline Ties Profitability Yield to Management,” SIAM News 27, no. 5(1994), cited in R. Preston McAfee and Vera te Velde“Dynamic Pricing in the Airline Industry”.“出于以下几个原因,这个数字(指正文中提到的‘5亿美元’)可能被高估。首先,这个数字包括美国航空公司售卖自己独家的收益管理策略的获利,但只占到总金额的很小部分;其次,在‘星期六晚停留政策’(Saturday-nightstay-over restrictions)的安排下,航空公司往往认为商务旅客会情愿付出高票价而换取及早回家过周末的机会,而休闲游乘客的价格敏感度更高,他们会为了买到低廉机票而宁愿在目的地停留一个周末。于是,航空公司会故意抬高周末的机票价格,从而实现对乘客的区分。这类价格政策有利于企业开展价格歧视,但这方面的影响力却被其他因素淹没,而被严重低估(Deneckere and McAfee 1996)。无论如何,有一点毫无疑问:定价歧视对于企业而言,的确有着重要的经济意义。对于普通消费者而言,美国大型航空公司使用的定价政策都是非常不透明的。因此,如果有种说法声称美国航空公司会在每天之中对近50万单机票的价格做出调整,那么也并不令人感到惊讶了。”详见:http://mcafee/Papers/PDF/DynamicPriceDiscrimination.pdf。
8. Jack Nicas, “Now Prices Can Change from Minute to Minute,”Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2015, http://wsj /articles/now-prices-can-change-from-minute-to-minute-1450057990.
9. 有一个例外,当执行歧视性定价的增量成本(incrementalcost)超过了增量利润(incremental profit)时,企业就无法从价格歧视中获利。
第10章 完全价格歧视时代的到来?
1. Advertising Week XII, “Journey of Data-Driven Marketing,”Advertising Week, September 28-October 2, 2015, http://advertisingweek /replay/#date=2015-09-30~video-id=227~venue=2;Suzanne Vranica, “Ad Blocking Is the Latest Hot Topic, Media Executives,” Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2015), http://wsj/articles/ad-blocking-is-a-hot-topic-for-marketing-mediaexecutives-1443259981.
2. James Surowiecki, “In Praise of Efficient Price Gouging,” MIT Technology Review(August 19, 2014), http://technologyreview/review/529961 /in-praise-of-efficient-price-gouging/.
3. J. Turow, L. Feldman, and K. Meltzer, K. “Open to Exploitation:America’s Shoppers Online and Offiine,” Report from the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania(June 6, 2005),http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/35; Jennifer Valentino-Devries,Jeremy Singer-Vine, and Ashkan Soltani, “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information,” Wall Street Journal, December 24, 2012,http://wsj/articles /SB100014241278873237772045781893918 13881534.
4. Valentino-Devries et al., “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information.”
5. Valentino-Devries et al., “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information.”
6. Valentino-Devries et al., “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information.”
7. Valentino-Devries et al., “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information.”
8. Valentino-Devries et al., “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information.”
9. Paragraph 290, House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market,” April 20, 2016,10th Report of Session 2015-16, http://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf.
10. Emily Steel and Julia Angwin, “On the Web’s Cutting Edge,Anonymity in Name Only,” Wall Street Journal, August 4, 2010, http://wsj /articles/SB10001424052748703294904575385532109190198.
11. Valentino-Devries et al., “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information.”
12. Valentino-Devries et al., “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information.”
13. Valentino-Devries et al., “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information.”
14. Consumer Federation of America, “Report Finds Auto Insurers Charge Higher Premiums in African American Zip Codes,” CFAnews Update(November 24, 2015), http://consumerfed.org/cfanewsupdate-11242015/.
15. Sal Thomas, “Does Dynamic Pricing Risk Turning Personalisation into Discrimination?” Marketing Magazine, October 22, 2014, http://marketingmagazine.co.uk/article/1317995/does-dynamic-pricingrisk-turning-personalisation-discrimination.
16. Coupons Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,2014(2015), 3, http://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/ data/1115128/000156459015001837/coup-10k_20141231.htm. In 2015,the company changed its name to Quotient Technology Inc.; Coupons Inc., “Coupons Incorporated Changes Corporate Name to Quotient”(October 6, 2015), http://investors.coupons/investors/press-releases/press-releases-details/2015/Couponscom-IncorporatedChanges-Corporate-Name-to-Quotient/ default . aspx.
17. Coupons Inc., “Coupons Incorporated Changes Corporate Name to Quotient.”
18. Coupons Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2014, 5.
19. Coupons Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2014, 5.
20. Coupons Inc., Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December,4。
21. Executive Office of the President, Big Data and Differential Pricing(Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President), February 2015, p.12, https://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/docs/Big_Data_Report_Nonembargo_v2.pdf. 文中称,“会员制度是最早应用大数据手段开展个性化定价的方式。顾客加入某项会员活动后,他们通常会提供一些个人信息给商家,同时也会对商家追踪消费记录的行为表示认可。反过来,顾客也会因此得到一些福利,比如航空公司优质会员的免费升舱、零售商店的会员特价等。除此以外,一些零售商还会与专业的信息科技公司合作,针对不同消费者提供定制优惠券,它们可能被印在了收银条的背面,或是在推销中被特别赠予。专长于此的企业声称,消费者使用定制化优惠券的概率要远远高于那些随机派发的优惠券(25:1)”。
22. Charles Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets,” New York Times Sunday Magazine, February 16, 2012, http://nytimes/2012/02/19 /magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
23. Charles Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets,” New York Times Sunday Magazine, February 16, 2012, http://nytimes/2012/02/19 /magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
24. Charles Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets,” New York Times Sunday Magazine, February 16, 2012, http://nytimes/2012/02/19 /magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
25. Charles Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets,” New York Times Sunday Magazine, February 16, 2012, http://nytimes/2012/02/19 /magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
26. Target, Privacy Policy, October 1, 2015, http://target/spot/privacy -policy#section1.
27. Target, Privacy Policy, October 1, 2015, http://target/spot/privacy -policy#section1.
28. Target, Privacy Policy, October 1, 2015, http://target/spot/privacy -policy#section1.
29. Target, Privacy Policy, October 1, 2015, http://target/spot/privacy -policy#section1.
30. Target, Privacy Policy, October 1, 2015, http://target/spot/privacy -policy#section1.
31. Target, Privacy Policy, October 1, 2015, http://target/spot/privacy -policy#section1.
32. Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets.”
33. Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets.”
34. Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets.”
35. Duhigg, “How Companies Learn Your Secrets.”
36. Brad Howarth, “How Tesco’s Loyalty Card Transformed Customer Data Tracking,” CMO(May 21, 2015), http://cmo.au/article/575497/how-tesco-loyalty-card- transformed -customer- datatracking /; Krish Swarmy, “Analyzing Tesco — The Analytics behind a Top-Notch Loyalty Program,” Big Data Analytics(August 21, 2011),http://stat-exchange.blogspot/2011/08 /analyzing-tesco-analyticsbehind-top.html.
37. McKinsey & Company, Making Loyalty Pay: Lessons from the innovators(McKinsey & Company, July 2013).
38. “The Card Up Their Sleeve,” The Guardian, July 19, 2003,http://www .theguardian/lifeandstyle/2003/jul/19/shopping.features.
39. Alex Chisholm(CMA chief executive), Why “Sleepers”Can’t Always Be Left to “Sleep,” CCRP 2016 Competition Policy Roundtable(London: Competition Markets Authority, January 25,2016), https://gov.uk/government/speeches/alex-chisholm-onconsumer-engagement-in-a-digital-world.
40. Coupons Inc., “Coupons Incorporated Changes Corporate Name to Quotient.”
41. 有关移动用户的行为追踪的内容,详见:Chris Cooper,“Nordstrom Stores Tracking Customers’ Cell Phones,” Stop Cell Phone Tracking(February 11, 2013), http://stopcellphonetracking/nordstrom-tracking-customers-cell-phones/; Chris Cooper, “This Is How Retail Stores Track Your Smartphone,” Stop Cell Phone Tracking(June 3,2013), http://stopcellphonetracking/this-is-how-retail-stores-track-your-smartphone-video/。有关个性化店内定位追踪技术的介绍,详见:Verne Kopytoff, “Stores Sniff Out Smartphones to Follow Shoppers,” MIT Technology Review(November 12, 2013), http://technology review/news/520811/stores-sniff-out-smartphones-to-follow-shoppers/。
42. Clare McDonald, “Almost 30% of Retailers Use Facial Recognition Technology to Track Consumers in Store,” ComputerWeekly(September 15, 2015), http://wwwcomputerweekly/news/4500253499/Almost30-of-retailers-use-facial-recognition-technology-to-track-consumers-instore; Jimmy Rose, “How Facial Recognition Will Change Shopping in Stores,” Extreme Tech(June 23, 2015), http://extremetech/ mobile/208815-how-facial-recognition-will-change-shopping-in-stores;James Hercher, “Shopper Behavior Begins In-Store — But Brick-andMortars Need Tech to Harness It,” Ad Exchanger(July 8, 2015), http://adexchanger/data -exchanges/shopper-behavior-begins-in-store-butbrick-and-mortars-need-tech-to-harness-it/(文中提到,“值得注意的是,许多新开业的零售店都格外依赖这种面部识别技术。一家名为AdMobilize的公司刚刚在近期获得160万美元的投资,而该公司的主业是在实体店内安装具备面部识别技术的摄像头,以实现收集消费者在店内活动的数据”); Heather Fletcher, “Facial Recognition:Ads Target Consumers for You,” Target Marketing(October 5, 2015),http://targetmarketingmag/article/facial-recognition-ads-targetconsumers / [“据‘透明度市场研究’(Transparency Market Research)的预测,到了2020年,全球面部识别技术市场的体量将达到27亿美元”] 。
43. Federal Trade Commission, Spring Privacy Series: Mobile Device Tracking,(February 19, 2014), https://ftc.gov/news-events/eventscalendar/2014/02/spring-privacy-series-mobile-device-tracking.
44. In re Nomi Technologies, Inc., FTC No. 132 3251(April 23, 2015),https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150423nomicmpt.pdf.
45. In re Nomi Technologies, Inc., FTC No. 132 3251(April 23, 2015),https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/150423nomicmpt.pdf.
46. Federal Trade Commission, Statement of Chairwoman Ramirez,Commissioner Brill, and Commissioner McSweeny in the Matter of Nomi Technologies, Inc.(April 23, 2015), https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/638351/150423nomicommissionstatement. pdf.
47. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability(May 2014), ii-iii, https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents /reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
48. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability(May 2014), ii-iii, https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents /reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
49. Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow.
50. Richard Thaler, Misbehaving: TheMakingofBehavioral Economics(New York: W. W. Norton, 2015), chap. 7.
51. G. B. Northcraft and M. A. Neale, “Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 39(1987): 84-97.
52. G. B. Northcraft and M. A. Neale, “Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 39(1987): 84-97.
53. G. B. Northcraft and M. A. Neale, “Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 39(1987): 84-97.
54. G. B. Northcraft and M. A. Neale, “Experts, Amateurs, and Real Estate: An Anchoring-and-Adjustment Perspective on Property Pricing Decisions,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 39(1987): 84-97.
55. David Streitfeld, “Some Online Bargains May Only Look Like One,” New York Times, April 13, 2016, http://nytimes/2016/04/14/technology /some-online-bargains-may-only-looklike-one.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore- iphone-share&_ r =0.
56. David Streitfeld, “Some Online Bargains May Only Look Like One,” New York Times, April 13, 2016, http://nytimes/2016/04/14/technology /some-online-bargains-may-only-looklike-one.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore- iphone-share&_ r =0.
57. 锚定效应是指当人们需要对某个事件做定量估测时,会将某些特定数值作为起始值,起始值像锚一样制约着估测值。在做决策的时候,会不自觉地给予最初获得的信息过多的重视。作为一种心理现象,锚定效应普遍存在于生活的方方面面,第一印象和先入为主是其在社会生活中的表现形式。
58. European Data Protection Supervisor, Mobile Health: Reconciling Technological Innovation with Data Protection, Opinion 1/2015(May 21, 2015), para.29, https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2015/15-05-21_Mhealth_EN.pdf.
第11章 近乎完美的行为歧视
1. 一篇商业文章的作者提出,以下几大情绪波动交织在一起影响了消费者做出购买决定:
(1)贪婪。“如果我现在买了它,我就占到了实惠。”
(2)恐惧。“如果我现在不买它,我就亏大了。”
(3)无私。“如果我现在买了它,我将可以帮助到他人。”
(4)嫉妒。“如果我现在不买它,我就比不过他了。”
(5)虚荣。“如果我现在买了它,这说明我还挺聪明。”
(6)羞愧。“如果我现在不买它,那可丢死人了。”
详见:Geoffrey James, “6 Emotions that Make Customers Buy: Customers Make Decisions at the Gut Level. Here’s How to Use the Customer’s Emotions to Your Advantage,” Inc(February 8, 2012),http://inc/geoffrey -j ames/6 - emotions-that-make- customers-buy.html。
2. Executive Office of the President, Big Data and Differential Pricing(Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, February 2015), 8, https://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/docs/Big_Data_Report_Nonembargo_v2.pdf.
3. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data: Report on the CMA’s Call for Information, CMA38(June 2015), 2.86, https://gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf. 2.86.
4. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data: Report on the CMA’s Call for Information, CMA38(June 2015), 2.86, https://gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf. 2.86.
5. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data: Report on the CMA’s Call for Information, CMA38(June 2015), 2.86, https://gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf. 2.86.
6. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data: Report on the CMA’s Call for Information, CMA38(June 2015), 2.86, https://gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf,2.75。
7. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data: Report on the CMA’s Call for Information, CMA38(June 2015), 2.86, https://gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf,2.85。
8. Apple, About Advertising & Privacy(September 14, 2015),https://support .apple/en-us/HT205223.
9. Apple, About Advertising & Privacy(September 14, 2015),https://support .apple/en-us/HT205223.
10. Apple, About Advertising & Privacy(September 14, 2015),https://support .apple/en-us/HT205223.。苹果公司方面声称,iAd不会“获取用户的性取向、宗教信仰、政治立场,更不会将这些信息用于广告营销”。同时,Apple Pay上的手机支付信息与内置“健康”App上的用户数据同样也不会用于iAd的广告营销。此外,iAd不会向第三方出售或是转让任何可识别出用户个人的信息。
11. Apple, About Advertising & Privacy(September 14, 2015),https://support .apple/en-us/HT205223.。在2015年里,如果苹果手机用户想要限制iAd在iOS系统上的数据追踪,他需要完成以下操作:“设置”—“隐私”—“广告”—勾选“限制广告追踪”。同样,不论是在iTunes、Apple TV上,用户都需要完成相似的步骤才可以限制广告追踪。
12. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability(Washington, DC: Federal Trade Commission, May 2014), 19-20, https://ftc.gov/system/files/ documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014 /140527databrokerreport.pdf.
13. Lifehack Quotes, http://quotes.lifehack.org/edward-norton/webuy-things-we-dont-need-with/.
14. Karen Freeman, “Amos Tversky, Expert on Decision Making,Is Dead at 59,” New York Times, June 6, 1996, http://nytimes/1996/06/06/us/amos -tversky-expert-on-decision-making-is-deadat-59.html.
15. Ned Welch, “A Marketer’s Guide to Behavioral Economics,”McKinsey Quarterly, February 2010, http://mckinsey/insights/marketing_sales/a_marketers_guide_to_behavioral_economics.
16. Robert B. Cialdini, Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion(New York: HarperBusiness, 2007).
17. Dan Ariely, Predictably Irrational: The Hidden Forces that Shape Our Decisions(New York: HarperCollins, 2009), 2.
18. Welch, “A Marketer’s Guide to Behavioral Economics”; Sheryl E.Kimes, Robert Phillips, and Lisabet Summa, “Pricing in Restaurants,”in The Oxford Handbook of Pricing Management, A. Ozer and Robert Phillips, eds.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 106(值得注意的是,这种现象也可被解释为“妥协效应”或“语境效应”)。
19. Welch, “A Marketer’s Guide to Behavioral Economics”; Sheryl E.Kimes, Robert Phillips, and Lisabet Summa, “Pricing in Restaurants,”in The Oxford Handbook of Pricing Management, A. Ozer and Robert Phillips, eds.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 106(值得注意的是,这种现象也可被解释为“妥协效应”或“语境效应”)。
20. Welch, “A Marketer’s Guide to Behavioral Economics”; Sheryl E.Kimes, Robert Phillips, and Lisabet Summa, “Pricing in Restaurants,”in The Oxford Handbook of Pricing Management, A. Ozer and Robert Phillips, eds.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 106(值得注意的是,这种现象也可被解释为“妥协效应”或“语境效应”)。
21. Welch, “A Marketer’s Guide to Behavioral Economics”; Sheryl E.Kimes, Robert Phillips, and Lisabet Summa, “Pricing in Restaurants,”in The Oxford Handbook of Pricing Management, A. Ozer and Robert Phillips, eds.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 106(值得注意的是,这种现象也可被解释为“妥协效应”或“语境效应”)。
22. Kyle James, “Beware of These Pricing Tricks Retailers Use to Fool Your Brain,” Two Cents(May 22, 2015), http://twocents. lifehacker/beware-of-these-pricing-tricks-retailers-use-to-foolyo-1706225322.
23. Anshu Jalora, “Applying Consumer Psychology to Software Pricing,” in Innovation in Pricing: Contemporary Theories and Best Practices, Andreas Hinterhuber and Stephan Liozu, eds.(London:Routledge, 2013), 396-399.
24. Anshu Jalora, “Applying Consumer Psychology to Software Pricing,” in Innovation in Pricing: Contemporary Theories and Best Practices, Andreas Hinterhuber and Stephan Liozu, eds.(London:Routledge, 2013),397。
25. Executive Office of the President, BigData and Differential Pricing, 11.
26. Aniko Hannak, Gary Soeller, David Lazer, Alan Mislove, and Christo Wilson, “Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce Web Sites,” Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference, New York, 305-318, http://ccs.neu.edu/home/cbw/pdf /imc151-hannak.pdf.
27. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data, 93-94.
28. Hannak et al., “Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce Web Sites.”
29. Hannak et al., “Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce Web Sites.”,sections 4.2-4.5。
30. Hannak et al., “Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce Web Sites.”,section 5.2。
31. Hannak et al., “Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce Web Sites.”,section 5.2。
32. Hannak et al., “Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce Web Sites.”,section 5.2。
33. Hannak et al., “Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce Web Sites.”,section 5.2。
34. Xavier Gabaix and David Laibson, “Shrouded Attributes,Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121(2006): 505-508; Oren Bar-Gill and Elizabeth Warren, “Making Credit Safer,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 157, no. 1(2008): 27-28; Simon Johnson and James Kwak, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown(New York: Pantheon, 2010), 81, 108.
35. Adi Ayal, “Harmful Freedom of Choice: Lessons from the Cellphone Market,” Law and Contemporary Problems 74(2011):91, 118; 文中提到,“合同文本的复杂性有助于提高顾客的转换成本,也使商家可以对不同消费者进行定价分化,粉饰自己的抬价行为”。
36. Eugenio J. Miravete, “The Doubtful Profitability of Foggy Pricing 2-3,” NET Institute Working Paper No. 04-07(2004), http:/ssrn/abstract=618465.
37. Ayal, “Harmful Freedom of Choice,” 124.
38. Ellen Peters et al., “More Is Not Always Better: Intuitions about Public Policy Can Lead to Unintended Health Consequences,” Social Issues & Policy Review 7, no. 1(1996): 114, 122.
39. Chris M. Wilson and Catherine Waddams Price, “Do Consumers Switch to the Best Supplier?” Oxford Economic Papers 62(2011): 98131; see also Adi Ayal, “Harmful Freedom of Choice,” 121. 有关美国医疗保健市场中的反竞争市场行为与启示,详见:William M. Sage and Peter J. Hammer, “Competing on Quality of Care: The Need to Develop a Competition Policy for Health Care Markets,” University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 32(1999): 1073, 1082。
40. Competition and Markets Authority, Energy Market Investigation:Summary of Provisional Findings Report(July 7, 2015), para.123, https://gov.uk /government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/442500/EMI_PFs_Summary.pdf.
41. Competition and Markets Authority, Energy Market Investigation:Summary of Provisional Findings Report(July 7, 2015)。英国竞争与市场管理局发现,消费者对产品定价缺乏审视精神的原因还在于“(他们)可能没有有效利用互联网进行相关产品价格搜索(或者没有条件上网)”。文中还提到,“低收入群体与教育水平较低的消费者”更加不善于使用比价网站。
42. Competition and Markets Authority, Energy Market Investigation:Summary of Provisional Findings Report(July 7, 2015),para. 126。
43. Stefania Sitzia, Jiwei Zheng, and Daniel John Zizzo,“Complexity and Smart Nudges with Inattentive Consumers,” CCP Working Paper 12-13, available online: http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/8158338/8251737/CCP+Working+Paper+12-13.pdf/f9d4eff9daf7-4244-acd7 -240b8972bfd7.
44. Anthony Giorgianni, “Avoid These Mattress Store Tricks:Don’t Be Misled into Paying More or Buying Stuff You Don’t Want,”Consumer Reports, May 8, 2014, http://consumerreports.org/cro/news/2014/05/avoid-mattress-store-tricks/index.htm.
45. U.K. Office of Fair Trading, The Impact of Price Frames on Consumer Decision Making, OFT1226(May 2010), 1.5, http://webarchive.national archives.gov.uk/20140402142426/, http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic _research/OFT1226.pdf.
46. Executive Office of the President, Big Data and Differential Pricing, 6.
47. Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208(1939).
48. Ismat Sarah Mangla, “3 Tricks to Help You Snag the Best Deals Online,” Time, September 8, 2014, http://time/money/3136612/ dynamic-pricing -amazon-best-buy-walmart/.
49. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk,” Econometrica 47(1979): 263; U.K.Office of Fair Trading, Consumer Behavioural Biases in Competition: A Survey, Final Report, OFT1324(May 2011), 3.10-3.201.11.
50. E. Vis and J. Toth, “The Abolition of the No-Discrimination Rule,”(Amsterdam: ITM Research, March 2000), 7-10, http://creditslips.org/files /netherlands-no-discrimination-rule-study.pdf.
51. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler,“Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,” in Advances in Behavioral Economics, Colin F. Camerer,George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, eds.(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, December 28, 2003), 252, 257.
52. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Competition and Regulation in Agriculture: Monopsony Buying and Joint Selling, DAF/ COMP(2005)44(December 21, 2005), 8, http://oecd.org/competition /abuse/35910977.pdf.
53. Colin F. Camerer, “Prospect Theory in the Wild: Evidence from the Field,” in Advances in Behavioral Economics, Colin F. Camerer,George Loewenstein, and Matthew Rabin, eds.(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, December 28, 2003): 148, 152(对于很多消费者而言,涨价带给他们的情绪波动要远甚于打折促销的喜悦。如果商家对于商品原价进行上调,他们往往会选择收缩开支;但当产品促销时,他们却不一定会抓紧采购)。详见:Daniel Kahneman, “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics,” American EconomicReview 93(December 2003): 1449, 1458。
54. James Surowiecki, “In Praise of Efficient Gouging,” MIT Technology Review(August 19, 2004), http://technologyreview/review/529961/in-praise-of-efficient-price-gouging/.
55. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).
56. Alex Chisholm(CMA chief executive), Why “Sleepers”Can’t Always Be Left to “Sleep,” CCRP 2016 Competition Policy Roundtable(London: Competition Markets Authority, January 25,2016), https://gov.uk/government/speeches/alex-chisholm-onconsumer-engagement-in- a-digital-world; quoting In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 874(7th Cir.)cert. denied sub nom and Aircraft Check Servs. Co. v. Verizon Wireless, 136 S. Ct. 524(2015).
57. Paragraph 79, House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market,” April 20, 2016,10th Report of Session 2015-16, http://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516 /ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf.
58. 本书第13章将介绍比价网站在限制商家进行价格歧视时发挥的作用。
59. Executive Office of the President, Big Data and Differential Pricing.
60. 在欧盟,有关隐私与电子通信的相关法规“约束了电信服务提供商对于用户隐私信息的收集行为以及对用户Cookies(即存储在用户本地终端设备上的数据)的使用”。比如,“被电信服务提供商获取到的用户定位数据必须在完成通信服务后被匿名化处理或者删除”,除非“相关信息还被用于提供增值服务”,又或者“用户已授权服务商可以保留相关信息。”此外,“(服务商)在使用并追踪Cookies或者相似技术上的数据时需要在搜索设置上提示用户是否同意跟踪其Cookies记录并且征得用户同意”。详见:DLAPiper, Data Protection Laws of the World, http://dlapiperdataprotection/#handbook /online-privacy-section/c2_GB。
61. Chisholm, Why “Sleepers” Can’t Always Be Left to “Sleep.”
62. “David Currie speaks about the CMA experience of behavioural economics,” April 20, 2015. Available on the CMA website: https://gov.uk /government/speeches/david- currie-speaks-about-the-cmaexperience - of -behavioural-economics.
第12章 行为歧视的社会经济效应
1. Michael Eisen, “Amazon’s $23,698,655.93 Book about Flies,”It Is NOT Junk(April 22, 2011), http://michaeleisen.org/blog/?p=358.
2. P. T. Leeson and R. Sobel, “Costly Price Discrimination,”Economics Letters 99, no. 1(2008): 206-208, http://peterleeson/Costly_Price_Discrimination.pdf; 文中提到,“我们之所以说‘完美的价格歧视的社会效率低下’,是因为企业需要在实施价格歧视的过程中负担种种开支。这些成本包括细分客户、识别需求弹性、防止转售。不论是在什么行业,这些成本都不菲。由此,也不是所有的企业的会采取如此的定价策略。(学术界)不该在现有的价格歧视理论中忽视这些交易成本。瓦里安(Varian)曾指出,‘一个完整的价格歧视社会福利效应分析不能忽视这种定价策略在施行过程中的交易成本’”。
3. P. Papandropoulos, “How Should Price Discrimination Be Dealt with by Competition Authorities?” Revue des droits de la concurrence 3(2007): 34-38, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/concurrences_03 _2007.pdf.
4. 有一点值得注意,在一项有关航空票价的研究中,研究者发现航空公司的实际策略符合他们对其定价模式的设想:当飞特定航线的航空公司增多时,航空公司会为需求价格弹性较高的旅客提供更优惠的票价,与此同时却维持对需求价格弹性低的旅客的票价。详见:J. Stavins, “Price Discrimination in the Airline Markets: The Effect of Market Concentration,” Review of Economics and Statistics 83(2001):200。
5. 比方说,医药行业市场,“在低收入水平国家,当地的民众会仅仅因为价格问题而不愿购买那些药效显著的药剂。这样看来,这些地方更需要价格歧视,特别是大规模的降价销售”。详见:JudithL. Wagner and Elizabeth McCarthy, “International Differences in Drug Prices,” Annual Review of Public Health 25(2004): 475。
6. 同样还是医药行业市场的例子,由Jerry Hausman和Jeffrey K.MacKie-Mason开展的一项研究揭示,由于价格歧视带给企业研发活动的积极影响,整体社会福利效应会在动态变化中得到改善。详见:Jerry A. Hausman and Jeffrey McKie-Mason, “Price Discrimination and Patent Policy,” RAND Journal of Economics 19(1988): 253。当企业能够通过价格歧视来负担研发活动造成的高昂前期投入成本时,他们也会有更大的创新动力:“如果考虑到动态激励,价格歧视也可以确保企业通过赚取可观的回报来维持长期的研发投资热情。”Papandropoulos, “How Should Price Discrimination Be Dealt with by Competition Authorities?”如果企业具备创新能力,那么创新的动力将被由创新带来的财务收益点燃。这一经济框架“经常与著名经济学家约瑟夫·熊彼特(Joseph Schumpeter)教授联系在一起”,他建议说:“拥有市场力量的公司应该最有动机创新,这是由他们的经营规模与市场地位决定的。”详见:D. L. Weisman and R. B.Kulick, “Price Discrimination, Two-Sided Markets, and Net Neutrality Regulation,” Tulane Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 13(2010): 81, https://researchgate/profile/Dennis_Weisman/publication/228307995_Price_Discrimination_Two-Sided_Markets_and_Net_Neutrality_Regulation/links/0deec5187eadf2a5c8000000.pdf。
7. Josh Wright, “Price Discrimination Is Good, Part I,” Truth on the Market(November 30, 2008), http://truthonthemarket/2008/11/30/price -discrimination-is-good-part-i/. 一般来讲,这种理念与诺贝尔经济学奖获得者肯尼斯·阿罗(Kenneth Arrow)不无关系,他提出“由创新带来的业务扩张多是来源于竞争对手的拱手相让,而寡头企业则可能在很大程度上蚕食自己的业务”。详见:Weisman andKulick, “Price Discrimination, Two-Sided Markets, and Net Neutrality Regulation.”
8. “价格歧视之所以会加剧竞争的原因在于:在统一定价策略下,企业只会就边际消费者展开争夺;但通过价格歧视,企业可以争夺市场中的所有客户,包括那些对竞争对手有着强烈忠诚度的顾客。”详见:Papandropoulos, “How Should Price Discrimination Be Dealt with by Competition Authorities?”
9. 以欧洲的汽车租赁行业为例。2014年,欧盟委员会致函六家国际汽车租赁公司,包括Avis、Europcar和Hertz。原来,这几家租车公司会针对顾客的国别而进行差别化定价。详见:“Car HirePrices ‘Unfairly Vary’ across the EU,” BBC News(August 12, 2014),http://bbc.co.uk/news/business-28756674。美国司法部在2003年的一起并购案中也注意到了这个问题。该案关乎北加州的两大临床实验室测试服务供应商——Quest Diagnostics公司与Unilab公司。“虽然这些服务的购买者不能将服务转售给其他客户并获取经济价值,但服务供应商可以根据医生的供职地确定这些客户还可选择的竞争替代品的多寡。这说明,并购促成后的这个垄断者可以基于客户的所在地进行价格歧视。”详见:Federal Trade Commission and U.S.Department of Justice, Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines(March 2006), 8, http://justice.gov/atr/commentary-horizontalmerger-guidelines。
10. Commission Decision 85/609 ECS/AKZO, OJ L 374(December 31, 1985), para. 83.
11. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data, CMA38(June 2015), https://gov.uk/government/uploads/system /uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_commercial_use_of_consumer_data .pdf, 3.48.
12. Papandropoulos, “How Should Price Discrimination Be Dealt with by Competition Authorities?”“价格歧视也可以成为实施掠夺性定价的手段。事实上,它还可以降低掠夺性定价的实施成本,从而让在行业中占支配地位的企业通过定价歧视实现掠夺性定价的暴利。”
13. Donald S. Clark(secretary of the Federal Trade Commission), The Robinson- Patman Act: General Principles, Commission Proceedings, and Selected Issues(San Jose, CA: Federal Trade Commission, June 7, 1995),https://ftc.gov /public-statements/1995/06/robinson-patman-act-generalprinciples-commission-proceedings-and-selected.
14. Office of Fair Trading, The Economics of Personalised Pricing,OFT1488(May 2013), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/, http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/research/oft1488.pdf; see also Office of Fair Trading, Personalised Pricing: Increasing Transparency to Improve Trust, OFT1489(May 2013), http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/, http://oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/markets-work /personalised-pricing/oft1489.pdf.
15. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data, 90(美国公平交易局在2012年曾号召企业在施行个性化定价策略时公布更多内情)。
16. Laura Bach, “Tobacco Company Marketing to Kids,” Campaign for Tobacco- Free Kids(June 4, 2015), https://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0008.pdf。
17. Laura Bach, “Tobacco Company Marketing to Kids,” Campaign for Tobacco- Free Kids(June 4, 2015), https://tobaccofreekids.org/research/factsheets/pdf/0008.pdf
18. United States v. Brown University, 5 F.3d 658(3d Cir. 1993).
19. Stacy Dale and Alan B. Krueger, “Estimating the Return to College Selectivity over the Career Using Administrative Earning Data,”Princeton University Working Paper 563(February 16, 2011), http://Lbnet/blogs /ivy-league-study.pdf。
20. Derek Thompson, “Why Smart Poor Students Don’t Apply to Selective Colleges(and How to Fix It),” The Atlantic, January 24, 2013, http://theatlantic/business/archive/2013/01/whysmart-poor-students-dont-apply-to-selective-colleges-and-how-to-fixit/272490/; Caroline M. Hoxby and Christopher Avery, “The Missing‘One-Offs’: The Hidden Supply of High-Achieving, Low Income Students,” NBER Working Paper 18586(December 2012), http://nber.org/papers/w18586(数据显示大量出身贫寒的优秀高中生没有向那些精英学府提交入学申请……即便这些学校会通过慷慨的奖学金制度向他们收取更低的学费)。
21. Maurice E. Stucke, “Is Intent Relevant?” Journal of Law,Economics & Policy 8(2012): 801, 822-828(文中提及了很多可以验证这个结论的研究文献); see also Lynn A. Stout, Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People(Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 2011), 238-240(文中讨论了公平与亲社会行为的社会规范在市场经济中的常见性和必要性);ThomasJ. Horton, “Unraveling the Chicago/ Harvard Antitrust Double Helix:Applying Evolutionary Theory to Guard Competitors and Revive Antitrust Jury Trials,” University of Baltimore Law Review 41(2012): 615, 653654 [引用了“公平是如何成为维持经济关系中社会和谐的稳定策略”的研究成果以及神经生物学方面的研究:“(资源)分配上的公平性是人类情绪处理过程中的关键”],详见:Joan Roughgarden, The Genial Gene: Deconstructing Darwinian Selfishness(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 160; Michael Shermer, The Mind of the Market: Compassionate Apes, Competitive Humans, and Other Tales from Evolutionary Economics(New York: Times Books, 2008), 11。
22. Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler,“Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market,”American Economic Review 76, no. 4(1986): 728, 735.
23. Ellen Garbarino and Sarah Maxwell, “Consumer Response to Norm- Breaking Pricing Events in E-Commerce,” Journal of Business Research 63(2010): 1066, 1069.
24. Lan Xia and Kent B. Monroe, “Is a Good Deal Always Fair?Examining the Concepts of Transaction Value and Price Fairness,”Journal of Economic Psychology 31(2010): 884, 891.
25. Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman, and Kimberly Meltzer, “Open to Exploitation: American Shoppers Online and Offline,” Report from the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania(June 1, 2005), 4, http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=asc _ papers.
26. Joseph Turow, Lauren Feldman, and Kimberly Meltzer, “Open to Exploitation: American Shoppers Online and Offline,” Report from the Annenberg Public Policy Center of the University of Pennsylvania(June 1, 2005), 4, http://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=asc _ papers.
27. Executive Office of the President, Big Data and Differential Pricing(Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, February 2015), 16, https://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/docs/Big_Data_Report_Nonembargo_v2.pdf.
28. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability,(May 2014), 20, https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents /reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
29. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability,(May 2014), 20, https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents /reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
30. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability,(May 2014), 20, https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents /reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
31. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability,(May 2014), 20, https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents /reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
32. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability,(May 2014), 20, https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents /reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.
33. Federal Trade Commission, Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability,(May 2014), 20, https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents /reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-reportfederal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf.,56; Article 21, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union; Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of July 5, 2006, 强调应在就业和职业问题上贯彻男女平等机会和平等待遇的原则。
34. Julia Angwin, Surya Mattu, and Jeff Larson, “The Tiger Mom Tax: Asians Are Nearly Twice as Likely to Get a Higher Price from Princeton Review,” ProPublica(September 1, 2015), https://propublica.org/article/asians-nearly-twice-as-likely-to-get-higher-pricefrom-princeton-review.
35. Julia Angwin, Surya Mattu, and Jeff Larson, “The Tiger Mom Tax: Asians Are Nearly Twice as Likely to Get a Higher Price from Princeton Review,” ProPublica(September 1, 2015), https://propublica.org/article/asians-nearly-twice-as-likely-to-get-higher-pricefrom-princeton-review.
36. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015, no. 1(2015): 92-112.
37. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015,92。
38. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015,92。
39. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015,93。
40. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015,93。
41. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015,93。
42. Amit Datta, Michael Carl Tschantz, and Anupam Datta,“Automated Experiments on Ad Privacy Settings: A Tale of Opacity,Choice, and Discrimination,” Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies 2015,105。
43. University of Washington, “Who’s a CEO? Google Image Results Can Shift Gender Biases,” ScienceDaily(April 9, 2015), sciencedaily/releases/2015/04/150409143143.html.
44. Latanya Sweeney, Online Ads Roll the Dice, Federal Trade Commission(September 25, 2014), https://ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/techftc/2014/09 /online-ads-roll-dice.
45. Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: The Secret Algorithms that Control Money and Information(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 38-42.
46. Aniko Hannak, Gary Soeller, David Lazer, Alan Mislove, and Christo Wilson, “Measuring Price Discrimination and Steering on E-Commerce Web Sites,” Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference, New York, 5, http://ccs.neu.edu/home/cbw/pdf/imc151-hannak.pdf。
47. Matthew A. Edwards, “Price and Prejudice: The Case against Consumer Equality in the Information Age,” Lewis & Clark Law Review 10(2006): 559, 580; “即使是在最自由的现行解释下,《鲁宾逊-帕特曼法》也难以庇护普通消费者的权益。由于消费者之间并不构成对于产品优惠价格的竞争,所以法律并不会对零售商提出明确要求,命令他们对消费者平等相待”。
48. 《鲁宾逊-帕特曼法》禁止卖方在同类商品的交易中对两个或多个相互竞争的买方之间的价格进行区分,在这种情况下,歧视的影响是“从实质上减少竞争”或是“损害、破坏或防止与明知交易中存在价格歧视的企业竞争,进而酿成买方对于终端客户的竞争”;Federal Trade Commission, The Robinson- Patman Act: General Principles, Commission Proceedings, and Selected Issues(June 7,1995), https://ftc.gov/public-statements/1995/06/robinson-patmanact-general-principles-commission-proceedings-and-selected。
49. Ross E. Elfand, “The Robinson-Patman Act,” American Bar Association(n.d.), http://americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/robinson_patman_act.html.
50. Ross E. Elfand, “The Robinson-Patman Act,” American Bar Association(n.d.), http://americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_201_practice_series/robinson_patman_act.html.,citing Feesers, Inc. v. Michael Foods, Inc., 591 F.3d 191,198(3d Cir. 2010)(这份案卷中讨论了近来美国高等法院的法理学研究进展);Ryan Luchs, Tansev Geylani, Anthony Dukes, and Kannan Srinivasan, “The End of the Robinson- Patman Act? Evidence from Legal Case Data,” Management Science 56, no. 12(2010):2123-2133, http://www-bcf.usc.edu/dukes/Papers/Dukes13_EndofRP_MgtSci_10.pdf. Federal Trade Commission, Price Discrimination:Robinson-Patman Violations(n.d.), https://ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/price-discrimination-robinsonpatman; see also Robert J. Toth, “A Powerful Law Has Been Losing a Lot of Its Punch,” Wall Street Journal, May 1, 2002, http://wsj/articles/SB100014240527023047466045773801727 54953842。
51. Edwards, “Price and Prejudice,” 596, quoting Howard J.Alperin and Roland F. Chase, Consumer Law: Sales Practices and Credit Regulation, 2004 Supplement(St. Paul, MN: West Pub. Co.,2004)39-40.
52. C-209/10, Post DanmarkA/S v. Konkurrenceradet.
53. C-209/10, Post DanmarkA/S v. Konkurrenceradet.,para. 30。
54. Competition and Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data, 2.120.
55. Mac Macmillan, “European MEP Calls for Investigation of Online Price Discrimination,” Hogan Lovells Chronicle of Data Protection,September 13, 2013, http://hldataprotection/2013/09/articles/ consumer-privacy/european-mep-calls-for-investigation-of-online-pricediscrimination/. Rafaele Rivais, “Why the Prices of Trains and Planes Vary from One Minute to the Next(Continued),” SOS Conso Blog, Le Monde(January 24, 2013), translation.
56. Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of October 24, 1995, European Parliament, Parliamentary Questions, P-001257/13, E-001574/13, E-000956/13, April 18, 2013,http://europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2013-000956&language=EN.
57. See Dana Mattioli, “On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2012, http://wsj/articles/SB10001424052 702304458604577488822667325882.
58. Pasquale, The Black Box Society, 32, discusses how runaway data can lead to cascading disadvantages; Katherine Noyes, “The EU Will Examine Banks’ Use of Customer Data for Profiling and Marketing Campaigns,” PCWorld, October 5, 2015, pcworld/article/2989048/privacy/banks-use-of-big-data-to-be-scrutinzed-by-eu-regulators.html.
59. Sydney Ember and Rachel Abrams, “On Instagram and Other Social Media, Redefining ‘User Engagement,’ ” New York Times, September 20, 2015, http://nytimes/2015/09/21/business/media/retailers-use-of-their-fans-photos-draws-scrutiny.html?smprod=nytcore-iphone&smid=nytcore-iphone-share; Vindu Goel, “Flipping the Switches on Facebook’s Privacy Controls,” New York Times, January 29, 2014, http://nytimes/2014/01/30/technology/personaltech/on-facebook-deciding-who-knows-youre-a-dog. html?_r=0.
60. Mattioli, “On Orbitz, Mac Users Steered to Pricier Hotels”.Article referred to in Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, “Online Price Discrimination and Data Protection Law,” Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2015-32(August 28, 2015), http://ssrn/abstract=2652665.
第13章 衡短论长的中间人
1. J. Yannis Bakos, “Reducing Buyer Search Costs: Implications for Electronic Market Places,” Management Science 43, no. 12(1997): 1, 5.
2. OFT Statement of Objections, para. 1.14-1.15, as cited in the Competition Appeal Tribunal judgment, Skyscanner Limited v.Competition and Markets Authority, Case No. 1226/2/12/14(September 26, 2014),(2014)CAT 16,31-32.
3. Ariel Ezrachi, “The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce,” European Competition Journal 11, no. 2-3(2015).
4. A. Ezrachi and Maurice E. Stucke, “Online Platforms and the EU Digital Single Market,” University of Tennessee Legal Studies Research Paper No. 283(October 16, 2015), http://ssrn/abstract=2677267;see also Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology 18(2016), http://papers.ssrn/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =2598128.
5. Marina Lao, “Networks, Access, and ‘Essential Facilities’: From Terminal Railroad to Microsoft,” Southern Methodist University Law Review 62(2009): 557, 560-561; “网络产业的特点是随着用户数量的增多,其产品对用户的价值越来越高,这种现象也可被称作‘网络效应’或需求侧规模经济”。价值增长的实现方式或直接或间接,它既可以由用户基数增大而产生的彼此互联带来,也可以由用户基数增大带动的周边产品兴盛而实现(如Windows操作系统的例子)。详见:United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20(D.D.C. 1999)(本案讨论了由媒体播放器所产生的间接网络效应)。
6. 据报道,2016年1月,一位供职于Oracle的律师向加利福尼亚州奥克兰市当地法院披露,一位谷歌公司高管曾郑重起誓,称谷歌每年会向苹果支付近10亿美元,以确保后者将自己的搜索服务设定为苹果iPhone手机的默认搜索程序。详见:Mike Swift, “Oracle Pushes Judge to Force Google to Disclose Terms of Deals with Apple,Other Mobile Competitors,” mLex Market Insight(January 14, 2016),http://mlexmarketinsight /category_editors/digital-risk/。
7. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, DataDriven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being, Interim Synthesis Report(October 2015), 29.
8. Ioannis Lianos and Evgenia Motchenkova, “Market Dominance and Search Quality in the Search Engine Market,” Journal of Competition Law & Economics 9(2013): 419, 422(advance access publication,April 17, 2013), 文中讨论了搜索引擎作为“信息的把关者”所发挥的作用;它们提供了用户所需要的资讯(相当于是黄页),同时也是“每个人畅游互联网世界时初涉的领地”。
9. Scott McCartney, “How Booking Sites Infiuence Which Hotels You Pick,” Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2016, http://wsj/articles/ how -booking-sites-infiuence-which-hotels-you-pick-1453921300.
10. Scott McCartney, “How Booking Sites Infiuence Which Hotels You Pick,” Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2016, http://wsj/articles/ how -booking-sites-infiuence-which-hotels-you-pick-1453921300.
11. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 856 F.2d 1563,1564-65(D.C. Cir. 1988).
12. Competitive Enter. Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 856 F.2d 1563,1564-65(D.C. Cir. 1988).
13. Doreen Carvajal, “Amazon Plans to Revise Its Ad Program,”New York Times, February 10, 1999, http://nytimes/1999/02/10/business /amazoncom-plans-to-revise-its-ad-program.html.
14. 与之相似,对于一些比价网站在默认搜索结果上的排序问题,社会各界也有不少非议。由于用户无法分辨出有机搜索结果和赞助式搜索结果的不同,所以由拥有市场力量的互联网平台向商家征收的这笔广告投放位置费一直饱受外界批评。详见:James Maguire,“Case Study: BizRate,” ECommerce-Guide(January 2, 2003), http://ecommerce -guide/news/news/article.php/1563011/CaseStudy-BizRate.htm; “How Shopping Bots Really Work,” Loginworks(December 18, 2014), http://loginworks/informative/shopping-bots-really-work/; Leslie Walker, “What Shopping Guides Don’t Advertise,” Washington Post, November 6, 2003, http://washingtonpost/archive/business/2003/ll/06/what-shopping-guidesdont-advertise/9c387768-f228-4356-850e-78a2afc60b47/。
15. 完整的研究报告与相关材料,详见:http://marktwaechter.de/pressemeldung/buchungs-und-vergleichsportale-bieten-zuwenig-nutzen-fuer-verbraucher; http://verbraucherzentrale.de/vergleichsportale#header。
16. Rachel Rickard Straus, “Price Comparison Website Bosses under Attack from MPs for Not Showing Customers the Best Deals,” This Is Money(February 4, 2014), http://thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-2939364/Price-comparison-website-bosses-attack-MPs.html.
17. Rachel Rickard Straus, “Price Comparison Website Bosses under Attack from MPs for Not Showing Customers the Best Deals,” This Is Money(February 4, 2014), http://thisismoney.co.uk/money/bills/article-2939364/Price-comparison-website-bosses-attack-MPs.html.
18. European Commission Case No. Comp/M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business Regulation(EC)No. 139/2004 Merger Procedure(February 18, 2010), para. 100.
19. European Commission Case No. Comp/M. 5727, Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business Regulation(EC)No. 139/2004 Merger Procedure(February 18, 2010), para. 100.。para. 35, 45.
20. Andrea Amelio and Dimitrios Magos, “Economic Background of the Microsoft/Yahoo! Case,” Competition Policy Newsletter 2(2010):51. “比如,区别于直接在有机搜索结果提供相关商家的链接,搜索引擎可以把一些‘资讯类’的网站放上去或是选取那些既掏了广告投放位置费又是有机搜索结果的链接,以弱化有机搜索结果与付费结果之间的替代关系。” Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Report,Google Inc., File No. 111-0161(August 8, 2012), 92, 根据《华尔街日报》的报道(详见:http://graphics.wsj/google-ftc-report/img/ftcocr-watermark.pdf),FTC出具的有关谷歌涉嫌操纵搜索结果的调查报告中曾提及,“通过将那些高品质的垂直网站驱逐出自己的搜索结果,显而易见,谷歌的搜索引擎已显现出了质量恶化的威胁,又或者说,它们原本就有意如此”。对于这份调查报告,仍是疑点重重。首先,《华尔街日报》的记者只是拿到了这份报告中偶数页的内容,遗失的奇数页或许还隐含了其他重要内容;其次,其他关于这起调查的报告尚未公开,所以问题还没有定论;最后,虽然反垄断执法部门建议FTC提起公诉,但是该委员会并未就此行事。
21. 欧盟委员会宣称,用户“往往无法在搜索引擎上查询到与自己所寻最相关的商品信息,除此以外……当谷歌的竞争对手意识到即便自己如何投入创新、优化用户体验也无法超越谷歌时,他们的创新热情也会减弱”。European Commission, Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on Comparison Shopping Service, MEMO/15/4781(April 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/pressrelease _MEMO-15-4781_en.htm.
22. European Commission, Statement by Commissioner Vestager on Antitrust Decisions Concerning Google, STATEMENT/15/4785(April 15, 2015), http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-4785_en.htm.
23. 考虑到正文中的三个条件,我们还在其他著作中也有涉及谷歌如何有意拉低产品质量的内容(通常是通过向用户提供不甚相关的搜索结果而实现)。详见:Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines,” Yale Journal of Law and Technology 18(2016), http://papers.ssrn/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2598128。
24. 根据苹果对系统的设置,出版商可以自由为iBooks上出售的电子书定价,并且提取70%的销售收入,剩余30%则作为佣金归苹果所有。详见:United States v. Apple, Inc, 791 F.3d 290, 303(2d Cir.2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376(2016)。其他的分销模式还包括批发销售与代理分销的结合。举例来看,就混合批发模式,也就是净价模式来讲(hybrid wholesale model),交易双方已在合同中约定了一个固定的加成。在这种分销模式下,上游的供货商设定一个批发价格,而交易双方则另就产品在销售给终端客户时产生的成本利润率达成一致协定。
25. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 304(2d Cir. 2015),cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376(2016).
26. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 304(2d Cir. 2015),cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1376(2016),305。
27. A. Ezrachi, “The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce,” Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 55/2015(October 11, 2015), http://papers.ssrn. com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2672541.
28. Benjamin Edelman and Julian Wright, “Price Coherence and Excessive Intermediation,” Harvard Business School Working Paper No.15-030(March 2015), 3, http://benedelman.org/publications/pricecoherence -2015-03-12.pdf.
29. Competition and Markets Authority, Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation: Final Report(September 24,2014), 8.42, 8.14, https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5421c2ade5274a1314000001/Final_report.pdf.
30. Competition and Markets Authority, Private Motor Insurance Market Investigation: Final Report(September 24,2014), 8.42, 8.14, https://assets.digital.cabinet-office.gov.uk/media/5421c2ade5274a1314000001/Final_report.pdf,8.13。
31. Douglas Fraser, “Heat Is On: Why Are Energy Bills so High?”BBC News(January 15, 2014), http://bbc.co.uk/news/ukscotland-scotland-business -25743336.
32. Douglas Fraser, “Heat Is On: Why Are Energy Bills so High?”BBC News(January 15, 2014), http://bbc.co.uk/news/ukscotland-scotland-business -25743336.
33. 根据公布的数字,拥有市场力量的比价网站每年的利润水平大致在5,390万英镑(Money Super Market网站)到6,970万英镑(Compare The Market网站),另有一些网站介于980万英镑(Confused网站和uSwitch网站)与1,980万英镑(Go Compare网站)。详见:Straus, “Price Comparison Website Bosses under Attack.”
34. Fraser, “Heat Is On.”
35. Fraser, “Heat Is On.”
36. U.K. Parliament Energy and Climate Change Select Committee,Protecting Consumers: Making Energy Price Comparison Websites Transparent(March 26, 2015), http://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415 /cms ele ct/cmen ergy/1145/114502. htm.
37. 英国天然气和电力市场办事处在提交给英国能源和气候变化委员会的报告中提到,比价网站征收的佣金高低并不会直接影响到终端消费者在变更自家能源供应商时的资费。正如政府报告中所言,“不论消费者是在比价网站的鼓动下调整能源供应商还是直接做出的决定,这并不会对资费水平造成差异”。U.K. Parliament Energy and Climate Change Select Committee,Protecting Consumers: Making Energy Price Comparison Websites Transparent(March 26, 2015), http://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415 /cms ele ct/cmen ergy/1145/114502.htm,Appendix 1:Government Response, Recommendation 3。
38. U.K. Parliament Energy and Climate Change Select Committee,Protecting Consumers: Making Energy Price Comparison Websites Transparent(March 26, 2015), http://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415 /cms ele ct/cmen ergy/1145/114502. htm.
39. U.K. Parliament Energy and Climate Change Select Committee,Protecting Consumers: Making Energy Price Comparison Websites Transparent(March 26, 2015), http://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415 /cms ele ct/cmen ergy/1145/114502. htm.
40. HRS-Hotel Reservation Service B 9-66/10(December 20,2013), http://bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidung/EN/Entscheidungen/Kartellverbot/B9-66-10.pdf; United States v. Apple Inc.,952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 15 647(S.D.N.Y. 2013); Case COMP/AT-39.847,E-Books(July 25, 2013).
41. 若有兴趣继续了解有关广义MFN条款与狭义MFN条款的效应问题,详见:Ariel Ezrachi, “The Competitive Effects of Parity Clauses on Online Commerce.”
第四部分 竞合关系
1. 有关网络效应所能发挥的作用详见:Report by the House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market”(April 20, 2016)10th Report of Session 2015-16,paras 65-93, http://www .publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf。
2. 比如,在个人计算机领域,两家超级平台的地位显耀:微软的Windows操作系统与英特尔的微处理器。
第14章 友敌间的互动
1. 也有些公司之间并不存在什么“旧交”,好比一家风投公司突然收购了一家濒临破产的报业企业。
2. Marius Schwartz and David Eisenstadt, “Vertical Restraints,” U.S.Department of Justice Antitrust Division, EPO Discussion Paper 82-2(1982), 4, 5; Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,485 U.S. 717(1988), 11.
3. “FTC Looks at Google-Apple Board Ties: Report,” Reuters(May 5, 2009), http://reuters/article/us-google-appleidUSTRE54403Z20090505. 在FTC宣布将要对谷歌和苹果公司的联合是否阻碍市场竞争的问题进行调查后不久,埃里克·施密特遂从苹果公司董事会辞职。另见:https://ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2009/08/statement-bureau-competition-director-richard-feinsteinregarding; “Statement of FTC Chairman Jon Leibowitz Regarding the Announcement That Arthur D. Levinson Has Resigned from Google’s Board,” FTC Press Release(October 12, 2009), https://ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2009/10/statement-ftc-chairman-jonleibowitz-regarding-announcement. See Section 8 of the Clayton Act,15 U.S.C. § 9(a)(5)。
4. 生产互补产品的公司之间可能并不存在直接的生意往来。但是如果一方的市场需求增加,往往另一方也会迎来高涨的需求,如番茄酱与炸薯条。
5. European Commission, Guidelines on the Assessment of NonHorizontal Mergers under the Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings(October 8, 2008), para. 5.
6. Ericsson, Ericsson Mobility Report: On the Pulse of the Networked Society(June 2015), http://ericsson/res/docs/2015/ericssonmobility-report-june-2015.pdf.
7. comScore, The 2015 U.S. Mobile App Report(September 22,2015), 5.
8. comScore, The 2015 U.S. Mobile App Report(September 22,2015), 5.
9. 此处需要强调一下本章中提到的超级平台与一般意义的超级平台的区别,后者的范围更宽泛,往往囊括了大多数在多边市场运营的线上平台。可参考欧盟对此的定义,详见:European Commission,Public Consultation on the Regulatory Environment for Platforms,Online Intermediaries, Data and Cloud Computing and the Collaborative Economy(September 24, 2015), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/public-consultation-regulatory-environment-platforms -onlineintermediaries-data-and-cloud。
10. Don Clark and Robert McMillan, “Facebook, Amazon and Other Tech Giants Tighten Grip on Internet Economy,” Wall Street Journal,November 5, 2015, http://wsj/articles/giants-tighten-grip-oninternet-economy-1446771732.
11. David McLaughlin, “Google Said to Be under U.S. Antitrust Scrutiny over Android,” Bloomberg(September 25, 2015), http://bloomberg /news/articles/2015-09-25/google-said-to-be-under-u-santitrust-scrutiny-over-android-iezf41sg.
12. Statistica, “Number of Available Applications in the Google Play Store from December 2009 to February 2015”(2016), http://statista/statistics /266210/number-of-available-applications-in-thegoogle-play-store/; Statistica, “Number of Available Apps in the Apple App Store from July 2008 to June 2015”(2016), http://statista/statistics/263795/number-of-available-apps-in-the-apple-app-store/.
13. 一项针对线上App商城最畅销的200个应用程序的研究发现,其中有38个付费应用程序与74个免费下载程序同时在Google Play商店和苹果App Store上架。详见:Mikey Campbell,“Apps No Longer Differentiator in iOS vs. Android War, Services Next Battleground,” Apple Insider(January 6, 2014), http://appleinsider/articles/14/01/06/apps-no-longer-differentiator-in-ios-vs-androidwar-services-next -battleground。
14. Vangie Beal, “API—Application Program Interface,” Wedopedia(n.d.), http://webopedia/TERM/A/API.html.
15. Ron Amadeo, “Google’s Iron Grip on Android: Controlling Open Source by Any Means Necessary,” Ars Technica(October 20,2013), http://arstechnica/gadgets/2013/10/googles-iron-grip-onandroid-controlling-open-source-by-any-means-necessary/4/.
16. Ron Amadeo, “Google’s Iron Grip on Android: Controlling Open Source by Any Means Necessary,” Ars Technica(October 20,2013), http://arstechnica/gadgets/2013/10/googles-iron-grip-onandroid-controlling-open-source-by-any-means-necessary/4/.
17. Ron Adner, Jianqing Chen, and Feng Zhu, “Frenemies in Platform Markets: The Case of Apple’s iPad vs. Amazon’s Kindle,” Harvard Business School Working Paper 15-087(May 6, 2015).
18. Ron Adner, Jianqing Chen, and Feng Zhu, “Frenemies in Platform Markets: The Case of Apple’s iPad vs. Amazon’s Kindle,” Harvard Business School Working Paper 15-087(May 6, 2015)。这份报告提供了一个经济模型论证了超级平台之间达成竞合关系的动机。回顾电子书市场,“苹果平板计算机iPad的功能远不止电子书阅读器,而亚马逊的Kindle则几近专属电子书阅读器。于是,在均衡状态下,苹果更看重自己的硬件产品销量,而亚马逊会更重视自己的电子书销量。当利润增长点的差距足够大时,在苹果App Store上线Kindle(电子阅读器)App是符合双方利益的选择:亚马逊的电子书销量以及iPad的产品销量会产生一种相互拉动和促进的作用。苹果从iPad销售中的获益将远超自己在电子书市场的损失。但与此同时,同样出于利益的考量,苹果不会让自己的iBook应用程序出现在Kindle上”。
19. Uber, “The Top 10 Facts You May Not Know about Uber Driver Partners”(August 5, 2015), http://newsroom.uber/2015/08/the-top10-facts-you-may-not-know-about-uber-driver-partners/.
20. Brad Stone, “Exclusive: Google Is Developing Its Own Uber Competitor,” Bloomberg(February 2, 2015), http://bloomberg/news/articles/2015-02-02/exclusive-google-and-uber-are-going-towar-over-taxis.
21. Brad Stone, “Exclusive: Google Is Developing Its Own Uber Competitor,” Bloomberg(February 2, 2015), http://bloomberg/news/articles/2015-02-02/exclusive-google-and-uber-are-going-towar-over-taxis.
22. Jack Nicas, “Alphabet Cruises into Ride-Sharing Business,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2016, B4.
23. Chunka Mui, “Google Is Millions of Miles Ahead of Apple in Driverless Cars,” Forbes, August 21, 2015, http://forbes/sites/chunkamui /2015/08/21/google-is-millions-of-miles-ahead-of-apple-indriverless-cars/.
24. Daisuke Wakabayashi, “Apple Targets Electric-Car Shipping Date for 2019,” Wall Street Journal, September 21, 2015, http://wsj/articles/apple -speeds-up-electric-car-work-1442857105.
25. “Apple Invests in Chinese Uber Rival Didi Chuxing,” BBC News(May 13, 2016), http://bbc.co.uk/news/business-36283661;“Apple Invests $1bn in ‘Chinese Uber’ Didi Chuxing,” The Telegraph(May 13, 2016), http://telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/05/13/apple-invests-lbn-in-chinese-uber-didi-chuxing /.
26. NDTV Correspondent, “Google Reportedly Wants More of Its Apps Preinstalled on Android Devices,” Gadgets360(September 29,2014), http://gadgets.ndtv/mobiles/news/google-reportedly-wantsmore-of-its-apps-preinstalled -on -android - devices -599478.
27. Jack Nicas, “Alphabet Cruises into Ride-Sharing Business.”
28. 在欧洲,这种情况的典型例子是占有市场支配地位的企业同时在上下游两个市场从事经营活动,因而拒绝为下游竞争企业提供相关服务。这种不合作行为有违《欧洲联盟运作条约》(Treaty on theFunctioning of the European Union)第102(c)条款,损害了下游市场的竞争机制。同样惹人生厌的行为还包括拥有市场力量的企业控制了某个重要基础设施的供给,但却在没有客观理由的情况下拒绝其他企业使用该设备。相关文献资料详见:Ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law — An Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases, 4th ed.(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014), 252。
29. John Markoff, “Toyota Invests $1 Billion in Artificial Intelligence in U.S.,” New York Times, November 6, 2015, http://nytimes. com/2015/11/06/technology/toyota-silicon-valley-artificial-intelligence-research- center. html ?_r=0; Mui, “Google Is Millions of Miles Ahead of Apple in Driverless Cars.”
30. Markoff, “Toyota Invests $1 Billion in Artificial Intelligence in U.S.”
31. Jean Tirole, “Comments Made at FT-ETNO Summit 2015,”Financial Times(October 13, 2015), https://live.ft/Events/2015/FTETNO-Summit-2015.
32. Stone, “Exclusive.”
33. Matt Weinberger, “Microsoft Could See an Opportunity to Poke Google in the Eye with Uber Investment,” Business Insider UK(July 31,2015), http://businessinsider/microsoft-and-google-are-uberinvestors -2015-7.
34. Nathaniel Mott, “Uber Should Fear the Company Formerly Known as Google,” Gigaom(August 11, 2015), https://gigaom/2015/08/11/uber-vs-alphabet-google/.
35. Weinberger, “Microsoft Could See an Opportunity to Poke Google in the Eye with Uber Investment.”
36. 报告中指出,独立音乐协会声称“YouTube曾威胁该机构,除非它们答应其提出的不可变更的许可条款,否则将撤掉网站上所有与之相关的内容”。详见:Paragraph 126, House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market”(April 20, 2016), 10th Report of Session 2015-16, http://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf。
37. Coupons, Form 10-K for 2014, 15, 17.
38. Facebook, Form 10-K for 2014(2014), 11.
39. Facebook, Form 10-K for 2014(2014), 11.
40. Facebook, Form 10-K for 2014(2014), 11.
41. Facebook, Form 10-K for 2014(2014), 11.
42. European Commission, “Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on Android Operating System and Applications,”press release(April 20, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP16-1492_en.htm.
43. 如果手机厂商希望能在自己生产的设备上预载谷歌的产品,包括Google Play商店和谷歌搜索引擎,谷歌方面要求其不得在这些设备上运行那些已被改造后的安卓系统。对于不少手机制造商来说,谷歌的产品实难割舍。根据《华尔街日报》的报道,亚马逊在2014年推出了搭载安卓系统的手机,但是却未预载那些常见的应用程序(包括谷歌搜索、YouTube、谷歌地图和Google Play商店)。事实上,该手机的销量并不佳。有批评者指出,缺乏可使用的谷歌应用程序是该产品销量遭遇滑铁卢的关键。详见:NataliaDrozdiak and Sam Schechner, “EU Set to Charge Google over Android Phone Apps: European Commission Focusing on Demand That Phones Load Google Apps,” Wall Street Journal, April 19, 2016, http://wsj/article_email/eu-set-to-charge-google-over-android-1461067383lMyQjAxMTI2MDE5OTAxMjk4Wj。
44. European Commission, “Antitrust: Commission Sends Statement of Objections to Google on Android Operating System and Applications—Factsheet”(April 20, 2016), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16 -1484_en.htm.
第15章 提取与俘获
1. 请详见本书第三部分行为歧视与第8章人工智能、上帝视角与电子眼。
2. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430(2014).
3. “首先,手机会在同一个地方收集许许多多不同类型的信息——地址、留言、药方、银行凭证、视频等。当把这些信息结合起来看时,它们能勾勒出一个鲜活的人物形象。其次,面对同一类型的用户信息,智能手机也可以揭示出更深层次的内涵。1,000张标有拍摄日期、地点和描述的照片可以拼凑起一个人的日常,这比钱夹里的亲密合影要更还原生活。再次,我们可以从手机的日期信息追溯到最早购买手机的那一天,甚至是更早些的时候。可能某人兜里揣着一张便条,提醒自己要致电琼斯先生,但他绝不会随身带着过去几个月来与琼斯先生的聊天记录,因为这些东西早已被存在了手机上。最后,手机的普及性以及人们对其的依赖性已经令它超越了其他外物,成为人们生活中不可或缺的工具。在数字化时代以前,人们通常不会随身携带那些敏感的个人信息。可是现在,人们反而会对那些出门不带手机的人感到稀奇。一份民调显示,近3/4的智能手机用户在大多数时间里会将手机放置在距离自己5英尺以内的范围,其中更有12%的受访者表示自己会在洗澡的过程中使用手机……毫不夸张地说,拥有手机的美国成年人中,有超过90%的人会通过数字化的形式记录自己的生活——从生活琐碎到亲密关系,事无巨细,面面俱到。” Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430(2014)。
4. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430(2014),at 2490。
5. 出处同上。详见:Brian X. Chen, “Why and How Apple Is Collecting Your iPhone Location Data,” Wired, April 21, 2001, http://wired/2011/04/apple-iphone-tracking/.
6. Australian Communications and Media Authority. Here, There and Everywhere — Consumer Behaviour and Location Services(December 2012), 1, http://acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310665/location_services-dec2012.pdf.
7. Australian Communications and Media Authority. Here, There and Everywhere — Consumer Behaviour and Location Services(December 2012), 1, http://acma.gov.au/webwr/_assets/main/lib310665/location_services-dec2012.pdf.
8. Jack Nicas, “Google to Increase Frequency, Size of Ads,” Wall Street Journal, May 25, 2016, B4.
9. Brian See Voo, “Smartphones & You: Who Is(Really)in Control?” Hongkiat(December 3, 2013), http://hongkiat/blog/smartphone-you-who-in-control/; Andrew Munchbach, “Your Smartphone Is Tracking You, and You Said It Was Okay,” BGR(April 20, 2011), http://bgr/2011/04/20/your-smartphone-is-tracking-youand-you-said-it-was-okay/.
10. Australian Communications and Media Authority, Here, There and Everywhere, 18.
11. Alun Williams, “Google Invites Developers to Its Brillo IoT Platform,” Electronics Weekly, October 28, 2015, http://electronicsweekly/blogs/eyes-on-android/embedded-android/googleinvites-developers-to-its -brillo -iot-platform-2015-10/.
12. Marcia Coyle, “Justices Hang Up on Call for Cellphone Location Protection,” National Law Journal, November 9, 2015, http://nationallawjournal/id=1202741937880/Justices-Hang-Up-on-Callfor-Cellphone-Location -Protection#ixzz3r2OQU3pN.
13. “许多用户都不知道,一些应用程序提供商和开发者会将其个人信息数据贩卖给广告商,用于搭建客户档案,以便其开展具有针对性的广告营销以及其他与原应用程序的使用无必然联系的目的……绝大多数依靠用户地理位置信息提供服务的应用程序虽会在采集用户信息之前征求用户的同意,但是它们的措辞却难以令用户完全理解这‘同意’背后的真实意味。” Taylor Wessing,“‘Toto, We’re Not in Satnav Anymore’: Does the Law Protect Mobile Users from a Misuse of Their Location Data?”(April 2011),http://united-kingdom.taylorwessing/download/article _satnav.html#.Vhw3oRNViko.
14. Craig Timberg, Nancy Scola, and Andrea Peterson, “Uber Executive Stirs Up Privacy Controversy,” Washington Post, November 18, 2014, http://washingtonpost/business/technology/uberexecutive-stirs-up-privacy-controversy/2014/ll/18/d0607836-6f61-lle4adl2-3734c461eab6_story .html.
15. Craig Timberg, Nancy Scola, and Andrea Peterson, “Uber Executive Stirs Up Privacy Controversy,” Washington Post, November 18, 2014, http://washingtonpost/business/technology/uberexecutive-stirs-up-privacy-controversy/2014/ll/18/d0607836-6f61-lle4adl2-3734c461eab6_story .html.
16. Uber, Privacy Statement(effective July 15, 2015), https://uber/legal /privacy/users/en.
17. Uber, Privacy Statement(effective July 15, 2015), https://uber/legal /privacy/users/en.
18. Uber, Privacy Statement(effective July 15, 2015), https://uber/legal /privacy/users/en.
19. Uber, Privacy Statement(effective July 15, 2015), https://uber/legal /privacy/users/en.
20. Uber, iOS App Permissions, https://uber. com /ios /permissions.
21. Uber, iOS App Permissions, https://uber. com /ios /permissions.
22. Uber, Android App Permissions, https://uber. com /android / permissions.
23. Kenneth Olmstead and Michelle Atkinson, “Apps Permissions in the Google Play Store,” Pew Research Center(November 10, 2015),http://pew internet.org/2015/ll/10/apps-permissions-in-the-googleplay-store/.
24. Daniel Eran Dilger, “After Abandoning iAd Revenue, Apple Inc Can Reintroduce an Ad-Free Internet,” Apple Insider(January 17,2016), http://appleinsider/articles/16/01/18/after-abandoning-iadrevenue-apple-can-reintroduce-an-ad-free-internet; see also Jennifer LeClaire, “Apple May Pull Plug on Its iAd Advertising Business,” CIO Today(January 14, 2016), http://cio-today/article/index.php?story_id=11300AJK1JYB.
25. Uber, Privacy Statement.
26. Uber, Privacy Statement.
27. Julia Angwin and Tom McGinty, “Sites Feed Personal Details to New Tracking Industry,” Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2010, http://wsj/articles/SB10001424052748703977004575393173432219064.
28. 出处同上。Open Tracker, “Third-Party Cookies vs First-Party Cookies”(April 15, 2013), http://opentracker/article/third-partyCookies-vs-first-party-Cookies. “举例来看,如果你在访问widgets时,第一方Cookies就是由地址栏中列出的网站域(也就是widgets)设置的Cookies,而第三方Cookies来自在网页上嵌入广告或图片等项的其他域来源,比如stats-for-free。”详见:WhatIs, “ThirdParty Cookies”(n.d.), http://whatis.techtarget/definition/third-partyCookies。
29. Angwin and McGinty, “Sites Feed Personal Details to New Tracking Industry.”
30. Angwin and McGinty, “Sites Feed Personal Details to New Tracking Industry.”
31. 出处同上(“例如,我们和我们的广告合作伙伴可能依赖于通过这些Cookie收集到的信息为用户在访问其他网站时提供广告。与之相似,我们的合作伙伴还可能运用Cookies、归属用户服务器以及其他类似的技术来判断我们是否已向某位用户投放过了广告,进而评估广告投放的成效”)。
32. Uber, Privacy Statement.
33. Google, “How Google Uses Data When You Use Our Partners’Sites or Apps,” Google Privacy & Terms, http://google/intl/en/policies / privacy/partners/.
34. Google, “How Google Uses Data When You Use Our Partners’Sites or Apps,” Google Privacy & Terms, http://google/intl/en/policies / privacy/partners/.
35. Google, “How Google Uses Data When You Use Our Partners’Sites or Apps,” Google Privacy & Terms, http://google/intl/en/policies / privacy/partners/.
36. Google, Google Analytics Opt-Out Browser Add-On, https://tools.google . com/dlpage/gaoptout.
37. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., No. CIV.A. 1207829, 2014 WL 3012873, 1-2(D.N.J. Jul. 2, 2014).
38. In re Nickelodeon Consumer Privacy Litig., No. CIV.A. 1207829, 2014 WL 3012873, 1-2(D.N.J. Jul. 2, 2014),2。
39. For a contrary view on the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C.§ 2710, see Yershov v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc., No. CIV.A. 14-13112- FDS, 2015 WL 2340752, 8(D. Mass. May 15, 2015), on appeal to the First Circuit.
40. In re Nickelodeon Consumer PrivacyLitig.
41. Steve Stecklow, “On the Web: Children Face Intensive Tracking,”Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2010, http://wsj/articles/SB10001424052748703904304575497903523187146.
42. Steve Stecklow, “On the Web: Children Face Intensive Tracking,”Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2010, http://wsj/articles/SB10001424052748703904304575497903523187146.
43. Steve Stecklow, “On the Web: Children Face Intensive Tracking,”Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2010, http://wsj/articles/SB10001424052748703904304575497903523187146.
44. Steve Stecklow, “On the Web: Children Face Intensive Tracking,”Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2010, http://wsj/articles/SB10001424052748703904304575497903523187146.
45. Steve Stecklow, “On the Web: Children Face Intensive Tracking,”Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2010, http://wsj/articles/SB10001424052748703904304575497903523187146.
46. Angwin and McGinty, “Sites Feed Personal Details to New Tracking Industry”; “The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets,” Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2010, http://wsj/articles/SB100014240527487039 40904575395073512989404?cb=logged0.6130286159459502.
47. Alex Chris, “Can You Still Make Money with AdSense?”reliablesoft, https://reliablesoft/can-you-still-make-moneywith-adsense/.
48. 在2016年第一季度里,谷歌的广告收入达到了180.2亿元:其中143.28亿元是由自身运营的互联网平台创造,另外36.92亿元是由谷歌的合作伙伴贡献。详见:Alphabet, Inc., Form 10-Q,for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2016(2016), 32, https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf /20160331_alphabet_10Q.pdf。
49. Jacob Weisberg, “We Are Hopelessly Hooked,” New York Review of Books, February 25, 2016, 9.
50. Jacob Weisberg, “We Are Hopelessly Hooked,” New York Review of Books, February 25, 2016, 9.
51. Jacob Weisberg, “We Are Hopelessly Hooked,” New York Review of Books, February 25, 2016, 9.
52. Lara O’Reilly, “There Is One Key Reason Why People Are Spending More Time on Facebook’s Apps Than Google’s,” Business Insider, June 29, 2015, http://businessinsider/facebook-vsgoogle-on-time-spent-in-apps-according-to-forrester-2015-6.
53. Daisuke Wakabayashi and Jack Marshall, “Apple’s Ad Blockers Rile Publishers: New iOS Lets Users Halt Ads on Mobile Devices, Posing a Challenge to Publishers and Google,” Wall Street Journal, August 30,2015, http://wsj/articles/apples-ad-blockers-raise-tensions1440974849?cb=logged0.8844516936223954.
54. Coupons, Form 10-K(2014), 21.
55. Allen Grunes, “Tracking Not Allowed(Unless You’re Google),” Politico(October 1, 2015), http://wwwpolitico/agenda/story/2015/10/tracking-not-allowed-unless-youre-google - 000261.
56. Allen Grunes, “Tracking Not Allowed(Unless You’re Google),” Politico(October 1, 2015), http://wwwpolitico/agenda/story/2015/10/tracking-not-allowed-unless-youre-google - 000261.
57. Allen Grunes, “Tracking Not Allowed(Unless You’re Google),” Politico(October 1, 2015), http://wwwpolitico/agenda/story/2015/10/tracking-not-allowed-unless-youre-google - 000261.
58. Allen Grunes, “Tracking Not Allowed(Unless You’re Google),” Politico(October 1, 2015), http://wwwpolitico/agenda/story/2015/10/tracking-not-allowed-unless-youre-google - 000261.
59. Deepa Seetharaman and Elizabeth Dwoskin, “Facebook’s Restrictions on User Data Cast a Long Shadow,” Wall Street Journal,September 21, 2015, http://wsj/article_email/facebooksrestrictions-on-user-data-cast-a-long-shadow-144288 1 332lMyQjAxMTE1MzIwMjEyMTIzWj.
60. Deepa Seetharaman and Elizabeth Dwoskin, “Facebook’s Restrictions on User Data Cast a Long Shadow,” Wall Street Journal,September 21, 2015, http://wsj/article_email/facebooksrestrictions-on-user-data-cast-a-long-shadow-144288 1 332lMyQjAxMTE1MzIwMjEyMTIzWj.
61. Bogdan Petrovan, “How Does Google Make Money from Android?” Android Authority(January 22, 2016), http://androidauthority/how-does-google-make-money-fromandroid-669008/.
62. Microsoft, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2014(2014), 19.
63. Alistair Barr, “Google Mobile Apps Grab Almost as Much User Time as Facebook’s Apps,” Wall Street Journal, June 29, 2015, http://blogs.wsj/digits/2015/06/29/google-mobile-apps-grab-almost-asmuch-user-time-as-facebooks-apps/.
64. Petrovan, “How Does Google Make Money from Android?”
65. Catherine Stupp and Jorge Valero, “Commission Mulls New Measures in Divisive Inquiry of Online Giants,” EurActiv(September 8, 2015), http://euractiv/sections/infosociety/commission-mulls-new-measures-divisive-inquiry-online-giants-317409.
66. “Desktop Operating System Market Share,” Net Market Share(December 2015), http://netmarketshare/operating-system-marketshare.aspx ?qprid=8&qpcustomd=.
67. Microsoft, Form 10-K, for the Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 2015(2015), 18, http://apps.shareholder/sec/viewerContent.aspx?compa nyid=MSFT&docid=10834537#D918813D10K_HTM_TX918813_3.
68. Disconnect, Inc., Complaint of Disconnect, Inc., 关于谷歌触犯《欧洲联盟运作条约》第102(c)条款,在安卓系统上进行捆绑销售并强行植入其他排他性的反竞争政策和安全技术,详见:CaseCOMP/40099(June 2015), para. 45。
第16章 “何苦请个纵火犯来家中做客?”——试着理解竞合关系
1. Feng Zhu and Qihong Liu, “Competing with Complementors: An Empirical Look at Amazon,” Harvard Business School Technology and Operations Management Unit Working Paper No. 15-044(August 21, 2015), http://ssrn/abstract=2533616 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2533616.
2. In re Goldenshores Technologies, FTC File No. C-4446(2014), Complaint 4, https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140409goldenshorescmpt .pdf .
3. In re Goldenshores Technologies, FTC File No. C-4446(2014), Complaint 4, https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140409goldenshorescmpt .pdf,Complaint 5。
4. Disconnect, Inc. Complaint of Disconnect, Inc., Regarding Google’s Infringement of Article 102 TFEU through Bundling into the Android Platform and the Related Exclusion of Competing Privacy and Security Technology, Case COMP/40099(June 2015) .
5. In re Goldenshores Technologies, Complaint 5.
6. Donald S. Clark, Letter to Isaac Buckman, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Re: In the Matter of Goldenshores Technologies, LLC,File No.1323087, Federal Trade Commission(March 31, 2014), https://ftc.gov/system/files /attachments/goldenshores-technologies-llc-etalmission-letters-commenters-april-9-2014/140409goldenshoresltrbuckman.pdf.
7. Donald S. Clark, Decision and Order, In the Matter of Goldenshores Technologies, LLC and Erik M. Geidl, Docket No: C-4446,Federal Trade Commission(March 31, 2014),https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140409 goldenshoresdo.pdf.
8. Donald S. Clark, Decision and Order, In the Matter of Goldenshores Technologies, LLC and Erik M. Geidl, Docket No: C-4446,Federal Trade Commission(March 31, 2014),https://ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140409 goldenshoresdo.pdf.
9. Goldenshores Technologies, LLC, Privacy Policy(2014), http://golden shorestechnologies/privacypolicy.html.
10. FTC发现,虽然安卓手机会向用户提示,应用程序会获取用户的信息数据(如地理位置信息)或者使用手机上的其他功能(如拍照功能),但安卓系统却从未“(向用户解释)是否这些应用程序会将用户信息分享给第三方机构”。详见:In re GoldenshoresTechnologies, Complaint, para. 7。
11. Google, Google Play Developer Policy Center, https://play.google/about/developer-content-policy.html.
12. Google, Google Play Developer Policy Center, https://play.google/about/developer-content-policy.html.
13. Alphabet, Inc., Form 10-K, for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2015(2016)at 25, https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf/20151231_alphabet_10K.pdf.
14. Alphabet, Inc., Form 10-K, for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2015(2016)at 25, https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf/20151231_alphabet_10K.pdf。Google Inc., Form 10-K, for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2014(2015)at 24, https://abc.xyz/investor/pdf/20141231_google_10K.pdf.
15. AdMob by Google, Monetize Your Apps Intelligently, https://google /admob/.
16. AdMob by Google, Maximize Ad Revenue, https://google/admob /monetize.html.
17. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2012 on Online Behavioural Advertising, 00909/10/EN WP 171(June 22, 2010),http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2010/wpl71_en.pdf.
18. Google Ads, Find New Customers Now, with Google AdWords,http://google/ads/.
19. “Moving Targets: What Advertisers Love, and What They Hate,about Mobile Devices,” The Economist, September 13, 2014, http:// economist/news/special-report/21615870-what-advertisers-love-andwha-they -hate-about-mobile-devices-moving-targets.
20. Julia Angwin, “The Web’s New Gold Mine: Your Secrets,” Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2010, http://wsj/articles/SB1000142405 2748703940904575395073512989404?cb=logged0.6130286159459502.
21. Julia Angwin and Tom McGinty, “Sites Feed Personal Details to New Tracking Industry,” Wall Street Journal, July 30, 2010, http://wsj/articles/SB10001424052748703977004575393173432219064.
22. Luigi Vigneri, Jaideep Chandrashekar, Ioannis Pefkianakis,and Olivier Heen, “Taming the Android AppStore: Lightweight Characterization of Android Applications,” Eurecom Research Report RR-15-305(April 27) .
23. Luigi Vigneri, Jaideep Chandrashekar, Ioannis Pefkianakis,and Olivier Heen, “Taming the Android AppStore: Lightweight Characterization of Android Applications,” Eurecom Research Report RR-15-305(April 27),7。
24. Luigi Vigneri, Jaideep Chandrashekar, Ioannis Pefkianakis,and Olivier Heen, “Taming the Android AppStore: Lightweight Characterization of Android Applications,” Eurecom Research Report RR-15-305(April 27),9。
25. Luigi Vigneri, Jaideep Chandrashekar, Ioannis Pefkianakis,and Olivier Heen, “Taming the Android AppStore: Lightweight Characterization of Android Applications,” Eurecom Research Report RR-15-305(April 27),19。
26. Disconnect, Inc., ComplaintofDisconnect, Inc., para.18.
27. Disconnect, Inc., ComplaintofDisconnect, Inc.,para. 19。
28. Disconnect, Inc., ComplaintofDisconnect, Inc.,para. 19。
29. Disconnect, Inc., ComplaintofDisconnect, Inc.,para. 20。
30. Disconnect, Inc., ComplaintofDisconnect, Inc.,para. 27。
31. Disconnect, Inc., ComplaintofDisconnect, Inc.,para. 38。
32. Disconnect, Inc., ComplaintofDisconnect, Inc.,para. 38。
33. https://disconnect.me/.
34. Julie Bort, “Why Google Banned a Privacy Tool Called‘Disconnect Mobile’ from the Android App Store,” Business Insider(August 28, 2014), http://businessinsider/why-googlebanned-connect-mobile-2014-8.
35. Julie Bort, “Why Google Banned a Privacy Tool Called‘Disconnect Mobile’ from the Android App Store,” Business Insider(August 28, 2014), http://businessinsider/why-googlebanned-connect-mobile-2014-8.
36. Reed Albergotti, Alistair Barr, and Elizabeth Dwoskin, “Why Some Privacy Apps Get Blocked from the Android Play Store,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2014, http://blogs.wsj/digits/2014/08/28/why-some-privacy-apps-get-blocked-from-the-android-play-store/.
37. Reed Albergotti, Alistair Barr, and Elizabeth Dwoskin, “Why Some Privacy Apps Get Blocked from the Android Play Store,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2014, http://blogs.wsj/digits/2014/08/28/why-some-privacy-apps-get-blocked-from-the-android-play-store/.
38. Reed Albergotti, Alistair Barr, and Elizabeth Dwoskin, “Why Some Privacy Apps Get Blocked from the Android Play Store,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2014, http://blogs.wsj/digits/2014/08/28/why-some-privacy-apps-get-blocked-from-the-android-play-store/.
39. Reed Albergotti, Alistair Barr, and Elizabeth Dwoskin, “Why Some Privacy Apps Get Blocked from the Android Play Store,” Wall Street Journal, August 28, 2014, http://blogs.wsj/digits/2014/08/28/why-some-privacy-apps-get-blocked-from-the-android-play-store/.
40. 据《华尔街日报》报道,“数十家仍在Google Play商店上架的隐私保护应用程序向用户承诺会帮助后者摆脱定向广告的数据追踪或者揭示那些正在追踪用户数据的企业名单”。但是其中有一个没有被踢出谷歌生态系统的浏览器扩展隐私工具。Ghostery虽会“要求数据追踪公司不向安装了该扩展工具的用户投放定向广告,但是用户照旧会收到广告推送”,并会“在阻断数据追踪前,事先征求广告商的意见”。引用出处同上。另据报道,Ghostery的研发者——Evidon科技公司——“通过将800万Ghostery用户的个人信息卖给第三方公司,从而帮助后者提升数据追踪能力”。详见:Tom Simonite, “A Popular Ad Blocker Also Helps the Ad Industry,” MIT Technology Review(June 17, 2013), http://technologyreview/news/516156/a-popular-ad-blocker-also-helps-the-ad-industry/。
41. Google Chrome., Turn “Do Not Track” On or Off, https://support.google/chrome/answer/2790761?hl =en.
42. 您可以通过访问谷歌浏览器中的广告设置页面来调整浏览器的广告设置。一些应用程序可能允许用户在不启动移动设备的默认网络浏览器的情况下查看网页。此类网页无法识别用户的默认浏览器设置,包括用户对由谷歌在网页上投放的广告的设置。
43. Google Ads Help, Opt Out, https://support.google/ads/answer/2662922?hl=en; “对于一些网站而言,广告收入就是它们的生命线。如果用户选择关闭定向广告推送,那么他们仍会收到由谷歌投放的广告——虽然这些广告不会基于用户的兴趣投放广告。但是,移动广告网络平台仍会基于用户访问页面的具体内容、大致定位信息或者近期的搜索记录向用户投放广告”。
44. 据谷歌所言,“关闭定向广告推送也不能阻挡那些非谷歌投放的基于用户兴趣的定向广告。所以说,如果你在浏览非谷歌的移动应用广告联盟成员的网页或应用程序时,用户仍会收到基于他们兴趣的定向广告”。Google Ads Help, Opt Out, https://support.google/ads/answer/2662922?hl=en。
45. Google Ads Help, Opt Out, https://support.google/ads/answer/2662922?hl=en。
46. Google Ads Help, Opt Out, https://support.google/ads/answer/2662922?hl=en。
47. Disconnect, Inc., ComplaintofDisconnect, Inc., para. 14-15.
48. Ingrid Lunden, “Disconnect.Me Files Antitrust Case against Google in Europe over Banned Anti-Malware Android App,” TechCrunch(June 2, 2015), http://techcrunch/2015/06/02/disconnect-mefiles-antitrust-case-against-google-in-europe-over-banned-anti-malwareandroid-app/.
49. Ingrid Lunden, “Disconnect.Me Files Antitrust Case against Google in Europe over Banned Anti-Malware Android App,” TechCrunch(June 2, 2015), http://techcrunch/2015/06/02/disconnect-mefiles-antitrust-case-against-google-in-europe-over-banned-anti-malwareandroid-app/.
50. Disconnect, Inc., Complaint of Disconnect, Inc., para. 13.
51. Google, 2014, Form 10-K, 16.
52. Google, 2014, Form 10-K, 16.
53. Facebook, Form 10-K, for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,2014(2015), 10, http://files.shareholder/downloads/AMDA-NJ5D Z/650609882x0xS1326801%2D15%2D6/1326801/filing.pdf.
54. Facebook, Form 10-K, for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,2014(2015), 10, http://files.shareholder/downloads/AMDA-NJ5D Z/650609882x0xS1326801%2D15%2D6/1326801/filing.pdf,10—11。
55. Coupons, Form 10-K(2014), 21.
56. Daisuke Wakabayashi and Jack Marshall, “Apple’s Ad Blockers Rile Publishers: New iOS Lets Users Halt Ads on Mobile Devices, Posing a Challenge to Publishers and Google,” Wall Street Journal, August 30,2015, http://www .wsj/articles/apples-ad-blockers-raise-tensions1440974849?cb=logged0. 8844516936223954.
57. Daisuke Wakabayashi and Jack Marshall, “Apple’s Ad Blockers Rile Publishers: New iOS Lets Users Halt Ads on Mobile Devices, Posing a Challenge to Publishers and Google,” Wall Street Journal, August 30,2015, http://www .wsj/articles/apples-ad-blockers-raise-tensions1440974849?cb=logged0. 8844516936223954.
58. United States v. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416, 430(2d Cir. 1945).
59. Aspen Skiingv. Aspen Highlands Skiing, 472 U.S. 585(1985);Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,540 U.S.398(2004).
60. CaseC-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB,[2011] ECR I-527, [2011] 4 CMLR 18, para. 24.
61. Barack Obama, Statement ofSenator Barack Obamafor the American Antitrust Institute,(September 7, 2007), http://antitrustinstitute.org /files/aai-%20Presidential%20campaign%20-%20 Obama%209-07_ 092720071759.pdf.
62. Barack Obama, Statement ofSenator Barack Obamafor the American Antitrust Institute,(September 7, 2007), http://antitrustinstitute.org /files/aai-%20Presidential%20campaign%20-%20 Obama%209-07_ 092720071759.pdf.
63. Barack Obama, Statement ofSenator Barack Obamafor the American Antitrust Institute,(September 7, 2007), http://antitrustinstitute.org /files/aai-%20Presidential%20campaign%20-%20 Obama%209-07_ 092720071759.pdf.
64. Brent Kendall, “Justice Department Doesn’t Deliver on Promise to Attack Monopolies: Obama Administration Arrived Promising a Tougher Stance, but Few Antitrust Cases Have Been Pursued in U.S. and Enforcement Has Shifted to Europe,” Wall Street Journal, November 7, 2015, http://wsj/articles/justice-department-doesnt-deliver-on promise-to-attack-monopolies-1446892202.
第17章 竞合关系的远大前程——虚拟助手的兴起
0. 引言: Internet Movie Database, “Quotes for HAL 9000(Character)from 2001: A Space Odyssey(1968)”(2015), http://imdb/character/ch0002900/quotes.
1. Danny Yadron, “Google Assistant Takes on Amazon and Apple to Be the Ultimate Digital Butler,” The Guardian, May 18, 2016, https://theguardian/technology/2016/may/18/google-home-assistantamazon-echo-apple-siri.
2. Christopher Mims, “Ask M for Help: Facebook Tests New Digital Assistant: Single Interface Could Replace Web Searches and Apps on Mobile Devices,” Wall Street Journal, November 9, 2015,http://wsj/articles/ask-m-for-help-facebook-tests-new-digitalassistant-1447045202.
3. Yadron, “Google Assistant Takes on Amazon and Apple”.
4. Yadron, “Google Assistant Takes on Amazon and Apple”.
5. Mims, “Ask M for Help” .
6. Mims, “Ask M for Help” .
7. Jack Nicas, “Google’ s New Products Refiect Push into Machine Learning,” Wall Street Journal, May 18, 2016, http://wsj/articles/googles-new-products-reflect-push-into-machine-learning1463598395?mod=ST1.
8. Margrethe Vestager, “How Competition Supports Innovation,”speech, Regulation4Innovation, Brussels, May 24, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/how-competitionsupports-innovation_en.
9. Margrethe Vestager, “How Competition Supports Innovation,”speech, Regulation4Innovation, Brussels, May 24, 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/how-competitionsupports-innovation_en.
10. Amy Mitchell, Jeffrey Gottfried, and Katerina Eva Matsa,“Millennials and Political News: Social Media — The Local TV for the Next Generation?” Pew Research Center, June 1, 2015, http://journalism.org/2015/06/01 /millennials- political -news/.
11. Katerina Eva Matsa, “Facebook, Twitter Play Different Roles in Connecting Mobile Readers to News,” Pew Research Center, May 9,2016, http://pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/05/09/facebook-twittermobile-news/.
12. Deepa Seetharaman, “Uproar over Bias Claims Ignites Fears over Facebook’s Infiuence,” Wall Street Journal, May 11, 2016, A1.
13. Jonathan Zittrain, “Facebook Could Decide an Election without Anyone Ever Finding Out — The Scary Future of Digital Gerrymandering — and How to Prevent It,” New Republic, June 2,2014, https://newrepublic/article/117878/information-fiduciarysolution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering. Also note more generally,Jonathan Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), http://blogs.harvard.edu/futureoftheinternet/download/.
14. Zittrain, “Facebook Could Decide an Election.”
15. Robert Epstein, “How Google Could End Democracy,” U.S.News & World Report, June 9, 2014, http://usnews/opinion/articles/2014/06/09/how-googles-search-rankings-could-manipulateelections-and-end -democracy; Robert Epstein, “How Google Could Rig the 2016 Election,” Politico(August 19, 2015), http://politico/magazine/story/2015/08/how-google-could-rig-the-2016election-121548.
16. Epstein, “How Google Could End Democracy.”
17. Epstein, “How Google Could End Democracy.”
18. Jack Smith, “Uber Is Using Its App to Rally New Yorkers to Protest Their Own Mayor,” Tech.Mic(July 16, 2015), http://mic/articles/122419/uber-rallies-new-yorkers-to-protest-mayor-bill-deblasio#.OHyU15P1r.
19. Zittrain, “Facebook Could Decide an Election without Anyone Ever Finding Out.”
20. “Facebook and Your Brain: The Inside Dope on Facebook,”Psychology Today, May 24, 2012, https://psychologytoday/blog/vitality/201205/face book-and-your-brain.
21. 塞缪尔·沃伦(Samuel D. Warren)和路易斯·布兰代斯(Louis D. Brandeis)在两者合著的有关个人隐私的文章中指出,“通过侵犯个人隐私的方式现代企业和发明令人们承受了精神上的痛苦与焦虑,这种危害性要远胜于身体上的伤害”。详见:Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy,” Harvard Law Review 4, no.5(December 15, 1890), http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/privacy/Privacy_brand_warr2.html。
22. George Orwell, 1984(1949), chap.1, https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/oZorwell /george/o79n/chapter1.1.html.
23. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society(Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 202, https://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf.
24. President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society(Washington, D.C.:U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979), 202, https://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf.
25. Jay Greene and Matthias Verbergt, “Microsoft Cuts Low-End Phones,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2016, B1. 微软收购领英的交易将令这家科技巨头获得超过4.3亿领英用户的个人信息数据。
26. Jack Nicas, “Google Touts New AI-Powered Tools,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2016, B1, B4.
27. Jack Nicas, “Google Touts New AI-Powered Tools,” Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2016, B1, B4.
28. Yadron, “Google Assistant Takes on Amazon and Apple.”
第五部分 有形之手的介入
第18章 监管还是放手?
1. Credit Suisse Research Institute, Global Wealth Report 2014(October 2014), https://publications.credit-suisse/tasks/render/file/?fileID=60931FDE-A2D2-F568-B041B58C5EA591A4; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, In It Together: Why Less Inequality Benefits All(Paris: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264235120-en(报告显示,发达国家的贫富差距正在拉大)。
2. F. A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), 85.
3. Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century(New York: W. W. Norton, 2007), 204.
4. Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century(New York: W. W. Norton, 2007),215。
5. F. A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35, no. 4(September 1945): 519-530.
6. F. A. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure”(Marcellus S.Snow, trans.), Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 5, no. 3(2002):11, https:// mises.org/sites/default/files/qjae5_3_3.pdf.
7. F. A. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure”(Marcellus S.Snow, trans.), Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 5, no. 3(2002):11, https:// mises.org/sites/default/files/qjae5_3_3.pdf.
8. Campbell R. Harvey, “Financial Glossary: Efficient Market Hypothesis,” Nasdaq(2011), http://nasdaq/investing/glossary/e/efficient-market-hypothesis.
9. W. Paul Cockshott and Allin F. Cottrell, “Information and Economics: A Critique of Hayek,” Research in Political Economy 16(1997): 177-202.
10. Hayak, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” 519-530.
11. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” 9.
12. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” 10.
13. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1975, Leonid Vitaliyevich Kantorovich, Tjalling C.Koopmans, “Mathematics in Economics: Achievements, Difficulties,Perspectives,” http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economicsciences/laureates/1975/kantorovich-lecture.html.
14. Travis Kalanick, “NYE Surge Pricing Explained,” Uber(December 31, 2011), http://newsroom.uber/2011/12/nye-surgepricing-explained/; see also Annie Lowrey, “Is Uber’s Surge-Pricing an Example of High-Tech Gouging?” New York Times, January 10, 2014,http://nytimes/2014/01/12/magazine/is-ubers-surge-pricing-anexample-of-high-tech-gouging.html; 优步前任首席执行官特拉维斯·卡兰尼克曾为溢价政策辩护,“为了让更多优步司机甘于在交通最繁忙的时段上路,溢价策略是十分必要的”。
15. Nicholas Diakopoulos, “How Uber Surge Pricing Really Works,”Washington Post, April 17, 2015,http://washingtonpost/news/wonkblog/wp/2015/04/17/how-uber-surge-pricing-really-works/.
16. Min Kyung Lee, Daniel Kusbit, Evan Metsky, and Laura Dabbish,“Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and Data-Driven Management on Human Workers,” Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems(New York: ACM,2015), http://cs.cmu.edu/mklee/materials/Publication/2015-CHI_algorithmic_management.pdf.
17. Min Kyung Lee, Daniel Kusbit, Evan Metsky, and Laura Dabbish,“Working with Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and Data-Driven Management on Human Workers,” Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems(New York: ACM,2015), http://cs.cmu.edu/mklee/materials/Publication/2015-CHI_algorithmic_management.pdf.
18. Uber, Interested in Driving with Uber? https://get.uber/drive/.
19. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Essential Galbraith(Boston:Mariner Books, 2010), 72.
20. John Kenneth Galbraith, The Essential Galbraith(Boston:Mariner Books, 2010), 72.
21. Eden Medina, Cybernetic Revolutionaries: Technology and Politics in Allende’s Chile(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011).
22. Evgeny Morozov, “The Planning Machine: Project Cybersyn and the Origins of the Big Data Nation,” New Yorker, October 13, 2014,http://newyorker /magazine/2014/10/13/planning-machine.
23. Eden Medina, “The Cybersyn Revolution,” Jacobin 17(Spring 2015), https://jacobinmag/2015/04/allende-chile-beermedina-cybersyn/.
24. Eden Medina, “Designing Freedom, Regulating a Nation:Socialist Cybernetics in Allende’s Chile,” Journal of Latin American Studies 38(2006): 571-606, http://informatics.indiana.edu/edenm/EdenMedinaJLAS August2006.pdf.
25. Laura Tam, “Smart Cities, Limited Resources,” SPUR(October 10, 2012), http://spur.org/publications/article/2012-10-10/smartcities-limited-resources.
26. Laura Tam, “Smart Cities, Limited Resources,” SPUR(October 10, 2012), http://spur.org/publications/article/2012-10-10/smartcities-limited-resources.
27. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Sensors(2016), http://sfpark.org/how-it-works/the-sensors/.
28. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary(June 2014), http://sfpark.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/SFpark_Eval_Summary_2014.pdf.
29. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pricing(2016), http://sfpark.org/how-it-works/pricing/.
30. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Sensors.
31. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary.
32. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary。“洛杉矶停车计划使用的智能停车场管理系统令司机寻找公共停车位的时间缩短了近43%。”
33. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary。“在洛杉矶停车计划的试点区域,寻找车位的轿车每天会排放7吨的温室气体。到了2013年,这一观测数据下降了30%。对比来讲,在非试点区域,温室气体排放仅下降了6%。”
34. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary。“洛杉矶停车计划鼓励人们错峰出行,并大为改进了公共停车场的利用效率。数据显示,高峰时段的停车场使用效率提升了22%。在洛杉矶停车计划运营的停车场,早晚高峰时段的车位占用率都有相应的提升,这说明洛杉矶停车计划有效地化解了高峰时段的城市交通拥堵,令路上司机的行驶过程更加顺畅。”
35. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary。“试点区域的双重泊车现象减少了22%,对比之下,非试点区域只减少了5%。”
36. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary。“不论是试点区域还是非试点区域,但凡是车位情况得到改善的地方,监测系统都能观察到明显的车流量减少现象。”
37. San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency, SFpark Pilot Project Evaluation Summary。“随着司机绕圈寻找车位情况的改善,试点区域里汽车行车距离从2011年的8,134英里/天下降到了5,721英里/天。对比非试点区域,这个数据只下降了6%。”
38. Michael Emmett Brady, “Comparing J. M. Keynes’s and F.Von Hayek’s Differing Definitions of Uncertainty as It Relates to Knowledge: Keynes’s Unavailable or Missing Knowledge Concept versus Hayek’s Dispersal of Knowledge Concept,” International Journal of Applied Economics and Econometrics 19, no. 3(January 2011),http://ssrn/abstract=1751569.
39. Steve Lohr, “Can Apple Find More Hits Without Its Tastemaker?”New York Times, January 18, 2011, http://nytimes/2011/01/19/technology/companies/19innovate.html?_r=0.
40. Peter Noel Murray, “How Steve Jobs Knew What You Wanted,”Psychology Today, October 13, 2011, https://psychologytoday/blog/inside-the-consumer-mind/201110/how-steve-jobs-knew-whatyou-wanted.
41. Sara Stefanini, “Think Tank Urges FERC to Reform Merger Policies,” Law360(March 15, 2007), http://competition.law360/Secure/ViewArticle.aspx ?id =20553.
42. Francois Moreau, “The Role of the State in Evolutionary Economics,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 28(2004): 847, 850.
43. Adrienne LaFrance, “People’s Deepest, Darkest Google Searches Are Being Used against Them: On the Internet, Search Queries Are Used to Target Vulnerable Consumers,” The Atlantic, November 3,2015, http://www .theatlantic/technology/archive/2015/11/googlesearches-privacy-danger/413614/.
44. Adrienne LaFrance, “People’s Deepest, Darkest Google Searches Are Being Used against Them: On the Internet, Search Queries Are Used to Target Vulnerable Consumers,” The Atlantic, November 3,2015, http://www .theatlantic/technology/archive/2015/11/googlesearches-privacy-danger/413614/.
45. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey(September 2015), http://bls.gov/cex/2014/standard/multiyr.pdf.
第19章 执法工具箱
1. House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market”(April 20, 2016), 10th Report of Session 2015-16, para.373, http://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516 /ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf.
2. 若想了解更多有关本书的内容,可详见:Michael Lewis, “About the Author”(2014), http://michaellewiswrites/index.html#top。
3. Nicolas Petit, “The ‘Oligopoly Problem’ in EU Competition Law,” in Research Handbook in European Competition Law, Ioannis Liannos and Damien Geradin, eds.(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2013),259.
4. Ramsi Woodcock, “Inconsistency in Antitrust,” University of Miami Law Review 68(2013), http://ssrn/abstract=2514030;Ariel Ezrachi and David Gilo, “Excessive Pricing, Entry, Assessment and Investment——Lessons from the Mittal Litigation,” Antitrust Law Journal 76, no. 3(2010): 873-898; Ariel Ezrachi and David Gilo, “Are Excessive Prices Really Self-Correcting?” Journal of Competition Law &Economics 5, no. 2(2009): 249-268.
5. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34(D.C. Cir. 2001);Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm’n, 2007 E.C.R. II-3601.
6. European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings(February 24, 2009), http://eur-lex.europa.eu /legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009XC0224(01)&from=EN; “欧盟在反垄断执法过程中对于排他性活动的重视是为了保障欧盟内部市场的市场竞争秩序,确保占有市场地位的企业围绕展品与服务的质量优化来与其他竞争对手展开竞争,而非利用其他竞争手段压制竞争对手。”U.S. Department of Justice, Single-Firm Conduct and Section 2 of the Sherman Act: An Overview(June 25, 2015), http://justice.gov/atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-under-section-2sherman-act-chapter-1; “《谢尔曼法》第2条条款既无意消灭市场垄断,也非禁止那些通过合法渠道取得垄断地位的企业行使自己的市场力量。这条条款意在保护市场竞争机制发挥作用,从而促进市场繁荣。《谢尔曼法》鼓励所有企业——包括垄断企业和向其发起挑战的挑战者——去追求事业上的起色。”
7. J. McCarthy and P. Hayes, “Some Philosophical Problems from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence,” Machine Intelligence 4(1969):463505; G. F. Luger, Artificial Intelligence: Structures and Strategies for Complex Problem Solving, 5th ed.(New York: Addison-Wesley, 2005),chap. 1 and 17.
8. Claire Cain Miller, “When Algorithms Discriminate,” New York Times, July 9, 2015, http://nytimes/2015/07/10/upshot/whenalgorithms-discriminate.html?_r0.
9. United States v. Ulbricht, 31 F. Supp. 3d 540, 559(S.D.N.Y.2014).
10. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,540 U.S. 398, 415(2004), quoting Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities:An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 Antitrust L.J. 841, 853(1989).
11. 详见:Ariel Ezrachi, “Sponge,” Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16/2015(March 1, 2015), http://ssrn/abstract=2572028; Harry First and Spencer Weber Waller, “Antitrust’s Democracy Deficit,” Fordham Law Review 81(2013): 2543, 2544 n.5(“反托拉斯执法理所应当有其政治目标,这是一种政治价值导向的体现”); John B. Kirkwood,“The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct,” Fordham Law Review 81(2013):2425, 2453(addressing and critiquing total welfare standard); Robert H.Lande, “A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust:Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice,”Fordham Law Review 81(2013): 2349, 2360 n.54; Barak Orbach, “How Antitrust Lost Its Goal,” Fordham Law Review 81(2013): 2253, 2273;Maurice E. Stucke, “Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?”Fordham Law Review 81(2013): 2575。
12. U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: SingleFirm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act(2008), https://justice.gov /atr/competition-and-monopoly-single-firm-conduct-undersection-2-sherman-act.
13. Pamela Jones Harbour et al., Statement of Commissioners Harbour, Leibowitz and Rosch on the Issuance of the Section 2 Report by the Department of Justice(2008), 5, http://ftc.gov/os/2008/09/080908section2stmt.pdf.
14. U.S. Department of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on Antitrust Monopoly Law: Antitrust Division to Apply More Rigorous Standard with Focus on the Impact of Exclusionary Conduct on Consumers,Press Release(May 11, 2009), http://justice.gov/opa/pr/justicedepartment-withdraws-report-antitrust-monopoly-law.
15. U.S. Department of Justice, “Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Texas Hospital Prohibiting Anticompetitive Contracts with Health Insurers Department Says United Regional’s Contracts Unlawfully Maintain Monopoly Power,” press release(February 25,2011), https://justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-reachessettlement-texas-hospital-prohibiting -anticompetitive-contracts.
16. Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
17. Barry C. Lynn, “Amazon’s Book Monopoly: A Threat to Freedom of Expression?” New America(January 27, 2016), https://newamerica.org/open -markets/amazons-book-monopoly/.
18. Margrethe Vestager, Competition in a BigData World(Munich:European Commission, January 17. 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-2019/vestager/announcements/competition-big-dataworld_en.
19. 比如,英国竞争与市场管理局有权对市场参与者的反竞争行为介入调查、收集证据并评估风险。并在必要时,采取一定的监管措施,以矫正市场失灵现象。详见:Guidelines for Market Investigations: Their Role, Procedures, Assessment and Remedies, CC3(Revised)(April 2013), https://gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachmen_data/file/284390/cc3_revised.pdf(adopted by the CMA Board)。在世界其他国家,反垄断执法机构也拥有相似的(但更为有限的)执法权限,从而对经济活动中的某一行业开展介入调查。比如,欧盟有权在《欧盟竞争法》第1/2003号规则的权限范围内发起行业调查。
20. 行业守则可能脱胎于业界各家企业的通力合作,并且涵盖了企业对企业的争端解决机制。它在特定的市场背景下,考虑到竞合场景中的很多动态因素并妥善化解了相关问题。详见:Writtenevidence to the House of Lords from IMPALA, and Comments by Hon. Ed Vaizey MP. House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market,” para. 129,130, 133。
21. Douglass C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 67.
22. Stucke and Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy.
23. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, and David R. Trossen,“Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to StandardForm Contracts,” Journal of Legal Studies 43, no. 1(January 2014);Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, “Consumer Behavior and Disclosure in Online Contracts,” presentation at the Conference on Behavioral Industrial Organization and Consumer Protection, University College London, October 18, 2014.
24. Alex Chisholm(CMA chief executive), Why “Sleepers”Can’t Always Be Left to “Sleep,” CCRP 2016 Competition Policy Roundtable(London: Competition Markets Authority, January 25,2016), https://gov.uk/government/speeches/alex-chisholm-onconsumer-engagement-in-a-digital-world.
25. Federal Trade Commission, Complying with COPPA: Frequently Asked Questions(March 20, 2015), https://ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/guidance/complying-coppa-frequently-askedquestions#General%20Questions.
26. T-201/04, Microsoft Corp v. Commission, Court of First Instance(September 17, 2007).
27. European Commission, Agreement on Commission’s EU Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single Market(Brussels: European Commission, December 15, 2015), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-15-6321_en.htm. 另见:Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC(General Data Protection Regulation),Brussels(April 27, 2016), http://data.consilium. europa.eu/doc/document/PE-17-2016-INIT/en/pdf。
28. Article 83, EU Data Protection Regulation(“行政罚款的最高金额可达2,000万欧元”)。
29. Samuel Gibbs, “EU Agrees Draft Text of Pan-European Data Privacy Rules,” The Guardian, December 16, 2015, http://theguardian/technology/2015/dec/16/eu-agrees-draft-text-paneuropean-data-privacy-rules.
30. European Commission, Agreement on Commission’s EU Data Protection Reform Will Boost Digital Single Market.
31. Pedro Domingos, “Get Ready for Your Digital Model: Algorithms Will Build Data-Driven Alter Egos for Us That Can Do Job Interviews,Shop for Cars and Go on Dates,” Wall Street Journal, November 12,2015, http://www .wsj/articles/get-ready-for-your-digital-model1447351480?alg=y.
32. 有关欧盟《一般数据保护法案》的适用性问题,详见:Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, “Online Price Discrimination and Data Protection Law,” Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2015-32(August 28, 2015), http://ssrn/abstract=2652665。
33. Simon Birch, “Collective Buying: The Emergence of a New Co-Operative Movement,” The Guardian, June 15, 2002, http:// theguardian/social-enterprise-network/2012/jun/15/collectivebuying-big-switch -cooperative-movement.
34. Martin Lewis, “Group Buying Is NOT Collective Purchasing,”MoneySaving Expert(February 10, 201 1), http://blog.moneysavingexpert/2011/02/10/group-buying-is-not-collectivepurchasing/.
35. Patrick Collinson, “Group-Buying — Does It Deliver?” The Guardian, January 29, 2011, http://theguardian/money/2011/jan/29/group -buying- do es-it- deliver.
36. for example, Autoebid, Reverse Auctions(2016), https://autoebid /reverse-auctions.asp, or Legal BenchMarket International.
37. President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology,Big Data and Privacy: A Technological Perspective(Washington,DC: Executive Office of the President, May 2014), x, https://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_big_data_and_privacy_-_may_2014.pdf; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Exploring Data-Driven Innovation as a New Source of Growth: Mapping the Policy Issues Raised by “Big Data”(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, June 18, 2003), 12, http://oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydoc umentpdf/?cote=DSTI/ICCP(2012)9/FINAL&docLanguage =En.
38. Stanford Graduate School of Business Staff, “Sharing Information to Boost the Bottom Line,” Insights by Stanford Business(March 1,1999), http://www .gsb.stanford.edu/insights/sharing-information-boostbottom-line.
最后的话
1. Ludwig von Mises, Bureaucracy, Bettina Bien Greaves, ed.(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007 [1944]), 17.
2. Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice,Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors(April 2000), https://ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_events/joint-venture-hearings-antitrust-guidelines-collaboration-amongcompetitors /ftcdojguidelines-2.pdf.
3. Paragraph 204 of the House of Lords, Select Committee on European Union, “Online Platforms and the Digital Single Market”(20 April 2016)10th Report of Session 2015-16, http://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/129/129.pdf.
4. Facebook, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,2014(2015), 33.
5. Statistics Portal, Facebook’s Average Revenue per User from 2010 to 2014, by Region(in U.S. Dollars), http://statista/statistics/251328/facebooks-average-revenue-per-user-by-region/.
6. Digital Strategy Consulting, “How Much Are You Worth? Average Revenue per User at Google, Facebook and Twitter”(June 18, 2014),http://www =.digitalstrategyconsulting/intelligence/2014/06/ad_revenue_per_user_google_facebo ok_twitter.php.
7. 2014财年,谷歌的净收入是144亿美元。详见:Google, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2014, 22。脸书当年的净收入则是29.25亿美元。详见:Facebook, Form 10-K for the Fiscal YearEnded December 31, 2014, 30。
8. Vindu Goel, “Flipping the Switches on Facebook’s Privacy Controls,” New York Times, January 29, 2014, http://nytimes/2014/01/30/technology/personaltech/on-facebook-deciding-whoknows-youre-a-dog.html?_r=1.
9. Facebook, Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31,2014, 9.
10. Deepa Seetharaman, “Facebook Prods Users to Share a Bit More,” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2015, http://wsj/articles/facebook-prods -users-to-share-a-bit-more-1446520723.
11. Deepa Seetharaman, “Facebook Prods Users to Share a Bit More,” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2015, http://wsj/articles/facebook-prods -users-to-share-a-bit-more-1446520723.
12. Deepa Seetharaman, “Facebook Prods Users to Share a Bit More,” Wall Street Journal, November 2, 2015, http://wsj/articles/facebook-prods -users-to-share-a-bit-more-1446520723.
13. Jacob Weisberg, “We Are Hopelessly Hooked,” New York Review of Books, February 25, 2016, 9.
14. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,Data-Driven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being: Interim Synthesis Report(Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,October 2014), 29, http://oecd.org/sti/inno/data-driven-innovationinterim-synthesis.pdf; 引自:C. Shapiro and H. R. Varian, Information Rules:A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy(Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press, 1999)。
15. Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission, 2007 E.C.R. II3601(Court of First Instance), para. 1061.
16. “Business in America: Too Much of a Good Thing: Profits Are Too High. America Needs a Giant Dose of Competition,” The Economist, March 26, 2016, http://economist/node/21695385/print.
17. 有关算法所发挥的网络效应,详见:Maurice E. Stucke and Allen P. Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016)。
18. Brad Brown, Michael Chui, and James Manyika, “Are You Ready for the Era of ‘Big Data’?” McKinsey Quarterly(October 2011), 2, http://t-systems /solutions/download-mckinseyquarterly-/1148544_l/blobBinary/Study -McKinsey-Big-data.pdf.
19. Maurice E. Stucke and Ariel Ezrachi, “When Competition Fails to Optimize Quality: A Look at Search Engines,” Yale Journal of Law &Technology 18(2016): 70.
20. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, DataDriven Innovation for Growth and Well-Being, 29; see also Federal Trade Commission, Google Inc., File No. 111-0163(August 8, 2012)(该报告发表于《华尔街日报》), 76(文中谈到了这种“恶性循环”以及它将“如何给潜在的市场进入者造成巨大的障碍”)。
21. Executive Office of the President, Big Data and Differential Pricing(Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, February 2015), https://whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/Big_Data_Report_Nonembargo_v2.pdf.
22. 这项研究表明,“基于用户人口统计学的个性化定价将可以为Netfiix带来0.8%的利润增长。如果使用5,000个网络浏览器变量(如用户日常的上网时间或者用户最近是否访问过维基百科或者IMDB),这将带来12.2%的利润增长”。出处同上,citing Benjamin Shiller, “First-Degree Price Discrimination Using Big Data”(2014),http://benjaminshiller /images/First_Degree_PD_Using_Big_Data_Apr_8, _2014.pdf。
23. 想对“短时预测雷达”了解更多,详见:Stucke and Grunes,Big Data and Competition Policy。
24. Yoko Kubota, “Toyota Aims to Make Self-Driving Cars by 2020,” Wall Street Journal, October 6, 2015, http://wsj/articles/toyota-aims-to-make -self-driving-cars-by-2020-1444136396; Yoko Kubota, “Behind Toyota’s Late Shift into Self-Driving Cars,” Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2016, http://wsj/articles/behindtoyotas-late-shift-into-self-driving-cars-1452649436(“在争夺全球领先地位的战斗中,传统汽车制造商担心,软件制造商将窃取汽车的灵魂和盈利能力,让这些企业沦为中国代工厂式的生产企业”)。
25. Joseph Menn, “Data Collection Arms Race Feeds Privacy Fears,”Reuters(February 19, 2012), http://reuters/article/us-datacollection-idUSTRE81I0AP20120219.
26. Evgeny Morozov, “Socialize the Data Centres!” New Left Review, January- February 2015, http://newleftrevieworg/II/91/evgenymorozov-socialize-the -data-centres.
27. Oxfam, “David Cameron: End the Era of Tax Havens So That We Can End Poverty”(2016), https://act.oxfam.org/great-britain/taxhavens-2016-644e5810 -f58e-40f5-8162-d09b2392efa6?sid=2016-01-18_ogbsite_homepage.
28. Graeme Warden, “Oxfam: 85 Richest People as Wealthy as Poorest Half of the World,” The Guardian, January 20, 2016, http:// theguardian /business/2014/jan/20/oxfam-85-richest-people-half-ofthe-world.
29. “Business in America,” The Economist; Jonathan B. Baker and Steven C. Salop, “Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality,”Georgetown Law Journal 104(2015): 1—28, http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1462 /; Greg Ip, “Behind Rising Inequality:More Unequal Companies,” Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2015,http://wsj/articles/behind-rising-inequality-more-unequalcompanies-1446665769(“越来越多的证据表明,工资不平等的主要驱动因素是高利润公司与低利润公司之间的创收水平拉大,而不是同一家企业中高工资与低工资员工的收入水平拉大。这表明,为提高个人福祉,提高最低工资标准与改善教育环境的方式并不能完全填补这种收入差距。通过监管手段促进竞争也很重要”)。
30. Council of Economic Advisers, “Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power,” Issue Brief(May 2016), https://whitehouse.gov/sites /default/files/page/files/20160502_competition_issue_brief_updated_cea .pdf.
31. Council of Economic Advisers, “Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power,” Issue Brief(May 2016), https://whitehouse.gov/sites /default/files/page/files/20160502_competition_issue_brief_updated_cea .pdf,14;“竞争政策和对市场力量滥用的积极对策,可能是政府确保市场为社会提供最佳产品服务选项、维护创新精神、实现完全竞争价格和公平的就业与商业环境的重要途径”。
32. Council of Economic Advisers, “Benefits of Competition and Indicators of Market Power,” Issue Brief(May 2016), https://whitehouse.gov/sites /default/files/page/files/20160502_competition_issue_brief_updated_cea .pdf,12-13。“一个具体问题是,大数据是否是一种关键资源,如果不掌握这些数据,市场新进入者可能很难进行营销或吸引客户。”
33. UN Secretary General’s Independent Expert Advisory Group on a Data Revolution for Sustainable Development, A World That Counts: Mobilising the Data Revolution for Sustainable Development(United Nations, November 2014), 7, http://en.unesco.org/un-sab/system/files/Data%20Revolution%20Report%20A-World-That-Counts_0.pdf.
34. Joseph E. Stiglitz, “Information and the Change in the Paradigm in Economics,” American Economic Review 92, no. 3(June 2002):460-501.
35. Nathan Newman, “The Costs of Lost Privacy: Consumer Harm and Rising Economic Inequality in the Age of Google,” William Mitchell Law Review 40, no. 2(2014), http://ssrn/abstract=2310146.
36. Jennifer Valentino-Devries, Jeremy Singer-Vine, and Ashkan Soltani, “Websites Vary Prices, Deals Based on Users’ Information,”Wall Street Journal, December 24, 2012, http://wsj/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534(根据对美国各地邮政编码对应的居民收入的研究表明,居民加权平均收入大致为59,900美元的区域往往能收到更高的折扣)。
37. Tom Fairless and Alistair Barr, “EU Lays Groundwork for Antitrust Charges against Google,” Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2015,http://wsj /articles/eu-lays-groundwork-for-antitrust-chargesagainst-google-1427928793.
38. Alistair Barr, “Alphabet Reports Rising Profits at Core Google Businesses,” Wall Street Journal, February 1, 2016, http://wsj/articles/alphabet -reports-rising-profits-at-core-googlebusinesses-1454361634.
39. Case No. COMP/M.7217, Facebook/Whatsapp(October 3,2014), para. 164.
40. 详见:Stucke and Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy; Maurice E. Stucke, “Better Competition Advocacy,” St. John’s Law Review 82, no. 3(2008): 951。
41. Adam Thierer, “Can There Be a Market for Unpaid Search Results and Could Google Be Classified as a Public Utility?” Antitrust &Competition Policy Blog(May 21, 2012), http://lawprofessors.typepad/antitrustprof_blog/2012/05/can-there-be-a-market-for-unpaid-searchresults-and-could-google-be -classified-as-a-public-utility-c-1.html.
42. Frank Pasquale, “Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified Transparency in Internet Intermediaries,” Northwestern University Law Review 104(2010): 105, 143.
43. Stucke and Grunes, Big Data and Competition Policy.
44. Sapienza Paola and Luigi Zingales, “Trust and Finance,” NBER Reporter 2(2011): 16(“然而,对于匿名市场的发展而言,重要的是广义的信任:即人们对一个可识别群体的随机成员的信任”);Lynn A.Stout, “Trust Behavior: The Essential Foundation of Securities Markets,” in Behavioral Finance: Investors, Corporations, and Markets, H. Kent Baker and John R. Nofsinger, eds.(Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2010), 513(信任,或更准确地说信任是证券市场顺利发展的基石);see also Thomas J.Horton, “The Coming Extinction of Homo Economicus and the Eclipse of the Chicago School of Antitrust: Applying Evolutionary Biology to Structural and Behavioral Antitrust Analyses,” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 42(2011): 474, 476, 502, 520(文中提到,公平和互惠的基本价值观不仅能够增进互信,还能创造一个更健康、更稳定、更高效的经济生态系统);Stephen Knack and Philip Keefer, “Does SocialCapital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation,”Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, no. 4(November 1997):1251,1252, 1260(对29个市场经济样本的回归分析表明,强劲的经济表现与公民互信与合作高度相关);Stephan M. Wagner, Linda Silver Coley, and Eckhard Lindemann, “Effects of Suppliers’ Reputation on the Future of Buyer-Supplier Relationships: The Mediating Roles of Outcome Fairness and Trust,” Journal of Supply Chain Management 47(April 2011): 42(值得注意的是,实证研究表明“信任是商业关系中最重要的调节者”)。
45. 参见:Maurice E. Stucke, “Is Intent Relevant?” Journal of Law,Economics & Policy 8(2012): 801(collecting studies).
46. Lynn Stout, Cultivating Conscience: How Good Laws Make Good People(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010).
47. Ellen Garbarino and Sarah Maxwell, “Consumer Response to Norm- Breaking Pricing Events in E-Commerce,” Journal of Business Research 63(2010): 1067(“[T]rust will be destroyed when a trusted seller does not behave according to the social norms of fairness”);Wagner et al., “Effects of Suppliers’ Reputation on the Future of BuyerSupplier Relationships,” 35(文中提到了公平的重要性与商业关系中互信的重要性)。
48. Devesh Rustagi, Stefani Engel, and Michael Kosfeld,“Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management,” Science 330(2010): 964.
49. U.K. Competition and Markets Authority, “The Commercial Use of Consumer Data: Report on the CMA’s Call for Information”(June 2015), 103(“CMA Report”). 波士顿咨询公司最近进行的一项全球调查显示,全球76%的受访者表示,他们对在线分享个人信息持谨慎态度。
50. CMA Report, 103-106.
51. 例如,2015年,英国上诉法院维持了用户起诉谷歌的权利,因为后者涉嫌开发了一种变通方法,使其得以绕过Safari用户的隐私设置。详见:Google Inc. v. Vidal-Hall & Ors, [2015] EWCA Civ 311。
52. Darlene Storm, “Nissan Leaf Secretly Leaks Driver Location,Speed to Websites,” Computer World, June 14, 2011, http://computerworld /article/2470123/endpoint-security/nissan-leafsecretly-leaks-drier-location-speed-to-websites.html.
53. CMA Report, 11.
54. CMA Report,12。
55. Nir Kshetri, “Big Data’s Impact on Privacy, Security and Consumer Welfare,” Telecommunications Policy 38, no. 11(2011):1134-1145.
56. 有关经济力量与反托拉斯的相关内容,详见:Adi Ayal, “TheMarket for Bigness: Economic Power and Competition Agencies’ Duty to Curtail It,” Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 1, no. 2(2013): 221—246。
57. Center for Responsive Politics, “Lobbying Database”(2016),http://www .opensecrets.org/lobby.
58. “UBER vs. Mayors: When Astroturfing Becomes Political Browbeating,” Who’s Driving You?(January 15, 2016), http://whosdrivingyou.org/blog /uber-vs-mayors-astroturfing-becomes-politicalbrowbeating.
59. “Business in America,” The Economist.
60. Brody Mullins, “Google Makes Most of Close Ties to White House: Search Giant Averages a White House Meeting a Week during Obama Administration,” Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2015.
61. Jonathan D. Salant, “Google’s Increased Lobbying Belies Cut in Total Spending,” Bloomberg Technology, January 30, 2013, http://bloomberg /news/articles/2013-01-30/google-s-increased-lobbyingbelies-cut-in -total-spending.
62. Mullins, “Google Makes Most of Close Ties to White House.”
63. David Dayen, “The Android Administration,” The Intercept,(April 22, 2016), https://theintercept/2016/04/22/googlesremarkably-close-relationship-with-the-obama-white-house-in-twocharts/.
64. 2013年初,美国联邦贸易委员会在谷歌自愿同意改变其商业惯例后,停止了对后者的反垄断调查。详见:Federal TradeCommission, “Google Agrees to Change Its Business Practices to Resolve FTC Competition Concerns in the Markets for Devices Like Smart Phones, Games and Tablets, and in Online Search: Landmark Agreements Will Give Competitors Access to Standard-Essential Patents; Advertisers Will Get More Flexibility to Use Rival Search Engines,” Press Release(January 3, 2013), https://ftc.gov /news-events/pressreleases/2013/01/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolveftc。
65. Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Report, Google Inc., File No. 111-0161(August 8, 2012), 92, released by the Wall Street Journal,http://graphics.wsj. com/google-ftc-report/img/ftc-ocr-watermark.pdf. “谷歌通过反竞争手段加强了对搜索和搜索广告的垄断,进而阻止了竞争对手(和潜在竞争对手)挑战自己的能力,此举将对消费者福利产生持久的负面影响。”出处同上。
66. Mullins, “Google Makes Most of Close Ties to White House.”
67. William Alden, “Email Shows How Google Gets Things Done in Washington,” BuzzFeed,(May 14, 2015), https://buzzfeed/williamalden /how-googles-lobbyists-get-things-done-inwashington?utm_term=.qsKDMjLnX#.ypLAW9PNn .
68. William Alden, “Email Shows How Google Gets Things Done in Washington,” BuzzFeed,(May 14, 2015), https://buzzfeed/williamalden /how-googles-lobbyists-get-things-done-inwashington?utm_term=.qsKDMjLnX#.ypLAW9PNn .
69. William Alden, “Email Shows How Google Gets Things Done in Washington,” BuzzFeed,(May 14, 2015), https://buzzfeed/williamalden /how-googles-lobbyists-get-things-done-inwashington?utm_term=.qsKDMjLnX#.ypLAW9PNn。还有一点值得注意的是,谷歌“聘用了几名前欧盟官员作为内部游说人士,并为与自己立场一致的欧洲智库和大学研究提供了资金支持”。详见:“Revealed: How Google Enlisted Members of US Congress It Bankrolled to Fight $6bn EU Antitrust Case,” The Guardian, 17 December 2015. theguardian /world/2015/dec/17/google-lobbyists-congress-antitrust-brussels-eu。
70. Jeffry A. Frieden, Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century(New York: W. W. Norton, 2006), 102; Darren Bush, “Too Big to Bail: The Role of Antitrust in Distressed Industries,”Antitrust Law Journal 77(2010): 277, 286.
71. “联合公民诉联邦选举委员会”一案是由美国联邦最高法院判决的一场具有重要意义的诉讼案。最高法院于2010年1月21日做出判决,认定限制商业机构资助联邦选举候选人的两党选举改革法案的条款违反宪法中的言论自由原则。自此以后,企业政治献金支出的限制被大大放宽,从而极大地提高了参选者取悦捐赠者以赢得选举的重要性。在审理过程中,大多数最高法院大法官都对现代科技表达出了极大的信心。他们相信,得益于现代技术令信息披露大大提速且内容也大为丰富,股东通过公司民主程序提出的反对意见可能会更有效。因此,迅速披露公司支出的行为可以为股东和公民提供所需信息,促使企业和民选官员对自己的立场和支持者负责。有关本案的详细内容,详见:Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 370, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753(2010)。
72. 合理原则(rule of reason)并不是企业和消费者能够轻易理解和内化的指令(如明确禁止与竞争对手达成价格一致)。相反,这个词包含了反垄断的大多数开放式原则。详见:Am. Needle, Inc. v.Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217(2010) [quoting Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238(1918)] 。“根据商业协议与市场环境的变化,合理原则也会适当地调整自己的关注焦点。”详见:Federal Trade Commission and U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors(2000) §1.2, at 4, http://ftc.gov/os/2000/04 /ftcdojguidelines.pdf。
73. David Graeber, “On the Phenomenon of Bullshit Jobs,” Strike!Magazine, August 17, 2013, http://strikemag.org/bullshit-jobs.
74. Barry C. Lynn, “What We Have Is Capture of the Regulators’Minds, a Much More Sophisticated Form of Capture Than Putting Money in Their Pockets,” published in Pro-Market Blog, Stigler Center,University of Chicago Booth School of Business, https://promarket.org/what-we-have-is-capture-of-the-regulators-minds-a-much-moresophisticated-form-of-capture-than-putting-money-in-their- pockets /.
75. Dayen, “The Android Administration.”
76. David Dayen, “Google’s Insidious Shadow Lobbying: How the Internet Giant Is Bankrolling Friendly Academics — and Skirting Federal Investigations,” Salon(November 24, 2015), http://salon/2015/11/24/googles_insidious_shadow_lobbying_how_the_internet_giant_is_bankrolling _friendly_academics_and_skirting_federal_investigations/.
77. David Dayen, “Google’s Insidious Shadow Lobbying: How the Internet Giant Is Bankrolling Friendly Academics — and Skirting Federal Investigations,” Salon(November 24, 2015), http://salon/2015/11/24/googles_insidious_shadow_lob